diff --git a/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_get_federation_token_followed_by_console_login_via_federation_exchange.toml b/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_get_federation_token_followed_by_console_login_via_federation_exchange.toml
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+++ b/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_get_federation_token_followed_by_console_login_via_federation_exchange.toml
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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2026/08/14"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2026/08/14"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects the three-event chain produced by tools like aws_consoler that convert exfiltrated
+long-term IAM access keys into browser-accessible AWS console sessions: GetFederationToken
+obtains temporary credentials, GetSigninToken exchanges them for a federation sign-in token
+via the AWS federation endpoint, and ConsoleLogin confirms the resulting console session was
+opened — all from the same source IP within two minutes. This sequence is a high-confidence
+indicator of credential abuse using stolen IAM access keys.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Legacy federation broker applications that call GetFederationToken and immediately redirect
+    users to a console session from the same host may trigger this rule. Validate the source IP
+    against known application server infrastructure and confirm the federation architecture is
+    documented.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS GetFederationToken Followed by Console Login via Federation Exchange"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating AWS GetFederationToken Followed by Console Login via Federation Exchange
+
+This rule detects the aws_consoler attack chain: an adversary exfiltrates a long-term IAM access key (AKIA* prefix), runs aws_consoler or equivalent tooling, which calls `GetFederationToken` to obtain temporary credentials and then exchanges them at the AWS federation endpoint (`https://signin.amazonaws.com/federation`) for a signed console URL. Opening that URL triggers a `ConsoleLogin` event from the same source IP, completing the sequence.
+
+The source IP correlation distinguishes this pattern from coincidental federation activity: both the API call and the browser-based console login originate from the same attacker machine in automated tooling scenarios.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify the IAM user from `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` in the first event and confirm whether this user and access key are expected to call `GetFederationToken`.
+- Review `source.ip` against known infrastructure. A call from an unexpected geography or cloud provider IP range is a strong indicator of exfiltrated key abuse.
+- Query CloudTrail for all API calls made during the resulting console session (user identity type `FederatedUser`) in the window following the `ConsoleLogin`.
+- Check GitHub, GitLab, CI/CD pipelines, and `.env` files for exposure of the access key.
+- Determine whether any sensitive resources were accessed or modified during the console session.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Immediately deactivate the long-term access key used in the `GetFederationToken` call.
+- Revoke all active sessions for the IAM user.
+- Review all actions taken during the federated console session and assess blast radius.
+- Rotate all credentials associated with the IAM user.
+- Migrate any legitimate federation use cases to IAM Identity Center or AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity.
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetFederationToken.html",
+    "https://github.com/NetSPI/aws_consoler",
+    "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/cloud-pentesting/gaining-aws-console-access-via-api-keys/",
+    "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/cloud-security-atlas/attacks/accessing-the-aws-console-with-getfederationtoken/"
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "065a9a1b-9e48-45a1-8fa5-72373245847c"
+setup = "The AWS integration must be ingesting management events into `logs-aws.cloudtrail-*`. STS and sign-in management events are logged by default."
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Platform: AWS",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS CloudTrail",
+    "Service: AWS STS",
+    "Service: AWS Sign-In",
+    "Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+sequence by source.ip with maxspan=2m
+  [any where event.provider == "sts.amazonaws.com"
+   and event.action == "GetFederationToken"
+   and event.outcome == "success"]
+  [any where event.provider == "signin.amazonaws.com"
+   and event.action == "GetSigninToken"
+   and event.outcome == "success"]
+  [any where event.provider == "signin.amazonaws.com"
+   and event.action == "ConsoleLogin"
+   and event.outcome == "success"]
+'''
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1606"
+name = "Forge Web Credentials"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+
+[rule.investigation_fields]
+field_names = [
+    "@timestamp",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
+    "user.name",
+    "event.provider",
+    "event.action",
+    "event.outcome",
+    "source.ip",
+    "source.as.organization.name",
+    "cloud.region",
+    "cloud.account.id",
+]