[New] Potential Evasion via Boot Time Removal Tool

rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_tunneling_nslookup.toml

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2020/11/11"
-integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2026/05/04"
+updated_date = "2026/07/03"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ index = [
     "logs-system.security*",
     "logs-windows.forwarded*",
     "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
+    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
     "winlogbeat-*",
 ]
 language = "eql"
@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instru
 - [SentinelOne Cloud Funnel](https://ela.st/sentinel-one-cloud-funnel)
 - [Sysmon Event ID 1 - Process Creation](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-1-setup)
 - [Windows Process Creation Logs](https://ela.st/audit-process-creation)
+- [CrowdStrike](https://ela.st/crowdstrike-integration)
 """
 
 references = ["https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-in-the-wild-overview-of-oilrigs-dns-tunneling/"]
@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ tags = [
     "Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR",
     "Data Source: SentinelOne",
     "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
 ]
 type = "eql"
 

rules/windows/defense_evasion_boot_time_removal_tool.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2026/08/21"
+integration = ["endpoint"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2026/08/21"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies creation of a `:changelist` NTFS alternate data stream or a Windows service Args registry value pointing to
+a `:changelist` path. Microsoft Defender's Boot-Time Removal (BTR.sys) driver reads an RC4-encrypted transaction blob
+from a driver ADS named `:changelist`, referenced by HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Args. Adversaries can
+reproduce this staging outside Defender to abuse BTR.sys as a signed kernel primitive for arbitrary file and registry
+operations. This rule focuses on non-System writers and excludes Microsoft-signed MRT.exe running as SYSTEM, which may
+perform related remediation staging.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+language = "esql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Potential Evasion via Boot Time Removal Tool"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Potential Evasion via Boot Time Removal Tool
+
+Windows Defender's Boot-Time Removal driver (`BTR.sys`) is instructed via an encrypted configuration stored in an
+Alternate Data Stream named `:changelist` on a `.sys` image. The service `Args` value under
+`HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\<name>\\Args` points at that ADS path. Check Point Research (BTR Reforged)
+showed that the same staging can be performed by non-Defender tooling (for example BTR_CLI) to drive Ring-0 file and
+registry actions, including neutralization of security products during early boot.
+
+#### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify whether the alert is a file ADS creation or a service `Args` registry write using `event.category`,
+  `file.name` / `file.path`, and `registry.path` / `registry.data.strings`.
+- Review `process.executable`, `process.name`, `process.pid`, `process.parent.executable`, and `user.id` to determine
+  whether a Defender component, MRT, or an unexpected user-mode binary staged the `:changelist` artifact.
+- For file events, inspect the base `.sys` path (strip `:changelist`), size, hash, and code signature. Confirm whether
+  the driver was recently dropped under a user-writable path (Downloads, Temp, Desktop) versus a Defender-managed path.
+- For registry events, note the service key name under `Services\\*` and check sibling values (`ImagePath`, `Type`,
+  `Group`). Abuse tooling often sets `Group` to `Boot Bus Extender` and may create the service via direct registry
+  writes / `NtLoadDriver` without a corresponding SCM service-install event (7045).
+- Hunt on the same `host.id` for related activity: creation of `*.sys:*.dat` feedback ADS, load of a Microsoft-signed
+  driver matching BTR, creation/deletion of `\\\\SystemRoot\\\\Temp\\\\BootClean.log` by PID 4, and deletions of security
+  binaries attributed to System.
+- Correlate with other alerts for the same `user.id` and `host.id` in the prior 48 hours for privilege escalation,
+  driver load, or Defender tampering.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate Defender or MRT reboot remediation may create `:changelist` ADS and related service Args values. This rule
+  excludes PID 4 and Microsoft-signed `MRT.exe` as SYSTEM; unsigned or differently signed `MRT.exe` still alerts. Rare
+  Defender paths (for example `MsMpEng.exe`) may still match and should be validated before exceptioning.
+- Security research labs intentionally exercising BTR_CLI or similar PoCs will generate true-positive-looking events;
+  confirm host cohort and change windows.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- If activity is unexplained: isolate the host, preserve the `.sys` file and `:changelist` stream, export the service
+  registry key, and capture the staging process tree before cleanup.
+- Search the estate for the same `file.name` / ADS pattern, service `Args` values containing `:changelist`, and related
+  driver hashes.
+- Remove unauthorized service keys and staged drivers, restore any deleted security components from known-good media,
+  and rotate credentials for accounts that held `SeLoadDriverPrivilege` on the host.
+- Restrict and monitor assignment/use of `SeLoadDriverPrivilege`; treat signed remediation drivers as LOLDrivers that
+  require lineage and ADS context monitoring, not signature blocking alone.
+"""
+
+setup = """## Setup
+
+This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
+
+Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend
+"""
+
+references = [
+    "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/btr-reforged-weaponizing-defenders-remediation-driver-as-a-kernel-operation-primitive/",
+    "https://github.com/Dump-GUY/BTR_CLI",
+]
+risk_score = 73
+rule_id = "942c8f59-f01c-4dc0-a05f-2f5bba836ad8"
+severity = "high"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Endpoint",
+    "OS: Windows",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "esql"
+
+query = '''
+from logs-endpoint.events.file-*, logs-endpoint.events.registry-* metadata _id, _version, _index
+| where host.os.type == "windows"
+  and process.pid != 4
+  and not (
+    user.id == "S-1-5-18"
+    and to_lower(process.executable) like """?:\\windows\\system32\\mrt.exe"""
+    and process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Microsoft Windows", "Microsoft Corporation")
+  )
+  and (
+    (
+      event.category == "file"
+      and event.type == "creation"
+      and ends_with(to_lower(file.name), ":changelist")
+    )
+    or (
+      event.category == "registry"
+      and event.type == "change"
+      and to_lower(registry.path) like """*\\system\\*controlset*\\services\\*\\args"""
+      and to_lower(registry.data.strings) like "*:changelist"
+    )
+  )
+| keep
+    @timestamp,
+    host.id,
+    host.name,
+    user.id,
+    user.name,
+    process.pid,
+    process.name,
+    process.executable,
+    process.code_signature.subject_name,
+    event.category,
+    event.type,
+    file.path,
+    file.name,
+    file.size,
+    registry.path,
+    registry.value,
+    registry.data.strings,
+    data_stream.namespace,
+    _id,
+    _version,
+    _index
+| limit 100
+'''
+
+[rule.investigation_fields]
+field_names = [
+    "@timestamp",
+    "host.id",
+    "host.name",
+    "user.id",
+    "user.name",
+    "process.pid",
+    "process.name",
+    "process.executable",
+    "process.code_signature.subject_name",
+    "event.category",
+    "file.path",
+    "file.name",
+    "file.size",
+    "registry.path",
+    "registry.value",
+    "registry.data.strings",
+]
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1564"
+name = "Hide Artifacts"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1564.004"
+name = "NTFS File Attributes"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1112"
+name = "Modify Registry"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1562"
+name = "Impair Defenses"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1562.001"
+name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1543"
+name = "Create or Modify System Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1543.003"
+name = "Windows Service"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"