diff --git a/internal/ota/gpg.go b/internal/ota/gpg.go
index ea5ca845f..2cee5438d 100644
--- a/internal/ota/gpg.go
+++ b/internal/ota/gpg.go
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package ota
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
+	_ "embed"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
@@ -35,6 +36,17 @@ const (
 	keyFetchTimeout = 30 * time.Second
 )
 
+// embeddedRootKey is the JetKVM release root public key compiled into the
+// binary. The trust anchor is rootKeyFingerprint (also compiled in), so the
+// key bytes are effectively constant — embedding them lets us verify updates
+// without a network round-trip to third-party keyservers on the update path,
+// and without leaking the device's IP to those keyservers. The keyservers
+// remain a fallback (see FetchPublicKey) in case the embedded key is ever
+// missing or fails to load.
+//
+//go:embed root_key.asc
+var embeddedRootKey []byte
+
 // GPGVerifier handles GPG signature verification for OTA updates
 type GPGVerifier struct {
 	mu            sync.RWMutex
@@ -44,14 +56,18 @@ type GPGVerifier struct {
 	logger        *zerolog.Logger
 	httpClient    func() HttpClient
 	rootKeyFP     string
+	// embeddedKey is the public key compiled into the binary, tried before any
+	// keyserver. Defaults to embeddedRootKey; tests may override or clear it.
+	embeddedKey []byte
 }
 
 // NewGPGVerifier creates a new GPG verifier instance
 func NewGPGVerifier(logger *zerolog.Logger, httpClient func() HttpClient) *GPGVerifier {
 	return &GPGVerifier{
-		logger:     logger,
-		httpClient: httpClient,
-		rootKeyFP:  rootKeyFingerprint,
+		logger:      logger,
+		httpClient:  httpClient,
+		rootKeyFP:   rootKeyFingerprint,
+		embeddedKey: embeddedRootKey,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -79,6 +95,22 @@ func (g *GPGVerifier) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error) {
 	}
 	g.mu.RUnlock()
 
+	// Prefer the key embedded in the binary. It is validated against the pinned
+	// fingerprint exactly like a fetched key, so it is no less trusted — and it
+	// avoids depending on third-party keyservers being reachable on the update
+	// path. Keyservers are only used as a fallback below.
+	if len(g.embeddedKey) > 0 {
+		keyring, err := g.parseAndValidateKeyring(g.embeddedKey)
+		if err == nil {
+			g.updateMemoryCache(g.embeddedKey, keyring)
+			g.logger.Debug().Msg("using public key embedded in binary")
+			key := make([]byte, len(g.embeddedKey))
+			copy(key, g.embeddedKey)
+			return key, nil
+		}
+		g.logger.Warn().Err(err).Msg("embedded public key failed to load, falling back to keyservers")
+	}
+
 	// Fetch from keyservers (returns already-validated keyring)
 	key, keyring, err := g.fetchFromKeyservers(ctx, g.rootKeyFP)
 	if err != nil {
diff --git a/internal/ota/gpg_test.go b/internal/ota/gpg_test.go
index 2d2e26fb6..fe6923159 100644
--- a/internal/ota/gpg_test.go
+++ b/internal/ota/gpg_test.go
@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ func TestFetchPublicKey_AllKeyserversFail(t *testing.T) {
 	callCount := &atomic.Int32{}
 	mock := &failingHTTPClient{callCount: callCount}
 	v := newGPGVerifierWithMock(t, func() HttpClient { return mock })
+	// Clear the embedded key so the keyserver path is actually exercised;
+	// otherwise the embedded key satisfies the request without any network.
+	v.embeddedKey = nil
 
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	key, err := v.FetchPublicKey(ctx)
@@ -265,6 +268,41 @@ func TestFetchPublicKey_AllKeyserversFail(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, int32(1), callCount.Load(), "should have tried the one test keyserver")
 }
 
+// TestEmbeddedRootKey_MatchesPinnedFingerprint guarantees that the key bytes
+// compiled into the binary actually match the pinned fingerprint. If someone
+// replaces root_key.asc with the wrong key, this fails at test time rather than
+// silently shipping a key that can't verify any real release.
+func TestEmbeddedRootKey_MatchesPinnedFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NotEmpty(t, embeddedRootKey, "a root key must be embedded in the binary")
+
+	v := newTestGPGVerifier() // rootKeyFP == rootKeyFingerprint
+	keyring, err := v.parseAndValidateKeyring(embeddedRootKey)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "embedded key must parse and match the pinned fingerprint %s", rootKeyFingerprint)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, keyring)
+
+	fp := extractFingerprintFromArmoredKey(t, embeddedRootKey)
+	assert.Equal(t, rootKeyFingerprint, fp, "embedded key fingerprint must equal the pinned fingerprint")
+}
+
+// TestFetchPublicKey_PrefersEmbeddedKey verifies the embedded key satisfies a
+// fetch without any keyserver request, even when every keyserver would fail.
+func TestFetchPublicKey_PrefersEmbeddedKey(t *testing.T) {
+	callCount := &atomic.Int32{}
+	mock := &failingHTTPClient{callCount: callCount}
+	logger := zerolog.New(os.Stdout).Level(zerolog.WarnLevel)
+	v := NewGPGVerifier(&logger, func() HttpClient { return mock })
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	key, err := v.FetchPublicKey(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "embedded key should satisfy the request")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, key)
+	assert.Equal(t, int32(0), callCount.Load(), "no keyserver request should be made when the embedded key is valid")
+
+	keyring, err := v.getKeyring(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, keyring)
+}
+
 func TestFetchPublicKey_CachedKeyIsValid(t *testing.T) {
 	// Generate a test key pair (keep the entity so we can sign with the private key)
 	entity, err := openpgp.NewEntity("Test", "", "test@example.com", nil)
diff --git a/internal/ota/root_key.asc b/internal/ota/root_key.asc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..614173e69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/ota/root_key.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+Comment: AF5A 36A9 93D8 28FE FE7C  18C2 D1B9 856C 26A7 9E95
+Comment: JetKVM Release Root <release@jetkvm.com>
+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+=jJYn
+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----