fix(ci): repair the Vale prose gate

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -150,19 +150,16 @@ jobs:
       - name: Vale linter
         uses: errata-ai/vale-action@d89dee975228ae261d22c15adcd03578634d429c # v2
         with:
-          files: |-
-            patterns
-            vendors
-            approaches
-            use-cases
-            jurisdictions
-            domains
-          separator: "\n"
+          # vale-action accepts a single path, a JSON array, or a string split
+          # on `separator`. A YAML block scalar is none of those, and a
+          # whitespace `separator` is trimmed away by core.getInput before the
+          # action reads it, so both forms end in "path is invalid; falling
+          # back to 'all'" and the whole repository gets linted.
+          files: '["patterns/", "vendors/", "approaches/", "use-cases/", "jurisdictions/", "domains/"]'
           fail_on_error: false
           reporter: github-check
         env:
           GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-        continue-on-error: true
 
   validate-changelog:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest

.vale.ini

@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ BasedOnStyles = EthSystems
 
 # Skip code blocks and frontmatter
 BlockIgnores = (?s) *```.*?```
-TokenIgnores = (`[^`]+`)
+# Ignore inline code and links whose text is a file name: `pattern-dvp-erc7573.md`
+# is an identifier, not prose, and must not be graded as terminology.
+TokenIgnores = (`[^`]+`), (\[[^\]]*\.md\]\([^)]*\))
 
 # Content directories - full linting
 [patterns/*.md]

.vale/styles/EthSystems/Marketing.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 # EthSystems Marketing Language Detector
 # Catches promotional/marketing language that should not appear in technical docs
-# Mirrors patterns from .marketing-exceptions.txt
+#
+# Scope rule: match promotional claims, not ordinary English. Words such as
+# "only", "first" and "unique" are normal technical prose ("only the sender
+# learns the amount", "the first step", "a unique nullifier"), so they are
+# matched only in their promotional forms.
 
 extends: existence
 message: "Avoid marketing language: '%s'. Use neutral, factual terms."
@@ -14,7 +18,9 @@ tokens:
   - world-class
   - top-tier
   - premier
-  - leading
+  - industry leader
+  - market leader
+  - leading (?:provider|platform|solution|protocol|vendor|network)
   - superior
   - unmatched
   - unrivaled
@@ -43,26 +49,19 @@ tokens:
   - comprehensive
   - one-stop
 
-  # Exclusive claims
-  - unique(?! identifier| ID)
-  - only(?! works with| supports| available| if| when)
-  - first(?!-come| step| phase)
+  # Exclusive claims (promotional forms only)
+  - the only (?:solution|platform|protocol|provider|network|option|way|choice)
+  - (?:world's|industry's|market's) (?:first|best|fastest|most)
+  - first-ever
+  - first-of-its-kind
+  - industry-first
+  - truly unique
+  - uniquely positioned
+  - unique (?:advantage|selling|value proposition)
   - fastest
   - most secure
 
 # Exceptions - these terms are allowed in context
 exceptions:
-  - unique identifier
-  - unique ID
-  - first-come-first-served
-  - end-to-end encryption
-  - end-to-end encrypted
-  - only works with
-  - only supports
-  - only available
-  - only if
-  - only when
-  - first step
-  - first phase
   - Best Execution
   - best execution

.vale/styles/EthSystems/Terminology.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
 # EthSystems Terminology Consistency
 # Enforces canonical spellings from GLOSSARY.md
 # See also: scripts/check-terminology.js for programmatic checking
+#
+# Case rule: the swap direction must agree with GLOSSARY.md. The glossary
+# writes "MPC (Multi-Party Computation)", "FHE (Fully Homomorphic
+# Encryption)" and "TEE (Trusted Execution Environment)" in title case, so
+# a swap that forced "Multi-Party Computation" down to lower case
+# contradicted both the glossary and the two entries next to it.
 
 extends: substitution
 message: "Use '%s' instead of '%s' for consistency with GLOSSARY.md."
@@ -56,7 +62,6 @@ swap:
 
   # Cryptographic terms
   multiparty computation: multi-party computation
-  Multi-Party Computation: multi-party computation
   fully homomorphic encryption: Fully Homomorphic Encryption
   trusted execution environment: Trusted Execution Environment
 

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ All notable changes to the EthSystems Map are documented here.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+- fix(ci): repair the Vale prose gate. Scope [EthSystems.Marketing](.vale/styles/EthSystems/Marketing.yml) to promotional claims instead of the bare words "only", "first" and "unique"; drop the [EthSystems.Terminology](.vale/styles/EthSystems/Terminology.yml) swap that forced "Multi-Party Computation" to lower case against GLOSSARY.md; ignore file names used as link text; pass `files` to `vale-action` as a JSON array, the one form the action parses, so the job lints the six content directories instead of the whole repository; and drop the `continue-on-error` added in [#196](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/196), which kept the job green while Vale still exited 1 on 207 findings. Also clears the five real marketing terms and the remaining ERC-7573 and DA Layer terminology drift in the prose. Vale findings in the linted scope: 187 to 0 ([#197](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/197))
 - feat(vendor): add [Interfold](vendors/interfold.md), plus patterns [Publicly Verifiable DKG and Threshold Decryption](patterns/pattern-verifiable-dkg-threshold-decryption.md) and [Ephemeral Committees](patterns/pattern-ephemeral-committees.md), covering single-use committees that dispose of key material after decryption ([#178](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/178))
 - feat(vendor): add [The Graph](vendors/the-graph.md), decentralized indexing and query infrastructure as the audit read path ([#186](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/186), landed via [#193](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/193))
 - feat(pattern): add [Reproducible Audit Extraction](patterns/pattern-reproducible-audit-extraction.md), the verifier's data-acquisition leg the disclosure patterns presuppose ([#186](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/186), landed via [#193](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/193))

GLOSSARY.md

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ A dedicated network or service that publishes and stores the data required for D
 
 **TEE (Trusted Execution Environment)**: Hardware-based secure computation environment
 
-**MPC (multi-party computation)**: Cryptographic technique for joint computation without revealing inputs
+**MPC (Multi-Party Computation)**: Cryptographic technique for joint computation without revealing inputs
 
 **OPRF (Oblivious Pseudorandom Function)**: Cryptographic protocol where a server evaluates a pseudorandom function on a client's input without learning the input, and the client learns the output without learning the server's key. Used for private set intersection, password-hardening, and privacy-preserving authentication.
 

patterns/pattern-cross-chain-privacy-bridge.md

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Threat model:
 - Two-phase commit workflow, not instant atomic settlement. Latency depends on source finality and any challenge window.
 - Cost scales with the verification mechanism. zero-knowledge proofs are expensive to generate; optimistic systems impose challenge delays; custodial designs are cheap but centralized.
 - Reorg handling and cross-domain confusion (wrong chain ID, token mismatch) are recurring failure modes that must be guarded at the contract layer.
-- Griefing through deposits that are never minted locks funds until timeout. The recovery path must be robust and well-documented.
+- Griefing through deposits that are never minted locks funds until timeout. The recovery path must be tested and well-documented.
 - Key and governance risks: TSS or MPC signer collusion, view-key misuse, and malicious contract upgrades each sit outside the cryptographic trust model and require operational controls.
 - Deployment topologies: pre-bridge mixing (deposit through a source-chain shielded pool first, then bridge: full sender privacy at added latency); hub-and-spoke (L1 as verification hub; multiple L2s prove deposits via the L1 bridge contract); privacy-to-privacy (shielded pools on both ends: privacy on both sender and receiver ends, more complex verification); asymmetric (one direction private, e.g. public L1 to private L2).
 

patterns/pattern-forced-withdrawal.md

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ When an L2 sequencer, relayer, or operator becomes unavailable, users need a uni
 
 ## Components
 
-- Data availability source lets the user reconstruct their position. Can be L1 calldata, L1 blobs, an external DA layer, a validium DA committee, or client-side storage.
+- Data availability source lets the user reconstruct their position. Can be L1 calldata, L1 blobs, an external DA Layer, a validium DA committee, or client-side storage.
 - L1 state-root oracle stores the last verified L2 state root. Validity rollups anchor with a zero-knowledge proof; optimistic rollups anchor after a challenge period survives.
 - Proof verifier contract accepts Merkle proofs (transparent systems) or zero-knowledge proofs (privacy systems) and checks them against the anchored root.
 - Nullifier registry records completed withdrawals to prevent double-claims.
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Where the data lives determines the trust assumption:
 | ----------------------- | ------------------------------------- | --------------------------------- |
 | L1 calldata             | Ethereum consensus                    | Nothing (permanent, expensive)    |
 | L1 blobs (EIP-4844)     | Ethereum plus archival within ~18 days | Pruned if nobody archives         |
-| External DA layer       | DA layer liveness plus economic security | DA layer offline or withholds   |
+| External DA Layer       | DA Layer liveness plus economic security | DA Layer offline or withholds   |
 | DA committee (validium) | Honest committee majority             | Committee withholds; funds frozen |
 | Client-side             | The user                              | User loses data; funds gone       |
 
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ Threat model:
 ## Trade-offs
 
 - Upgrade risk: 86% of 129 L2 projects allow instant contract upgrades without exit windows ([Ethical Risk Analysis of L2 Rollups, 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2512.12732v1)). An escape hatch the operator can remove via upgrade provides no meaningful guarantee. L2Beat Stages requires 7-day (Stage 1) or 30-day (Stage 2) upgrade delays, minus any withdrawal delay.
-- DA withholding: validium DA committees can freeze all funds by refusing to share state. External DA layers add a liveness dependency. On-chain calldata and blobs are immune but expensive. For privacy systems, data can sit on-chain yet be useless without decryption keys.
+- DA withholding: validium DA committees can freeze all funds by refusing to share state. External DA Layers add a liveness dependency. On-chain calldata and blobs are immune but expensive. For privacy systems, data can sit on-chain yet be useless without decryption keys.
 - State freshness gap: users can prove only against the most recently anchored root. Any transactions after that root are lost. Anchoring intervals range from minutes (validity rollups) to hours.
 - Mass exit: everyone hits L1 at once. Gas prices spike, users with no L1 ETH cannot participate, and leveraged DeFi positions may create claims exceeding underlying bridge deposits.
 - Proving liveness: for privacy systems, the user must retain secrets and run a compatible prover. The prover code must be open-source, deterministically compilable, and match the L1 verifier's expected proof format. A version mismatch means funds are frozen until governance acts. Browser WASM proving works but is materially slower than native.
@@ -119,5 +119,5 @@ A bank operates a private payment L2 for its clients. The sequencer goes offline
 
 - [L2Beat Stages Framework](https://l2beat.com/stages): maturity classification for rollup escape hatches
 - [A Practical Rollup Escape Hatch Design (Zircuit, 2025)](https://arxiv.org/html/2503.23986v1): resolver contracts for DeFi positions
-- [L2Beat DA Risk Framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-data-availability-risk-framework/318): DA layer risk evaluation methodology
+- [L2Beat DA Risk Framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-data-availability-risk-framework/318): DA Layer risk evaluation methodology
 - [Introducing Stages (Medium)](https://medium.com/l2beat/introducing-stages-a-framework-to-evaluate-rollups-maturity-d290bb22befe)

patterns/pattern-plasma-stateless-privacy.md

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Use a stateless Plasma architecture to enable private token transfers where tran
 - L1 anchor contract: stores block commitments (Merkle roots of transaction hashes) and handles deposits, withdrawals, and forced exits.
 - Block producer: aggregates transactions, collects signatures, and posts the block commitment to L1. Stateless with respect to transaction contents.
 - Client-side prover: users generate ZK balance and transfer proofs locally (e.g., recursive FRI-based proofs).
-- User-held Data Availability: users custody their own note and transfer history. Optional trust-minimized DA layer for redundancy.
+- User-held Data Availability: users custody their own note and transfer history. Optional trust-minimized DA Layer for redundancy.
 - Forced-exit mechanism: L1 contract accepts exit proofs independently of the block producer, bypassing liveness failure.
 
 ## Protocol

vendors/chainlink-ace.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Modular compliance layer built on the Chainlink Runtime Environment (CRE) to def
 ## Fits with patterns
 - [Regulatory Disclosure Keys Proofs](../patterns/pattern-regulatory-disclosure-keys-proofs.md)
 - [Crypto Registry Bridge eWpG EAS](../patterns/pattern-crypto-registry-bridge-ewpg-eas.md)
-- [DvP ERC7573](../patterns/pattern-dvp-erc7573.md)
+- [DvP ERC-7573](../patterns/pattern-dvp-erc7573.md)
 
 ## Not a substitute for
 - Privacy L2 or App-chain

vendors/fhenix.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ maturity: testnet
 
 ## What it is
 
-Fhenix builds a CoProcessor that brings Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) to EVM chains, enabling developers to compute directly on encrypted data without ever decrypting it. This allows dApps to offer on-chain privacy by default. At its core, Fhenix introduces CoFHE, a decentralized coprocessor that makes encrypted computation fast, scalable, and easy for Solidity developers to adopt.
+Fhenix builds a CoProcessor that brings Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) to EVM chains, enabling developers to compute directly on encrypted data without ever decrypting it. This allows dApps to offer on-chain privacy by default. At its core, Fhenix introduces CoFHE, a decentralized coprocessor that runs encrypted computation off-chain and exposes it to Solidity developers.
 
 ## Fits with patterns
 

vendors/flashbots.md

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Flashbots develops MEV infrastructure including private mempools, block building
 
 - Established MEV mitigation with significant adoption
 - Strong relationship with the Ethereum ecosystem
-- Active development of next-generation infrastructure (SUAVE)
+- Active development of new infrastructure (SUAVE)
 - Revenue-sharing mechanisms align user incentives
 
 ## Risks and open questions

vendors/paladin.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ A strong design principle of the project is that existing privacy preserving tok
 
 ## Fits with patterns
 - [Shielding](../patterns/pattern-shielding.md)
-- [DvP ERC7573](../patterns/pattern-dvp-erc7573.md)
+- [DvP ERC-7573](../patterns/pattern-dvp-erc7573.md)
 - [Private Stablecoin Shielded Payments](../patterns/pattern-private-stablecoin-shielded-payments.md)
 - [Crypto Registry Bridge eWpG EAS](../patterns/pattern-crypto-registry-bridge-ewpg-eas.md)
 

vendors/tx-shield.md

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ OpenTMP LLM:
 - Privacy-preserving AI model training and inferences for enterprises and regulated sectors, such as healthcare, finance, and government. 
 
 Collab-Key:
-Institutional wallets, custodians, and enterprise-grade signing infrastructure requiring fault-tolerant, hardware-secure (ReRAM) key management to eliminate single points of failure.
+Institutional wallets, custodians, and signing infrastructure requiring fault-tolerant, hardware-secure (ReRAM) key management to eliminate single points of failure.
 
 ---
 

vendors/zksync.md

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Target segments include financial institutions tokenizing treasuries and fund sh
 
 ## Strengths
 
-- Comprehensive enterprise features including compliance, KYC/AML, and selective disclosure
+- Enterprise features including compliance, KYC/AML, and selective disclosure
 - Efficient ZK Proving
 - Modularity and interop accross Prividiums
 - L1 as final settlement layer