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Updated 1:05 AM PT - Sep 8th, 2026
❌ @robobun, your commit 9bf4cf6 has 1 failures in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 32100That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-32100 --bun |
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 1 remains after this review. WalkthroughAdds shared seconds-based timeout validation for SQL pools, reserved connections, transactions, and constructor timeout options. Validation now occurs before millisecond conversion and close-state changes. Tests cover overflow, boundaries, invalid values, exact errors, and continued connection usability. ChangesSQL timeout validation
Severity of issue fixed: Medium Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to SQL timeout options now reject values that would overflow timer milliseconds, preventing premature connection closure while preserving valid boundary behavior. The covered pool, reserved connection, transaction, and constructor paths are ready to merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@test/js/sql/sql-close-timeout-overflow.test.ts`:
- Around line 103-112: The test leaks the reserved connection if an assertion
fails because reserved.release() is called after assertions; wrap the test body
that performs assertions and queries in a try/finally (or register cleanup) so
reserved.release() runs on every exit path. Specifically, after obtaining the
connection via sql.reserve() and performing the reserved.close() call/assertions
and the subsequent reserved`select 1 as x` check, ensure reserved.release() is
placed inside a finally block (or registered before assertions) so it always
executes even when expect() throws.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
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🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts`:
- Around line 1222-1248: The timeout branch is incorrectly gated by truthiness
so a provided timeout of 0 is treated as "no timeout"; update the check to
detect presence (e.g., options?.timeout !== undefined) so that timeout =
validateCloseTimeout(timeout) is used for zero and the immediate-close behavior
(this.closed = true; if (timeout === 0 || !this.hasPendingQueries()) { await
this.#close(); return; }) runs; ensure the rest of the timeout flow
(Promise.withResolvers, setTimeout using timeout * 1000, timer.unref(),
this.onAllQueriesFinished clearing timer and calling
this.#close().finally(resolve)) remains unchanged.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts`:
- Around line 1222-1248: The timeout branch is incorrectly gated by truthiness
so a provided timeout of 0 is treated as "no timeout"; update the check to
detect presence (e.g., options?.timeout !== undefined) so that timeout =
validateCloseTimeout(timeout) is used for zero and the immediate-close behavior
(this.closed = true; if (timeout === 0 || !this.hasPendingQueries()) { await
this.#close(); return; }) runs; ensure the rest of the timeout flow
(Promise.withResolvers, setTimeout using timeout * 1000, timer.unref(),
this.onAllQueriesFinished clearing timer and calling
this.#close().finally(resolve)) remains unchanged.
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src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts (1)
1222-1248:
⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major | ⚡ Quick winHandle
timeout: 0by presence, not truthiness.Line 1223 and Line 1247 both gate on
if (timeout), sosql.close({ timeout: 0 })never enters the timeout path and does not take the intended immediate-close branch. That leaves0behaving like “no timeout provided” instead of “force close now”.💡 Suggested fix
async close(options?: { timeout?: number }): Promise<void> { if (this.closed) { return; } let timeout = options?.timeout; - if (timeout) { + const hasTimeout = timeout === 0 || !!timeout; + if (hasTimeout) { timeout = validateCloseTimeout(timeout); this.closed = true; if (timeout === 0 || !this.hasPendingQueries()) { // close immediately @@ return promise; } else { this.closed = true; if (!this.hasPendingQueries()) {🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts` around lines 1222 - 1248, The timeout branch is incorrectly gated by truthiness so a provided timeout of 0 is treated as "no timeout"; update the check to detect presence (e.g., options?.timeout !== undefined) so that timeout = validateCloseTimeout(timeout) is used for zero and the immediate-close behavior (this.closed = true; if (timeout === 0 || !this.hasPendingQueries()) { await this.#close(); return; }) runs; ensure the rest of the timeout flow (Promise.withResolvers, setTimeout using timeout * 1000, timer.unref(), this.onAllQueriesFinished clearing timer and calling this.#close().finally(resolve)) remains unchanged.
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Re the latest CodeRabbit finding on the timeout truthiness gate in shared.ts close(): that behavior is pre-existing, this PR only replaces the bound check inside the branch. close({ timeout: 0 }) being treated as "no timeout" is tracked in #32038 and has a dedicated fix open in #32039, so changing it here would be an out of scope behavior change that conflicts with that PR. |
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LGTM — focused validation fix with thorough test coverage.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR fixes a timeout-overflow bug in sql.close({ timeout }): the option is in seconds, but the deadline timer is armed in milliseconds, and the old upper-bound check (> 2 ** 31 seconds) allowed values whose millisecond product overflows setTimeout's 32-bit limit and gets clamped to 1 ms. The fix consolidates three identical inline checks into a shared validateCloseTimeout helper bounded at (2 ** 31 - 1) / 1000 seconds, and reorders validation in reserved_sql.close / transaction_sql.close to run before clearing acceptQueries, so a rejected close no longer poisons the handle. A new test file covers rejection of overflowing values, acceptance of the exact boundary, continued rejection of previously-invalid inputs, and the validate-before-mutate ordering across postgres/mysql/sqlite/reserved paths.
Security risks
None. This is input validation tightening on a numeric timeout option; no auth, crypto, network, or untrusted-input parsing is involved.
Level of scrutiny
Low-to-moderate. The change is small (~30 source lines), mechanical, and follows the existing validation pattern used for idleTimeout / connectionTimeout / maxLifetime in the same file. The only behavior changes are (1) rejecting timeouts in (2147483.647, 2^31] seconds that were previously accepted-but-broken, and (2) a more accurate error message — both strict improvements with no realistic compatibility impact.
Other factors
- The bug-hunting system found no issues.
- CodeRabbit's only comment (release the reserved connection on assertion failure) was addressed via
await usingand confirmed resolved. - No CODEOWNERS apply to these paths.
- The reordering preserves semantics:
validateCloseTimeoutthrows inside async functions, so callers still see a rejected promise; the splitif (timeout) { validate } … if (timeout) { use }is equivalent to the prior single block for all inputs (0, falsy, truthy, string-coercible). - Test coverage is well-designed: pool tests need no server (lazy connect), the sqlite transaction path runs in-process, and only the reserved-connection test is docker-gated.
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LGTM — focused fix that corrects the seconds-vs-milliseconds bound and moves validation ahead of state mutation, with thorough test coverage.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR fixes #32096: sql.close({ timeout }) validated the upper bound against the seconds value (2 ** 31) but then passed timeout * 1000 to setTimeout, so values in (2147483.647, 2 ** 31] seconds overflowed the 32-bit ms range and were clamped to 1 ms, force-closing immediately. The fix introduces a shared validateCloseTimeout in internal/sql/shared.ts bounded at (2 ** 31 - 1) / 1000 seconds and replaces the three inline checks (pool close in shared.ts, reserved_sql.close and transaction_sql.close in sql.ts). It also reorders the reserved/transaction close paths so validation runs before clearing acceptQueries, so a rejected close no longer leaves the handle unusable. A new test file covers overflow rejection, boundary acceptance, the error message, and post-rejection usability for sqlite transactions and (docker-gated) postgres reserved connections.
Security risks
None. This is pure input-validation tightening on a numeric option in JS-land; no auth, crypto, parsing of untrusted data, or native code is touched. The only behavior change is that previously-accepted absurdly large timeouts now reject with ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE instead of silently misbehaving.
Level of scrutiny
Low-to-moderate. The production diff is ~30 lines: a 10-line helper plus three call-site substitutions and two statement reorderings. The bound math ((2 ** 31 - 1) / 1000) is correct for setTimeout's documented limit, and the reordering is a clear improvement (validate-then-mutate). The split into two if (timeout) blocks preserves the existing control flow exactly aside from where the throw lands relative to the state flip.
Other factors
- No CODEOWNERS for these paths.
- The bug-hunting system found nothing.
- The one CodeRabbit finding (reserved-connection cleanup on assertion failure) was addressed via
await usingand confirmed resolved. - The author explicitly scoped out the pre-existing
timeout: 0truthiness quirk (#32038/#32039) and the unrelated reserved-close hang (#32099), keeping this change minimal. - Tests verify both the new rejection boundary and that previously-rejected inputs (
-1, non-numeric) stay rejected, and were reported passing on the fixed build and failing on the unfixed one.
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CI status: every lane that ran is green (284 jobs, including the ASAN lane). The only outstanding check is darwin-14-aarch64-test-bun, which has expired twice waiting for an agent and is requeued; the red check is queue starvation on that lane, not a test failure. The diff is ready for review. |
… start (#32201) First item of #32198. The second item there (the `close({ timeout })` validation mismatch) is already addressed by the open #32100, which bounds the timeout at setTimeout's real millisecond limit and rewords the message, so it is deliberately not touched here. ### Repro No database server needed: ```js const sql = new Bun.SQL({ adapter: "postgres", hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 5432, username: "u", database: "d", max: 2, password: () => { sql.flush(); // TypeError: undefined is not an object (evaluating 'this.closed') return ""; }, }); sql.connect().catch(() => {}); ``` ### Cause `BaseSQLAdapter.connections` is allocated as `new Array(max)` and filled one slot at a time in `connect()`'s pool-start loop. `createPooledConnection` can synchronously run user code: a function-valued `password` option is invoked synchronously by `createPooledConnectionHandle`. If that user code re-enters a pool method that scans `this.connections`, the scan hits slots that are still unassigned holes. `hasConnectionsAvailable()` already guards for this (`if (connection && ...)`) and documents the scenario, but the equivalent loops in `isConnected()`, `flush()`, `#close()`, and the retry scan in `connect()` read `connection.state` unguarded and throw a raw `TypeError: undefined is not an object (evaluating 'connection.state')`. (In the observed errors JSC quotes a nearby expression, `this.closed` / `this.readyConnections`, due to line skew between the embedded and on-disk bundle source; the stack points at the `connection.state` reads.) ### Fix Optional-chain the state reads in those four loops (`connection?.state`), matching the guard `hasConnectionsAvailable()` already has, and document the hole invariant where the array is created. In the retry scan a hole counts as a connection still being created (`all_closed = false`), so the caller is queued and served when the pool finishes connecting. `#close()` does not appear reachable with holes today (pool start always queues a waiter first, so close defers), but it gets the same guard for consistency, which also covers the `connections[i] = null` slots it writes. ### Verification New test in `test/js/sql/sql-close-pending-connection.test.ts` re-enters `sql.flush()` and `sql.connect()` from a function-valued `password` during pool start, against a local TCP server that never answers (no database needed). On the unfixed build it fails with the TypeErrors above captured from both re-entry points; with the fix the whole file passes (`bun bd test test/js/sql/sql-close-pending-connection.test.ts`, 5 pass).
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Stale PR review: keep open, rework. The bug in #32096 is still on main. All three The diff is not the shape that would land. It conflicts with main's The shape that would be wanted: wait for #39617, #32149, and #33740 to land. Then one shared helper in |
…ange The timeout option is in seconds but the deadline timer is armed in milliseconds. The upper bound was checked against the seconds value (2 ** 31), so timeouts in (2147483.647, 2 ** 31] passed validation and setTimeout clamped the overflowing delay to 1 ms, force-closing the pool and cancelling in-flight queries. All four close() sites now share one validator bounded at (2 ** 31 - 1) / 1000 seconds. On reserved connections and transactions, validation now runs before acceptQueries is cleared so a rejected close leaves the handle usable. Fixes #32096
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Additional findings (outside the current diff — GitHub can't attach inline comments there):
-
🟣
src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts— Pre-existing: the same seconds-bounded-at-231-then-×1000 defect this PR fixes forclose({ timeout })remains at three sibling sites in the same file —idleTimeout(2089),connectionTimeout(2101),maxLifetime(2113) each check the seconds value against2 ** 31and then*= 1000, so values in (2147483.647, 231] pass validation and overflow the millisecond consumer just like the close() bug. REVIEW.md requires fixing the whole class in the same PR. Fix: bound all seconds→ms options at(2**31 - 1)/1000via one shared helper (parameterize the option name), or state in the PR why these sites are excluded.Extended reasoning...
parseOptionsin shared.ts validatesidleTimeout/connectionTimeout/maxLifetimewithif (v > 2 ** 31 || v < 0 || v !== v)and then doesv *= 1000(lines 2096/2108/2120). A user passing e.g.idle_timeout: 3_000_000(seconds) passes validation and yields 3_000_000_000 ms, which overflows the 32-bit millisecond range the downstream timers use — the identical mechanism the PR describes and fixes forclose({ timeout }). The PR extractsvalidateCloseTimeoutinto this file but applies it only to the three close() call sites; the PR description does not mention excluding these siblings. Per REVIEW.md "Fix the whole class in the same PR — grep for every sibling site sharing the pattern; if a site is intentionally excluded, say so in the PR", this is in scope. Marked pre-existing because the base branch already has the wrong bound at these three sites.Verification: pre-existing — the base branch already has the identical defect at these three sites and this PR does not touch them, so merging makes nothing worse; flagged under REVIEW.md's "Fix the whole class in the same PR". The three sibling sites in /home/claude/bun/src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts share the exact seconds-bounded-then-×1000 pattern this PR fixes for close(): - Line 2089: `if (idleTimeout…
… millisecond product These three options share the close() defect: validated in seconds against 2 ** 31, then multiplied by 1000 for a 32-bit millisecond consumer. The native side saturates them at 2 ** 31 - 1 ms instead of rejecting. One validator now covers every seconds-to-milliseconds option. The constants are named so the bound explains itself.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline finding: commit 01b187f added constructor tests for idle_timeout / connection_timeout / max_lifetime rejecting 2 ** 31 and 2147483.648, but only touched the test file — parseOptions in src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts (lines ~2087–2121) still validates those three options against > 2 ** 31 before the *= 1000. Six of the new constructor tests will fail as-is; the shared validator (or an equivalent bound) needs to be applied there too.
Extended reasoning...
The "What changed" summary flagged that the diff shows no change to parseOptions for the constructor timeout options, and asked to verify. I checked: the latest commit's message says it bounds idle_timeout, connection_timeout, and max_lifetime by their millisecond product, but git show 01b187f2 --stat shows it modified only the test file. The current parseOptions still uses if (idleTimeout > 2 ** 31 || ...) for all three options, so the newly added test.each([2 ** 31, 2147483.648, Infinity]) constructor-rejection cases will fail for the first two values on each option. This is a concrete gap not covered by the posted inline finding, so it's worth surfacing in the review body rather than staying silent.
…est runs An outer isDockerEnabled() guard skipped the block on lanes that serve postgres through BUN_TEST_SERVICE_* or the docker coordinator.
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Rebased onto main at ae3c3ad. One conflict in shared.ts: main had restructured the pool close() around a hasTimeout flag that already runs validation before closed = true, so the validator now sits inside that block. The dead code passes on main had also dropped buildDefinedColumnsAndQuery and normalizeSSLMode from the export list, which I kept dropped. On the sibling sites: the review was right that idle_timeout, connection_timeout and max_lifetime carried the same seconds-bounded check before their own * 1000. Traced the consumer: createConnection reads them with to_int32(), which saturates, so those options silently clamped to 24.8 days instead of rejecting. 6a48937 generalizes the helper to validateTimeoutSeconds(name, value) and applies it to all seven seconds-to-milliseconds sites (the three close() paths plus the three constructor options). The only remaining 2 ** 31 check is options.max, a connection count, which is correct as is. 01b187f shipped those constructor tests without the matching src change; that is why test/js/sql/sql-close-timeout-overflow.test.ts went red on build 112360. 6a48937 has the src. Verified on this tree: 37 pass with the fix, 13 fail against main src. |
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LGTM — the isDockerEnabled() wrapper is gone and describeWithContainer now decides for itself, which was the last thing I'd flagged.
Checked: the new MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS bound ((2**31 - 1) / 1000) is exact for every * 1000 site it feeds; validation now runs before acceptQueries is cleared in both reserved_sql.close and transaction_sql.close, and the pool close() in shared.ts already had hasTimeout gated before this.closed = true; all six former inline checks route through the one helper with the same $ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE code. Tests pin the boundary at 2147483.647 / 2147483.648, keep -1 and non-numeric rejected, and assert the reserved/transaction handle still runs queries after a rejected close.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR replaces six duplicated inline timeout > 2 ** 31 || timeout < 0 || timeout !== timeout checks (three close({timeout}) variants plus idle_timeout/connection_timeout/max_lifetime in parseOptions) with a single validateTimeoutSeconds() helper in src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts that bounds against (2 ** 31 - 1) / 1000 seconds so the subsequent * 1000 cannot exceed setTimeout's 32-bit millisecond ceiling. In src/js/bun/sql.ts the reserved-connection and transaction close() paths are reordered so the validator throws before state.connectionState &= ~ReservedConnectionState.acceptQueries, fixing the "rejected close leaves the handle unusable" side effect. A new test file covers the overflow boundary, the exact upper bound, still-rejected inputs, the error message text, and the stays-usable behavior across pool/reserved/transaction and postgres/mysql/sqlite.
Security risks
None. This is input validation on a numeric option that only affects when a locally-armed timer fires. No auth, crypto, network parsing, or filesystem paths are touched. The change tightens validation (values that previously silently misbehaved now throw ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE), which is the safer direction.
Level of scrutiny
Low-to-moderate. It is a small, mechanical consolidation of duplicated validation into a shared helper — exactly the shape REVIEW.md's "fix the whole class" rule asks for — plus a two-line reordering to move validation ahead of a state mutation. The arithmetic is straightforward and the helper preserves the existing $ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE error code, so callers that catch on .code are unaffected; only the message text changes, and it now states the real bound. No CODEOWNERS entry covers src/js/bun/sql.ts or src/js/internal/sql/.
Other factors
This is my third look at the PR. The only concern I'd previously raised — an if (isDockerEnabled()) guard around describeWithContainer that would have silently skipped the reserved-connection test on Linux arm64 CI lanes served by the docker coordinator — was addressed in commit 9bf4cf6, which drops the guard and lets describeWithContainer handle availability itself. There are no outstanding CHANGES_REQUESTED reviews from other reviewers (only bot COMMENTED states), and the bug hunt exited on dry_streak with no findings. The PR description's justification for a separate test file (the existing sql.test.ts is entirely gated on isDockerEnabled() while most of these tests need no server) is reasonable given the harness constraints.
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CI on 9bf4cf6 (build 112511): 178 jobs green, including the sql test file on every lane that has finished. The one red job is debian x64-asan, where the only failure is test/js/node/test/parallel/test-crypto-dh-leak.js, an RSS assertion in node:crypto that is red on main too and is already reported for triage. The remaining darwin x64 test jobs are still queued after expiring three times waiting for an agent. Nothing here touches this change; the diff is ready for review. |
…quests (#45304) ### What does this PR do? It folds 197 open pull requests on `Bun.sql` (PostgreSQL, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite), `bun:sqlite` and `node:sqlite` into one change: 149 are replaced by it, 18 are closed without porting, 30 stay open. Most PRs were taken as a diagnosis; the files many of them patched were rewritten once. 257 files, +41,670 / -21,600: `src` +12,536 / -16,054, tests +26,903 / -5,100. CI ran the suite on Linux x64 / aarch64, musl, ASAN, macOS and Windows at this head (78e0830cdd): every job that ran passed (178; one macOS aarch64 job could not download the build, two macOS x64 jobs got no machine). Numbers marked (release) compare CI's Linux x64 release binaries of main (f841e3670) and of earlier commits of this PR, in user-space instructions unless a unit is given; the others are from a local debug + ASAN build. ### How did you verify your code works? 102 SQL and SQLite test files on a Linux x64 debug + ASAN build against PostgreSQL, MySQL and MariaDB containers: 5,918 tests pass; 8 time out on a machine at load 210 to 250, each of which passes alone or is known to depend on load. Nearly every new test was run on main first and fails there; the exceptions are guards that pin behaviour we keep. PostgreSQL parameters against main, cell by cell (value, type, mode): of 942, 726 are equal, 137 work that main rejects, 17 reject with another code, 44 are new errors, 18 stored another value (six cases: two are main's again since, four are listed). The option parser against main: 120,000 generated cases, every difference named; TLS is weaker than on main only on a unix socket (3,191), where `url` names another driver than a variable's name (14), or where the adapter's own URL rules and main read another adapter's (21); no file main opens read-only is writable. Option keys that an options object inherits are read where main reads them. On the wire against main, the startup packet and the number of round trips are the same (no parameter, one, jsonb + text + timestamptz, begin / commit; prepared and `prepare: false`); only a redundant Flush is gone. Client CPU (release, 43ad527e44): point select -48 %, 100-row select -30 %, insert -21 %. The pool, `cancel()`, MySQL pipelining and the `bun:sqlite` hooks were also run under randomized stress or differential scripts. ### Behaviour changes to look at first `main -> now`. The rule: a visible change stays only where main is broken (crash, hang, data lost or stored wrong, security hole, against its own docs); elsewhere this PR behaves like main, and the pull request that wanted the change stays open. Every bullet was run on main, on this branch and, where there is one, on the reference clients: postgres.js, pg, mysql2, mariadb, Node 26.3's `node:sqlite`, psql 15 (not better-sqlite3). `ERR_*_X` stands for the `POSTGRES`, `MYSQL`, `SQLITE` codes. **Waiting for the maintainer's word** - **Integers from 2^51 to 2^53 - 1** were `float8` (MySQL: DOUBLE) -> `int8` (BIGINT). PostgreSQL stored 2^52 + 1 as 4503599627370500 in `numeric` and `4.503599627370497e+15` in `text`; now exact. The price: `select ${2 ** 52} as x` returns a string and `/ 3` divides as integers, as from 2^31 to 2^51 already. On MySQL only VARCHAR was wrong; there `* 4096` is a new errno 1690, and mysql2 and mariadb behave like main (#43293). - **An array with an enumerable `raw` is refused.** `Object.assign([text], { raw: [text] })`, also what Babel's and swc's loose mode emit for a tagged template, ran `text` as SQL, as in postgres.js -> `TypeError`; tslib and the strict helpers (non-enumerable `raw`) still run. It closes `ids.raw = []` on a data array pasting `ids[0]` into the SQL, which only the application itself can set. The own-property half of the check closes more: on main a polluted `Array.prototype.raw = []` turns `sql([userData])` into SQL text. The price is every tagged call compiled in loose mode (#38219). - **An untyped `sql.array()` has no cast.** `sql.array(["a", "b"])` without a type was cast to `::JSON[]`, so both examples of main's docs fail -> no cast, the server decides (#41301, #41242). Where it can't tell, main and postgres.js work and this PR doesn't: `select ${sql.array([1, 2])}` is the string `{"1","2"}`, `unnest()` 42725, `array_length()` 42804. Pass the type. - **`prepare: false`:** an object with its own `toString()` bound to `json` / `jsonb` was that string (decimal.js: the number `1.5`) -> its JSON, as in a prepared query on main (#39452). - **bun:sqlite `db.transaction(fn)`, the minimal fix.** When `fn` returns a native promise that is already rejected (an `async` function that throws before its first `await`), main committed -> rolls back and returns the promise. All else is as on main: an `async` callback commits at its first `await`, a `throw` behind it keeps the rows, and the docs now warn. The alternative is to refuse async callbacks outright (#45132), which also refuses what works today: `async` without an `await`, an `await` that comes last, a returned fulfilled promise or thenable. - **bun:sqlite, not changed:** without `safeIntegers` a BigInt parameter above 64 bits keeps its low 64 bits (`2n ** 64n + 5n` binds 5), as on main; a `RangeError` for it (a third of #32841) was in and is reverted. Proposed on this PR: reject below -2^63 or above 2^64 - 1, which still lets `Bun.hash()` output bind but makes a released call throw. **Silent: the same code gives another result** - bun:sqlite `changes` also counted rows written by triggers, cascades, FTS5 / rtree shadow tables -> only the statement's own, like node:sqlite and SQLite's `changes()`. An insert through an INSTEAD OF trigger on a view counted what the trigger wrote -> 0. The SQLite adapter's `count` follows (#43306). - `affectedRows` was `null` on PostgreSQL and SQLite -> rows written, 0 for a `SELECT`, so `r.affectedRows ?? r.count` gives 0 after a `SELECT` (#40434, #40432). MySQL `count` of a write: 0 -> rows affected (#41886). SQLite adapter: `lastInsertRowid` of `INSERT ... RETURNING` `null` -> the rowid; `count` of `WITH ... INSERT` 0 -> 1; `command` is the first keyword: an upsert `UPDATE` -> `INSERT`, but `with ... insert` `INSERT` -> `WITH`. - `uuid[]`, `int4range[]`, `tsvector[]`, `reg*[]`, 35 built-in array types in all, read as the literal `"{...}"` -> arrays, like postgres.js (pg: `uuid[]` only) (#41042, #41039). Columns named `01` and `1` collapsed into one key -> each keeps its name; `row[1]` no longer finds `01` (#45096). - Into `text`: a `Date` was `Tue Jan 02 2024 03:04:05 GMT+0000 (...)` -> ISO 8601; a plain object was `[object Object]`, as in postgres.js -> JSON, as in pg (#41976, #29010). - `null` in `sql.array(values, "TEXT")`, `"INT"` and the rest was the string `"null"` or an error -> SQL NULL (#35111); in a `"JSON"` / `"JSONB"` array it stays the JSON value `null`, as on main. A `Buffer` element there was its hex string -> `JSON.stringify(buffer)`. - PostgreSQL, a late mode on a statement that is already prepared: `.execute().raw()` gives text for `numeric`, `time` and binary for `int2[]`, `float8[]`, the reverse of main; `.raw()` and a late `.values()` of `numeric`, `time` rejects with `ERR_POSTGRES_UNKNOWN_FORMAT_CODE`. All else of `.raw()` is as on main (658 of 666 cells). - `prepare: false` sends what a prepared query sends (one more round trip next to an array, an `Int32Array`, an object with its own `toString()`): `[1]` into `jsonb` was the scalar `1`, an `Int32Array` into `bytea` the bytes of the text `1,2`; an `Array` into `bytea` is now `ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE` (#39452). - bun:sqlite `get()` read every row, as documented, so an error in row 2 was thrown -> one step. `SELECT 1 a, 2 b, 3 a`: `{b, a}` -> `{a: 3, b: 2}` (key order). A column named like an index (`"2023"`) now comes first in `Object.keys(row)`, as JS orders keys (#37238). `values()` / `raw()` without columns: `null` -> `[]`. node:sqlite `run()` on a `SELECT` stepped through every row -> one step. All like Node. - SQLite's `MEMSTATUS` is off: `PRAGMA hard_heap_limit` / `soft_heap_limit` are accepted and no longer enforced, as in node:sqlite (#44197, #44187). - PostgreSQL: a Flush after every simple Query disarmed the server's idle timers; after an extended query they already worked -> `idle_in_transaction_session_timeout` / `idle_session_timeout` end Bun's sessions on both paths (25P03, 57P05), `listen()` included (docs: `connection: { idle_session_timeout: 0 }`) (#44784). - After `SET datestyle = 'SQL, DMY'` April 3 read as March 4, as in postgres.js -> any non-ISO style reads Invalid Date, also MDY, which main read right. - TCP keepalive (60 s idle, 10 probes 1 s apart) on every SQL socket, no option, as in postgres.js (pg, mariadb: none): a query silent for 60 s can reject after a 10 s outage, where main resumed (not run). #44983 asked for `listen()` only. - `then()`, `catch()`, `finally()`, `run()` started the query a microtask later -> in the call, like `execute()` (#44105). `begin()` / `reserve()` overtook older plain queries -> one queue, oldest first, like postgres.js (#45275). `sql.file(path)` ran at once -> a lazy `Query`, as typed and as in postgres.js. - A result returned from a `begin()` / `savepoint()` callback came back as a plain `Array` without `count`, `command`, `columns` -> the result itself, like postgres.js; `assert.deepStrictEqual` with an array literal then fails (#45387). - A statement on an ended `tx`: `ERR_*_CONNECTION_CLOSED` -> `ERR_*_INVALID_TRANSACTION_STATE`, because retry helpers rerun on "connection closed" (#43263). - With a URL, `host` / `user` / `pass` beat `hostname` / `username` / `password`; without one they lost -> the long names always win. `?path=A` beat `{ path: B }` (also `unix://A` and `{ socket: B }`) -> the option wins, like every other option. - MySQL / MariaDB ignored `?connect_timeout=`, `?idle_timeout=`, `?max_lifetime=`, `?max=` in the URL -> they set the options (see New). - MySQL / MariaDB: `close()` and the timers send COM_QUIT, like mysql2 and mariadb. "Connection closed" / "failed to bind and execute query" for most client-side codes -> one sentence per code (#38468). An ERR packet the server sends unasked reaches `onclose` as the server's error, not as `ERR_MYSQL_UNEXPECTED_PACKET` (#40913). - Driver errors: `stack` is the header line only (it had two `internal:sql/*` frames); a non-`Error` thrown while a parameter is read is no longer wrapped (#44118, #44204). PostgreSQL statement names in server logs: `P` + 40 bytes of SQL + `$` + id -> `P<id>` (#44042). **Loud: an error where main ran** - `PGUSERNAME` and `USERNAME` are read as the PostgreSQL user, as main's docs promise; main ignored both. `PGUSERNAME` beats `USER`. `USERNAME` counts where `USER` isn't set, as on Windows, where main logged in as `postgres` (not run there) (#26711, #26684). - `mariadb://` without a database asked for one named `mariadb`, which no server has, and couldn't connect (1049) -> selects none, like the mariadb connector; the first unqualified table is a 1046. MySQL keeps `mysql`, as main's docs promise; the types said the user name (#44367, #44373). - MySQL / MariaDB: `sql("db.table")` was one name `` `db.table` `` -> `` `db`.`table` ``, as documented, as on PostgreSQL and SQLite and in mysql2 (mariadb keeps one name). Helper keys (`sql({ "c.d": 7 })`) and aliases split too, so a name with a real dot can't be passed. A name taken from a user can now reach another schema (#24050). - A query created on `reserved` / `tx` / `sp` and first awaited after `release()`, COMMIT, ROLLBACK or RELEASE ran on the pooled connection, as in postgres.js: a `select` worked, an insert that landed in another caller's transaction resolved and kept 0 rows -> rejects unsent. Typical: ``return reserved`...` `` without `await` out of a `using` block (#43261, #43263). - `sp === tx` in `tx.savepoint(sp => ...)` -> `sp` is its own handle, like postgres.js, and ends with its savepoint; on main and in postgres.js it kept running in the transaction (#43263). - PostgreSQL: an array or object bound to `bool` / `int4` / `float8` / `timestamp` was coerced in the client (`[]`: `true`, 0, 0, 2000-01-01), so `delete ... where ${[]}` removed every row -> sent as text, which the server rejects (22P02, 22007) unless it is valid: `[5]` into `int4` is still 5, and `['2024-01-02']` into `timestamptz`, 2000-01-01 on main, is that date (#41976, #41970). - An Invalid Date was stored as 1970-01-01 on PostgreSQL (#41976) and MySQL -> rejected. MySQL: a function, or an object whose `toJSON()` returns undefined, was bound as `""` (MariaDB: errno 1210) -> `TypeError`, like mysql2. - bun:sqlite: `stmt.run(new Date())`, a Map, a Promise as the only argument bound NULL, as in node:sqlite; in any other position main throws already -> `TypeError` everywhere. An `ArrayBuffer` alone bound NULL -> BLOB. - `channelBinding: "require"` / `?channel_binding=require` on MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite was an unknown key and ignored -> `TypeError`. - A `path` that doesn't exist was dropped and TCP dialed -> `ERR_*_CONNECTION_REFUSED` (postgres.js, pg: ENOENT) (#41570). - `tls.checkServerIdentity` was never called -> called, and it raises an `sslmode` below `verify-ca` to `verify-full`, so a self-signed certificate without `ca` fails, as in pg and postgres.js (#42054, #41856). - SQLite adapter: what `onconnect` / `onclose` throw was swallowed -> uncaught exception, as on the other adapters. `?mode=RO`, `?mode=readonly`, `?mode=`, `{ readOnly: true }` opened read-write -> throw (#45153, #45079). - The guard against `BEGIN` on a pooled client also catches `START\tTRANSACTION` and `/* c */ BEGIN`, and no longer trips on `begin_work()` or copies the query (#41758, #41740). - A nested `sql.unsafe(text, values)` behind other parameters read the wrong parameter on PostgreSQL, as in postgres.js -> `SyntaxError` (#38220). - A simple `FETCH` from a binary PostgreSQL cursor decoded `numeric`, `time` and read `int2` / `oid` as 0, `int8` / `uuid` as garbage -> these reject with `ERR_POSTGRES_UNKNOWN_FORMAT_CODE`. - `COPY ... TO STDOUT` without a stream resolved `[]`, `COPY ... FROM STDIN` hung and wedged the connection -> both reject with `ERR_POSTGRES_COPY_NOT_SUPPORTED` (#45332). **Main was broken; code that leaned on it will notice** - A pooled connection that came back inside an open or failed transaction (a reservation after `BEGIN`, `sql.unsafe("select 1; begin")`) went to the next caller, who got 25P02 or lost its writes -> the drivers keep the server's transaction status and the pool closes it. For that status to be current, a failed PostgreSQL query rejects at its ReadyForQuery, like libpq, not at the ErrorResponse. Exempt: plain queries at `max: 1`, where the docs allow `BEGIN` by hand, and a prepared XA branch. - `idleTimeout` / `maxLifetime` closed connections under a running query, a reservation or a `begin()` transaction -> they never interrupt those, as in postgres.js; past `maxLifetime` a connection takes nothing new, finishes, closes (#30648, #30646, #25405). - What the caller's own `catch(f)`, `then(_, f)` or `finally(f)` handler throws was swallowed -> an unhandled rejection. MySQL / MariaDB: `begin()` never settled when a statement on `tx` was only started and failed -> settles. (94 cells against main: these 32 differ.) - Callers waiting for a connection were rejected with the close error of somebody else's connection -> the pool dials for them (#44938). A client-side auth or TLS error before the first connection was cached until restart -> every query dials. - A second `close()` resolved while a session was still open -> all calls wait for one close, the shortest timeout wins (#43959). `close({ timeout: 0 })` waited for running queries -> closes at once, as documented (#33740, #32038). - `tx.close()` without `await`: `begin()` resolved with nothing stored, or committed -> one ROLLBACK, no COMMIT, `begin()` rejects (#44799). - Two `reserved.begin()` at once shared one server transaction -> the second waits. SQLite: a second `sql.begin()` failed with "cannot start a transaction within a transaction" -> it waits. Side effect: the same call awaited inside its own callback never settles, like `max: 1` on a server; use `tx.savepoint()`. - `where id in ${sql([])}` was a syntax error on the servers -> `in (NULL)`, no row, like postgres.js. SQLite keeps `in ()` / `not in ()`. - Statement caches were unbounded -> a connection keeps the statements it used last, 1,024 on PostgreSQL and 256 on MySQL / MariaDB (there all connections share the server's `max_prepared_stmt_count`, 16,382 by default), and sends Close / COM_STMT_CLOSE for the rest (#28980, #33190). MySQL: a failed prepare was replayed, even after `CREATE TABLE` -> every use prepares again (#33189, #42720). - A SCRAM password that SASLprep changes costs a second login (see New), so a wrong one counts as two failed logins per query (main: `max`) and a right one as at most one per `SQL` instance: the rest of the pool waits for the first login, which fills the pool one login later for such a password only. A `password` function that returns a promise is not held: `max` each. Other passwords, md5 and cleartext roles: one login, as before (#41605). - `$PASSWORD` was sent as the database password -> not read. `postgres:///x` was a socket if `/x` existed -> always database `x` (#41570). - `sql("a\0b")` returned a rejected promise no `try` could catch -> throws at the call (#45160). A `resolve` / `reject` overwritten on a query with a function that throws hung `close()` -> uncaught exception; under an `uncaughtException` listener it still hangs. - bun:test: `expect(p).resolves` / `.rejects` / `expect(() => p).toThrow()` never called `then()`, so a lazy `Query` hung `bun test` forever -> they call it once while `p` is pending, like Jest (#19130). - MySQL / MariaDB: `lastInsertRowid` above 2^53 - 1 was rounded -> exact, a string, or a BigInt with `bigint: true` (#44646). Commands are pipelined (see New). A command of 16 MB or more failed in the client (`ERR_MYSQL_OVERFLOW`, session kept) -> it is sent; over `max_allowed_packet` the query gets the server's 1153 and the connection fails, because the server hangs up. A 0xFB reply (a request for a local file) hung the query -> fails the connection, no file is read. - MySQL / MariaDB: prepared `TIME(n)` lost its fraction -> `"12:34:56.789"`, padded to the column's precision like `.simple()` (mysql2 and mariadb don't pad) (#31738). `.raw()` on a prepared query gave a string for TIME, a `Date` for DATE, DATETIME, TIMESTAMP -> a `Buffer`, as documented. `caching_sha2_password` over a unix socket couldn't log in -> the password goes in clear, as the server expects there and as mysql2 and mariadb do (#37819). - bun:sqlite: `{ readonly: true, create: true }` opened read-write -> `TypeError` (#41815). `db.run("a; b; c")` / `exec()` swallowed a runtime error of any statement but the last -> throws there, the rest doesn't run (#37418, #37415, #41010). Running a `Statement` again inside its own `iterate()` loop restarted the loop forever -> the newest run wins, the older iterator throws "This iterator was invalidated" (#32917). Both like node:sqlite. - node:sqlite: `stmt.get()` on `INSERT ... RETURNING` returned a row although the commit failed (deferred foreign key) -> throws. Node 26.3 has the bug. Undo: 6 lines in `NodeSqlite.cpp`. **Costs** - The first `new Bun.SQL()` of a process: 23.3 M -> 25.1 M (+7.9 %); the first bun:sqlite database +4.6 % (release). - bun:sqlite `prepare` + `finalize`: 21,739 -> 23,284 (+7.1 %, release), because statements report their native memory to the GC: 20,000 dropped 200-parameter statements 465 -> 27 MB. - More distinct texts than the statement cache holds are prepared again and again. PostgreSQL, 24,000 queries over N texts at `max: 4` (release, limit still 256): N = 1,000: 2.0 -> 4.7 s, client CPU 470 -> 880 ms; N = 300: 1.4 -> 1.6 s. With 1,024 (debug builds) 1,000 texts cost what 300 cost; the step lies between 1,000 and 1,100. A full cache costs the server about 41 MB per connection (41 KB per statement with a join and ten columns); main has no bound. - A bulk insert with an `undefined` cell on PostgreSQL: +2.1 % (see Memory and performance). ### New **`query.cancel()` works.** It was typed and documented but did nothing. A query that isn't written yet leaves the queue, is never sent and rejects with `ERR_*_QUERY_CANCELLED`. On PostgreSQL a running query with nothing else written behind it is stopped by a CancelRequest on a second connection, outside `max` (same peer, same TLS settings and certificate check, at most 5 s) and rejects with the server's 57014. The session writes nothing until the server has closed that connection, so a late cancel can't hit the next caller's query. There `reserved.close()` / `tx.close()` also stop the running query (#33370, #44625). **COPY streams (PostgreSQL).** `query.readable()` is a `ReadableStream<Uint8Array>` for `COPY ... TO STDOUT`, `query.writable()` a `WritableStream` for `COPY ... FROM STDIN`. Bytes only (text, CSV, binary), no row encoder. Backpressure both ways. `close()` / `pipeTo()` resolve when the server has stored the rows and reject with its error; `abort()` sends CopyFail, and so does the end of the transaction, savepoint or reservation that a stream is open on: `begin()` then rejects with that error and rolls back. The query still resolves with `count`. They are web streams, not Node streams, and a `COPY` without parameters always goes out as a simple query (#23350, #15088). **`result.columns`, `result.statement`.** PostgreSQL: `[{ name, type, table, number }]` (OIDs, like postgres.js); MySQL / MariaDB: `[{ name, type, table, length, flags }]`. `statement` is `{ string, types, columns }`. Both are built on the first read, prepared or not. The runs of a prepared statement share one object, which isn't frozen. On SQLite both stay `null`: capturing them cost a 1-row query +17 % to +34 % (main's release build) (#30037, #26809, #18866). **Column name transforms (all adapters).** `new SQL({ transform: SQL.camel })` reads column `user_id` as `userId` and writes `user_id` for `sql({ userId })`, `sql("userId")`. Presets `SQL.camel`, `pascal`, `kebab`; one direction with `SQL.toCamel`, `SQL.fromCamel` and so on; or `{ column: fn | { from, to }, undefined: value }`. Names, directions and casing are postgres.js's. With `undefined: value` (`null` counts) a helper leaves no column out, like postgres.js. No `value` / `row` transform, so keys inside json aren't renamed (#36451, #15087). **`sql.json(value)` (all adapters)** stores any value as JSON: a number, a boolean, `null`, an object or array on SQLite, and a JSON *string* where Bun sends a string as it is (MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite, PostgreSQL with `prepare: false`). On PostgreSQL it returns a small wrapper, elsewhere `JSON.stringify(value)`. **SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, `channelBinding: "disable" | "prefer" | "require"`**, also `?channel_binding=` and `PGCHANNELBINDING`. `tls-server-end-point`, hash as in RFC 5929, RSASSA-PSS included, checked against libpq 15. `require` fails with `ERR_POSTGRES_CHANNEL_BINDING_REQUIRED` before anything derived from the password is sent. Off (`disable`) unless asked for, on the maintainer's decision: the login on the wire is main's. With `prefer`, psql's default, a login fails behind a proxy that terminates TLS but forwards the server's `-PLUS` offer (28000) and with an Ed25519 certificate (#41703). **SASLprep, by retry.** A non-ASCII SCRAM password typed in another Unicode form than it was set in (NFD, soft hyphen) got 28P01 while psql logged in -> the first login uses the password as typed, like main; on 28P01 from a SCRAM role, if SASLprep (two `replace` and `normalize("NFKC")`, no Unicode tables) changes the string, Bun logs in once more with that form. The pool remembers which form worked; the LISTEN connection does the same (#41605). **`tls.checkServerIdentity(hostname, cert)` (PostgreSQL, MySQL, MariaDB).** Called once per connection, after the chain verified and before anything is sent inside TLS; replaces the built-in name check. A returned object or a throw fails the connection with that value; a Promise is `ERR_INVALID_RETURN_VALUE`. Not called next to `rejectUnauthorized: false` (SQL half of #42054, #41856). **Re-prepare after DDL (PostgreSQL).** After `ALTER TABLE`, `DEALLOCATE ALL` or `DISCARD ALL` every run of a cached statement failed forever (0A000, 26000) -> it is prepared again under a new name and the old one closed. The query is re-sent only when nothing is written behind it (a re-send would reorder writes) and outside a transaction block; otherwise it rejects with the server's error and the next run works. 20 concurrent runs after `ADD COLUMN`: main rejects 20 and every later run; now 19 at `max: 1`, 15 at `max: 5`, then none (#35120, #29484). **`bun --hot` keeps database connections (PostgreSQL, MySQL).** Every save opened up to `max` new connections and never closed the old ones (2 4 6 8 10 12 sessions at `max: 2`) -> a `new SQL()` with equal settings takes over the previous load's idle connections when it would dial. Settings are compared by value; a function counts as changed. A pool of an earlier load closes only when nobody asked it for a connection during a whole load: a replaced pool lives one reload longer, a pool kept on `globalThis` and used is never touched. Session state (`SET`, temporary tables) survives, `onconnect` runs again for a reused connection. A module-level `sql.listen()` shares one LISTEN connection across loads (#25623, #23215). **MySQL / MariaDB pipelining.** `.simple()` queries and queries whose statement is already prepared go out without waiting for earlier replies; an error fails only its own query. Nothing is written behind a text with a `;` until it has ended, and a packet out of sequence fails the connection. Main's docs promise this; it sent one command at a time. Undo: `BUN_FEATURE_FLAG_DISABLE_SQL_AUTO_PIPELINING=1`. 4 executes through a proxy that holds each reply 30 ms took 124 ms on main, now 31 ms on both servers, 1 write instead of 4 (release) (#44022). **MySQL: `sha256_password`** was documented, but every login failed with errno 1045. **Arrays as PostgreSQL array parameters.** `where id = any(${[1, 2]})` (08P01) and `sql({ tags: ["a"] })` into a `text[]` failed -> a JS array or an `Int32Array` bound to a built-in array type goes as an array literal, with NULLs and nesting, also with `prepare: false`. The other typed arrays stay `bytea`; `sql.array(new Float32Array([1.5]))`, which main rejects, puts them into an array column. Into `text`, an untyped position or a user-defined type an array stays `String(value)` (`a,b`), as on main and in postgres.js (pg: `{"a","b"}`), so an array of an enum needs `sql.array(values, "mood")`. A plain array into `json[]` / `jsonb[]` follows `sql.array(values, "JSONB")`: nested arrays are dimensions, `null` is the JSON value, `undefined` is SQL NULL, `sql.json([1, 2])` is one element (that half of #33579, #29551). **MySQL / MariaDB `foundRows: true`**, also `?foundRows=true`: `CLIENT_FOUND_ROWS`, so `affectedRows` counts rows matched, not rows changed, the default of mysql2 and mariadb. Off by default, as on main (#30848, #30843). **libpq URL keys and variables.** `?connect_timeout=`, `?sslrootcert=` ... went to the server, which refused the connection, and `?password=` went out in the startup packet. Now read: `host`, `port`, `user`, `password`, `dbname`, `connect_timeout`, `idle_timeout`, `max_lifetime`, `max`, `prepare`, `channel_binding`, `sslrootcert`, `sslcert`, `sslkey`, `sslpassword`. Keys that only tune libpq (`keepalives*`, `target_session_attrs` ...) are dropped. Keys that restrict the connection (`require_auth`, `sslcrl` ...) still go to the server, which refuses them. New variables: `PGUSERNAME`, `USERNAME`, `PGAPPNAME`, `PGOPTIONS`, `PGCONNECT_TIMEOUT`, `PGCHANNELBINDING`. **bun:sqlite: `db.function()`, `db.aggregate()`**, better-sqlite3's signatures (options `varargs`, `deterministic`, `directOnly`, `safeIntegers`); `inverse` makes a window function. What a callback throws comes out of `get()` / `all()` / `run()` unchanged. A BigInt result outside 64 bits follows the function's `safeIntegers`, like a parameter (#8558, #25703, #1474, #5051). **bun:sqlite: `db.onInsert`, `db.onUpdate`, `db.onDelete`** `= function (database, tableName, rowid, schemaName)`; `null` removes it. What a hook throws is an uncaught exception at once, and the statement goes on. While a function, aggregate or hook runs, every other call on that `Database`, `close()` included, throws "This database connection is busy executing a query". No commit hook (#12631, #4175). **Small:** `db[Symbol.for("sqlite-type")]` (#22109), `stmt.reader`, `stmt.readonly` (#16469), `stmt.declaredTypes` before the first run. ### Fixed What is listed above isn't repeated. A line without `->` names a symptom that is gone. #### Pool and lifecycle - A pool that lost connections dialed nothing while one was ready (it stayed at 4 of 5 for ever and ran 3 parallel queries on 1 backend) -> it grows back, one dial per waiting caller that no dial in flight covers. - `execute()` / `begin()` inside `onclose` got the dead connection ("connection must be a PostgresSQLConnection") -> it has left the pool and the waiting callers are redialed for before `onclose` runs (#43958, #44938, #45039). - A connection the server killed in the read that finished the handshake got `onclose`, then `onconnect`, and stayed in the pool: every later query failed, `close()` hung -> `onconnect` never comes after `onclose`, both drivers (#40913, #45039, #42804). - `close({ timeout: 2 ** 31 })` overflowed `setTimeout` and killed the queries after 1 ms -> clamped (#32100, #32096). `close()`, then `close({ timeout: 0 })`, left a held reservation running (#43959). - A replaced `Promise.prototype.finally` could wedge the pool -> a private promise; the connection is released before the caller's reactions run (#44315). - `q.cancel(); await q` never settled -> rejects (#44799). - The connect-retry budget read `Date.now()`: endless under `setSystemTime()`, short on a clock step -> monotonic clock (#37960). - A `password` function that throws `undefined` left the query pending forever. `` sql`a; b`.values().simple() `` ignored `simple()`. `query.active` was always false. - PostgreSQL: a FATAL error for the running query left the connection in the pool until the FIN, and a session ended while idle reached `onclose` as `ERR_POSTGRES_EXPECTED_REQUEST` -> fails at once with the server's error, e.g. 57P01 (#40913). - `onconnect` / `onclose` never fired for the `sql.listen()` connection (#41051, #41050). - `bun --sql-preconnect` with a refused connection ran the script, then exited 1, against the docs -> exit 0. #### Handles, transactions, savepoints - `sql.begin(tx => Promise.all([...]))` with one failing task: the other tasks' later statements ran after ROLLBACK in autocommit, so rows of a rejected `begin()` or `savepoint()` stayed -> they reject, on all four databases (#43263). - `tx.unsafe()`, `tx.file()`, `reserved.unsafe()`, `reserved.file()`, `notify()`, `commitDistributed()` ignored the handle's state and ran after its end (#43249, #43261). `` tx`...`.values() `` on an ended handle threw `.values is not a function` -> a `Query` that rejects when run (#43257). - `tx.close({ timeout })` whose queries finished in time committed -> rolls back (#44799, #32148); `reserved.close({ timeout })` then lost the pool slot. `close({ timeout: -1 })` left the handle unusable (#32100). A handled failing query was reported again as unhandled. - `close()` or a lost connection started or rejected identifiers, fragments and unstarted queries, and a handle retained them all -> a query is tracked from start to settle (#44932). - `tx.close()` and the end of the callback could both end the transaction -> one end. Now that `cancel()` works, `close()` spares Bun's own BEGIN / COMMIT / SAVEPOINT (#44799, #44625). - Connection lost under a `begin()` whose callback doesn't return: later `begin()`, `reserve()`, `close()` hung -> the slot goes back at the loss (#43205). `reserved.unsafe()` then ran on the pool's next connection (#45039). - `reserved.release()` during a running `reserved.begin()`: the nested COMMIT committed the next caller's work -> the connection goes back after the transaction (#43255). - `tx.savepoint(sp => [q1, q2])` sent RELEASE before the queries (#43263). `tx.savepoint("audit", fn)` sent `SAVEPOINT s0` -> `s0_audit` (#45111). A failed ROLLBACK lost the callback's error -> it is the `cause` (#41817). - The `begin()` callback saw no `AsyncLocalStorage` store on a cold pool, another request's on a busy one -> its caller's (#43652). - A `reserve()` handle dropped without `release()` kept its connection forever -> released when collected (#35117). - `sql instanceof Bun.SQL` threw -> true for every handle; `class X extends Bun.SQL {}` threw at the definition -> `new X()` throws "Bun.SQL cannot be subclassed" (#42637). `new Bun.sql(url, { tls: true })` dropped the options and connected in plaintext (#45118). - SQLite: a failed COMMIT left the transaction open and every later `begin()` failed -> rolled back. After `INSERT OR ROLLBACK`, `RAISE(ROLLBACK)`, `SQLITE_FULL` the rest of the callback ran in autocommit -> nothing more runs (#45065). `close()` didn't reject a running `begin()` (#43116). #### Options, URLs, environment - `{ filename: "./dev.db" }` without `adapter` dialed PostgreSQL on host `.`; `SQLITE_URL=x.db` opened `postgres://x.db` (#44483). A server's URL in `filename`, or `hostname`, `port` ... next to it, still make it a connection string. `{ adapter: "sqlite", url }` opened `:memory:` (that half of #38427). - `{ adapter: "sqlite" }` next to a server `DATABASE_URL` used it as the file name -> `:memory:`. `{ adapter: "mysql" }` without a host next to `DATABASE_URL=postgres://...` dialed that host and timed out -> `MYSQL_URL`, else defaults, and then with the TLS level the passed-over URL asks for, as on main (`tls: false` or `ssl: "..."` replaces it); such a URL without a host fills in as on main (#45080). - `hostname`, `host`, `path`, `socket` or five explicit PostgreSQL fields next to `DATABASE_URL=:memory:` or another SQLite URL opened SQLite -> the server. `{ url: "postgres://..." }` next to `MYSQL_URL` ran the MySQL driver on it and timed out -> the scheme of `url` wins over the name of a variable (those parts of #41586). - SQLite: `?mode=rw` created the file; `?mode=rw&mode=ro`, a `mode=ro` next to a `#` (`?mode=ro#x`, `?a=b#mode=ro`), `?mode=ro` + `{ readonly: undefined }`, `{ readwrite: false }` opened read-write -> read-only (#38417, #45079, #45153). `bigint: true` did nothing -> `safeIntegers` (#41816). - `socket:` and `?socket=`, both documented, did nothing -> aliases of `path`. `mysql://user:pass@/db?socket=...` threw `Invalid URL` -> URLs without a host parse (#37807, #23954). - A host that starts with `/` (`hostname`, `PGHOST`, `?host=`, `%2F...`) went to DNS -> socket directory. `sslmode=require` on a PostgreSQL unix socket failed -> ignored there, like libpq. - PostgreSQL: a `path` that is a directory was dialed as it is -> `<directory>/.s.PGSQL.<port>`. The pathname of `unix:///run/a.sock` was also the database `run/a.sock` -> the default database. `SQLITE://` / `FILE:` in `filename` or in a variable were `Invalid URL` or PostgreSQL -> SQLite, as in the string form. A NUL in `path` was dropped and TCP dialed -> rejected. - `console.log(sql.options)` printed the password, `tls.key`, `tls.passphrase` -> `[REDACTED]` (#41725). `sql.options.sslMode = "require"` meant `disable` -> the next query rejects (#43818). #### Query building - ``where ${[sql`a`, sql`or b`]}`` bound one parameter and matched every row on PostgreSQL -> the fragments are joined. ``sql({ ts: sql`now()` })``, `sql({ n: sql.array(a, "INT4") })` failed -> work. - The MySQL update helper knew one spelling of `ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE` -> any (#32040, #32035). Keywords inside strings and comments confused helpers. Each helper copied and lower-cased the whole text so far (#43789). - `Buffer` / `Uint8Array` elements in `sql.array` stored garbage -> `\x` hex; a typed array stored `{NaN,NaN}` -> its numbers (#36241). - `sql({ "-1": 1 })` threw. An identifier used in another client's query was quoted for the wrong dialect (#24050). `sql.unsafe(text, values)` read the caller's array when the query ran. - `globalThis.Array = ...` before the first use of `Bun.SQL` threw "The superclass is not a constructor" (#32558). #### PostgreSQL protocol, types, errors - Every pattern of NULLs in a statement's parameters prepared another statement, and none was ever closed, so backends grew to several GB -> the cache key is the text plus the declared types, NULL fits any (#28980). - A statement name could end inside a multi-byte character, and two texts with the same first 40 bytes could share one (42P05) (#44042). A text that ends in NUL put the stream out of step; extended batches sent a Flush before Sync (#44784). - An `int4[]` / `float4[]` with a NULL or more than one dimension was rejected on a binary path (`NULLS_IN_ARRAY_NOT_SUPPORTED_YET`, `MULTIDIMENSIONAL_ARRAY_NOT_SUPPORTED_YET`) -> a plain `Array`, `null` for NULL, `float4` elements widened. The elements decide, not the header's has-nulls flag, which the server leaves set after the last NULL is gone (those parts of #45211, #45062). - A `numeric` of 131,069+ digits read `""` or `"-"` when sent in binary -> to decode, `numeric` and `time` are asked for in text and their binary decoders are deleted (#45014); `int2[]` and `float8[]` are asked for in binary. The values are the same. - Text arrays had a parser with its own number, JSON, date and bytea decoders -> a tokenizer that hands each element to the scalar decoder. Fixed by it: explicit bounds, `'[0:2]={1,2,3}'`, `indkey::int2[]` (#43335, #43332); `1e-07`, `1e+20` in float arrays, `12345678901`, `1e5`, `[null]` in `json[]`, `-0` (#43336, #45305); `json[]` nested over 100 deep. - BC dates were Invalid Date, dates past year 9999 were read in local time on the text paths -> one parser, same instant under every `TZ`. - 65,536 parameters, and on MySQL the second run of a failed prepare or a wrong parameter count, rejected with a plain object (no `stack`, not `instanceof Error`) (#44118, #43992, #43993). A failing query stayed pending forever when `Error.prepareStackTrace` threw -> `stack` is made on the first read (#44204). - `PostgresError.column` / `.line` held a position in Bun's own source when the server sent none -> absent (#45151, #45064). `detail`, `hint`, `constraint` ... were UTF-16 bytes read as text when non-ASCII. `severity` was translated on a server with another `lc_messages`. - The Bind format code came from the list of types Bun can decode, so `numeric`, `float4`, `time` were announced binary and sent as text (08P01) -> binary only where value and type match (`bool`, `int4`, `float8`, `bytea`, `timestamp(tz)`); the rest is text (#41976). - `Date` into `date` / `time` failed (#41976, #29010). `prepare: false` sent a `Date` as `toString()` and an object as `[object Object]` (#39452, #29010, #30221, #39450). decimal.js / Temporal values into `numeric`, `time` failed; `URL`, `DataView` threw; a bigint outside int64 failed -> `numeric`. - A CopyBothResponse hung the query -> "Streaming replication is not supported". - Ten codes that nothing can produce any more are gone: six `ERR_POSTGRES_*` (`*_NOT_SUPPORTED_YET`, `UNSUPPORTED_NUMERIC_FORMAT`, `INVALID_QUERY_BINDING`, `OVERFLOW`, `INVALID_BYTE_SEQUENCE_FOR_ENCODING`), four `ERR_MYSQL_*` (`INVALID_QUERY_BINDING`, `*LOCAL_INFILE*`, `PASSWORD_REQUIRED`). #### PostgreSQL authentication and TLS - `?channel_binding=` was forwarded as a startup parameter (42704). A server that offers no known mechanism got a SCRAM-SHA-256 answer anyway -> `ERR_POSTGRES_SASL_NO_KNOWN_MECHANISM`. A mandatory extension (`m=`) is rejected before the proof (#41703). - A SCRAM iteration count out of bounds failed with `ERR_POSTGRES_INVALID_MESSAGE` "Failed to read data" -> `ERR_POSTGRES_SASL_ITERATION_COUNT_OUT_OF_RANGE` with the count and the bounds (the error of #38133). A GSSAPI / SSPI request showed an unfilled format string -> "GSSAPI authentication is not supported". - Over TLS the StartupMessage (user, database) was queued when the handshake started -> written once chain and identity are accepted. - A TLS 1.2 server that renegotiates reports a second handshake: both drivers sent their login again, and the next query got the reply to it -> ignored after the first. #### MySQL / MariaDB - Two queries on one connection could resolve with each other's rows when a parameter's `toJSON` started a query (#32005). `BUN_FEATURE_FLAG_DISABLE_SQL_AUTO_PIPELINING=1` hung every prepared query (#44022). - One INSERT with K nullable columns was up to 2^K server statements, and statements piled up until the server ran out of memory (a production report is on #33190) (#33190, #28980). - `caching_sha2_password`: the scramble hashed 21 bytes (nonce + NUL), so fast authentication always failed: plain TCP needed `allowPublicKeyRetrieval: true` at every login, not just the first; a password of 20+ bytes failed with errno 1045 -> 20-byte nonce (#33504, #28161, #26195). - A length that points past its packet's end hung the query or decoded the next packet as data (a phantom row) -> `ERR_MYSQL_MALFORMED_PACKET` (#35118). - A `Date` before 1970 was rejected -> years 0 to 9999 (#31209). Prepared `TIMEDIFF()`, `SEC_TO_TIME(3661.25)` lost their fraction (#31738). MariaDB: every object or array parameter failed with errno 1210 (#37125). `DataView` was rejected. - An idle connection that got a query didn't ref the event loop: exit 0 with the query in flight, or a spinning core under top-level await (#38163, #27102). A short `maxLifetime` with a slow handshake rejected the first query. - Every `close()` counted as an aborted client on the server (`Aborted_clients` +3 after 3 closes -> +0). #### SQLite adapter - A valid `SELECT` resolved `[]` (`'%"%'` in the text, `/*c*/select`, `select*from`, `values (...)`), and `INSERT ... SELECT`, `WITH ... INSERT` reported `count` 0 -> the adapter asks SQLite whether the statement returns columns instead of tokenizing (#33583, #30811). - A text whose first statement returns rows (`sql.unsafe("SELECT 1; INSERT ...")`, a migration file that starts with a `PRAGMA`) ran only that statement -> every statement runs; the result is the first statement's rows. Only the first statement can have parameters: a later one that has any is refused, where main bound NULL or skipped it. - Named parameters on a nested `sql.unsafe()` were dropped and NULL was bound: `delete ... where name is not ${sql.unsafe("$o", { $o: "bob" })}` emptied the table -> `SyntaxError`. `sql.unsafe("... = ?", 0)` (also `""`, `false`, `0n`) bound NULL -> binds the value. PostgreSQL: a fragment with a second argument that is no array, in front of a parameter, sent `$NaN` -> works (those parts of #44745, #44867). - More than about 640,000 rows rejected with `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` (#38438). `sql.flush()` threw -> no-op (#41816). - Through the adapter too: multi-statement errors (#37418), `byteOffset` (#45229); a NUL in a file name throws from `new SQL()` (#37006). #### bun:sqlite - `{}`, `{ create: false }`, `{ readonly: false }`, `{ readwrite: false }` failed with `SQLITE_MISUSE`, `{ create: false, strict: true }` created the file -> the mode comes from `readonly`, `create`, `readwrite` only (#44908, #32422, #9410, #15876). - `SQLiteError.byteOffset` counted from the failing statement -> from the start of the text (#45229). - A kept statement returned rows with the old keys, or values under wrong keys, after `ALTER TABLE` (#32841, #1332); `stmt.columnNames` / `declaredTypes` still update at the next run, as in Node. `SELECT 1`: `row["1"]` was `undefined` (#37238, #18326). - `{ name: 1 }` for `$name` bound NULL (default), `{ $name: 1 }` threw (strict) -> both work (#13409, #18456). Strict `$1` read key `0` (#37240). - UTF-16 strings: a lone surrogate read back as three U+FFFD, a leading U+FEFF was dropped, a leading U+FFFE byte-swapped the rest (#32841). A whole number from 2^51 on was stored as REAL (#43281). `db.prepare(sql, "x")` ignored the binding (#25472, #45367); a lone value is still dropped unless the statement has one parameter. A bind that threw in `prepare()` kept the file open after `close()` until a GC. - `break` out of `iterate()` left the cursor open (`SQLITE_LOCKED`, "database is locked") -> reset (#32917). - A NUL byte in a file name, extension path or schema name cut the string short -> throws (#37006, part of #38514). `Database.setCustomSQLite()` returned `true` where it does nothing (#36371). - A bind failure was a plain `Error` -> `SQLiteError`. SQL text over 1e9 bytes failed as a whole -> the limit is per statement. System-library builds asked `dlopen` for `sqlite3` -> `libsqlite3.so.0` (#26629). #### node:sqlite - `db.close()` / `using db` kept the file and `-wal` / `-shm` open until every `StatementSync` was collected (`EBUSY` on Windows) -> `close()` finalizes the connection's statements and releases the file at once, like Node (#40005, #41890, #40001). - `stmt.get()` built a new Structure per call (#44103, #44084). A `Proxy` (Vue `reactive()`, MobX), a module namespace or a `String` object as named parameters bound NULL to everything. `applyChangeset()` errors had an `errstr` Node's don't have (#34453). #### Crashes and memory safety - PostgreSQL: a query started from a parameter's `toString()` / `toJSON()` on the same connection panicked (`@intCast`) with `prepare: false`, or gave 08P01 plus two queries that never settle -> parameters are converted first, writing Bind runs no JS, and the nested query runs behind the outer one (#43918). - `sql.options.idleTimeout = -1` (or `"abc"`, `{}`) panicked at the next connection, both drivers (#43818). `run()` on the private PostgreSQL query handle with a missing argument panicked (SQL half of #44897). - MySQL: a later parameter's `toJSON` that shrank an earlier resizable `ArrayBuffer` segfaulted -> bytes are read after all user code ran (MySQL half of #38289, #38277). - bun:sqlite: `db.fileControl(op, null)` segfaulted, `(op)` threw -> storage Bun owns (#44089, covers #36301). A `Database` could be closed under its own running `serialize()` (#41611). `RAISE(ABORT, '')` hit a debug assertion (part of #43797). - bun:sqlite, node:sqlite: a 2^30-character string aborted the process -> `RangeError` (parts of #42868). #### Memory and performance - GC cells per awaited `select 1` (release): PostgreSQL 84 -> 28, MySQL 76 -> 27, SQLite 52 -> 33 (whole PR; #44105, #44315). Per cached PostgreSQL query: 47,770 -> 23,291 instructions (-51 %). - A bulk insert of 1,000 x 10, end to end (release, 43ad527e44, the union of keys still in): PostgreSQL -38.0 %, MySQL -52.6 %; with one `undefined` cell +2.1 % and -15.7 %. - The PostgreSQL read buffer was never compacted while reads ended inside a message (rows larger than a socket read): a 1,000 MiB COPY stream grew RSS by 1,235 MB without the fix. Now (release): 255 MiB/s, peak RSS 59 MiB. - bun:sqlite (release): `all()` per row, `get` by key and an insert of 3 ints cost 4,613, 8,375 and 4,489 on main, now 3,225, 6,502 and 3,381; 29 of 31 cases are cheaper. Rows of 63+ columns made one Structure per row -> one per statement, 1,665 -> 310 per cell (#31669); an `exec()` of 80,000 statements 5.34 -> 0.11 s of CPU (#45207). - bun:sqlite: the `Database` is a GC cell that owns its connection (#41611), so dropped `deserialize()` databases and failed opens (#34898) no longer pile up: 40,000 of the first +3,016 -> +3.9 MB. #28911's `db.query()` loop 953 -> 92 MB; text over 64 KB isn't cached (#28912, #28911). Workers shared SQLite's malloc mutex -> configured once per process, `MEMSTATUS` off and `MULTITHREAD` (#44197). - node:sqlite (release): a 5-column `get()` 13,458 -> 4,077 (#44103); all 10 cases are cheaper. #### Tests and CI - **The PostgreSQL test containers crash-restarted under load** (57P03 "the database system is in recovery mode"). We infer: docker kills the `sh -c pg_isready` health check at its 5 s timeout, the postmaster (PID 1) adopts the orphan and takes its exit 2 for a crashed backend. `test/docker/docker-compose.yml` now has an exec-form check and `init: true`. - `sql-tls-ip-literal-host.test.ts` failed 16 of 108 runs on main (mock on 127.0.0.1, client dialed `::1`) -> 0. - `postgres_auth` had the md5 and SCRAM verifiers swapped and no test used it -> fixed; the login tests are in `test/js/sql/postgres-auth.test.ts`. - MariaDB runs the whole `sql-mysql.test.ts` matrix. `prestart-map.mjs` is complete (#35912, #44043), and `test/internal/prestart-map.test.ts` fails when a test's container is missing. The `isDockerEnabled()` wrappers are gone, so `BUN_TEST_SERVICE_*` overrides run the suites (#37123, SQL part of #39850). - Ported test-only PRs: #36948 #37114 #38221 #40193 #40194 #40537 #40633 #41104 #41176 #42587 #44035 #44850. #### Docs and types - `docs/runtime/sql.mdx` was rewritten. - Types: ``await sql`...` `` carries the result metadata (`SQL.ResultMetadata`) (#40434, #30037); `release()` is `Promise<void>` (#43255); `SavepointSQL` has `savepoint()`; bun:sqlite options accept `undefined` under `exactOptionalPropertyTypes` (#45079). - `onconnect` / `onclose` were documented as receiving a client -> an error or `null` (#38625, #38634). `timestamp` decodes as UTC (#39881, #39879). Multi-statement files are atomic on PostgreSQL only (#41744). Also #41813 (SQLite codes, placeholders, MySQL DDL), #44998 (what a savepoint holds), #44373 (defaults), #42206 (SQL half), #41094. - bun:sqlite: examples call `db.run()`, not the deprecated `db.exec()` (#24482); typings and docs for `safeIntegers()` (#26627), `isFinalized`, `toJSON()`, `clearQueryCache()`; `get()` / `all()` without arguments reuse the last bound values (#31747, #26622). ### Found and not fixed "Also on main" is marked (m). - **Worth a close read:** `signature_digest_nid` in `src/boringssl_sys/boringssl.rs` is new unsafe FFI over a certificate the peer chooses, and `on_handshake` now runs user code. - **node:sqlite, macOS:** #45171 (read-only open of a WAL database whose sidecars are gone) isn't fixed and gets easier to hit, because every `close()` is now a real close. - **Options, decided by the maintainer: as on main.** `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` also switches off `sslmode=verify-ca` / `verify-full` (#41589). `new SQL({ hostname })` takes the other fields of an environment URL, its user and password too (#41586). A `TLS_*` URL is taken as written: `?sslmode=disable` or `tls: false` make it plaintext. `PGDATABASE` / `MYSQL_DATABASE` / `MARIADB_DATABASE` beat the URL's database (#45276, #45287). The hardening was in this PR, is out again, and stays open in those pull requests. - **Pool (m):** no lazy or `min`-sized pool (#30631, #30632, #30636), no `AbortSignal` (#23175). Queries assigned to a connection but not sent yet die with it (#44924). At `max: 1` with a `BEGIN` by hand, `idleTimeout` / `maxLifetime` can close the connection between two statements (documented). Other callers' queries already sent behind a query that leaves a transaction open are rolled back with it. - **`--hot`:** a kept pool that nobody asks for a connection during a whole load has its idle connections closed and dials again on demand. An uncleared `setInterval` of an earlier load that queries makes its old pool fill again (m). `listen()` callbacks of earlier loads keep running (m). - **cancel():** a running PostgreSQL query with another one written behind it rejects at once but runs to its end on the server, as on main. MySQL / MariaDB (m): a query on the wire runs to its end. No `KILL QUERY` is sent: it names a session, and a late kill hit the session's next query in 34 % to 88 % of our tries, depending on server and set-up (#44625). - **MariaDB XA**, `max > 1` (m): the connection that prepared a branch answers other callers with 1399, and `commitDistributed()` elsewhere gets 1397. New: `reserved.beginDistributed()` directly followed by `reserved.release()` closes the connection. - **PostgreSQL (m):** `real`, `int4[]` and `float4[]` follow the wire format: `0.1` / `Array` in text, `0.10000000149011612` / a typed array in binary (#41888, #45211). A string bound to `json` / `jsonb` is stored as a JSON string when prepared, like postgres.js, and sent as it is with `prepare: false`, like pg; so `${JSON.stringify(obj)}` stores a string (#28819, #40944). Arrays of user-defined types read as the literal `"{a,b}"` (#41040), composites as `"(1,q)"` (#20379). A fractional number into `numeric` keeps 15 digits, a bare number into `json` / `money` fails (42804). `prepare: false`: a `Date` into `time`, `json`, `jsonb` is rejected. - **PostgreSQL auth:** `prefer` doesn't stop a server from asking for a cleartext or md5 password; `require` does. (m): the SCRAM iteration count must be within 4096..10,000,000, deliberate hardening; libpq, postgres.js and pg accept any count >= 1. Parity is the range check in the SASLContinue arm of `PostgresSQLConnection.rs` (#38133). - **MySQL:** `sha256_password` over a unix socket still needs `allowPublicKeyRetrieval: true`. (m): FLOAT reads `0.1` from `.simple()`, `0.10000000149011612` prepared, like mysql2 (#41888); BIGINT above 2^31 is a string; after `USE` a cached text still runs in the OLD database, silently; a multi-statement text that `KILL QUERY` hits between two statements never settles (`maxLifetime` bounds it). - **SQLite:** on every adapter `transform.undefined` skips `sql.unsafe()` values. `db.prepare("a; b").run()` runs only `a`, like node:sqlite (documented). - **Not reproduced on Linux, no claim:** #24130 #24845 #24434 #23305 #30494 #16844 #17173 #23654 #32099. ### Decisions reversed while writing this - `--hot` was first going to close the old load's connections; the maintainer overruled it. "Close when the settings changed" then closed pools the program still used; now use decides. - The MySQL statement cache was going to be keyed on the text alone, like mysql2 and mariadb. MySQL >= 8.0.22 settles a parameter's type at its first non-NULL value, so `WHERE name = ${"bob"}` after `${5}` returned wrong rows: one statement per text and set of non-NULL types. - Ed25519 under `prefer` was going to fall back to unbound SCRAM, as in #41703; psql 15 fails, and a fallback lets whoever picks the certificate switch the binding off. - `SQLITE_DEFAULT_WAL_SYNCHRONOUS=1` (#20662) was in and is reverted: an upgrade must not lower the durability of a COMMIT. - On the maintainer's decision: a bulk insert takes the first row's keys as its columns, as on main and in postgres.js, not the union of all rows' keys (half of #35111); `int4[]` / `float4[]` and `real` follow the wire format, not one form on every path (#45211, #41888); `console.log(rows)`, `Object.keys(rows)` and a spread list `count`, `command`, `lastInsertRowid`, `affectedRows`, as on main (#38443; `columns` and `statement`, new, are not listed); MySQL's default database stays `mysql`. - Five more are main's again, because main works there and nobody asked: a failing query that nobody handles no longer ends the process; the first query fills the pool to `max` (the lazy pool, #30636); a caller whose dial is refused waits for a connection that is reserved or in a transaction; PostgreSQL `.raw()` returns main's bytes, not text; in `sql.array(values, "JSON" | "JSONB")` `null` is the JSON value and a nested array a dimension. - Taken out before the merge, because main works there. Values: a string into `json` / `jsonb` sent as it is (#40944), a JS array into `text` as an array literal, `Infinity` untyped, typed arrays by the server's type, `foundRows: true` by default, `not in (NULL)` for an empty list on SQLite, the result mode fixed at `execute()`. Errors: for an `async` `db.transaction()` callback (#45132), `parts.map(sql.unsafe)`, `sql.unsafe(text, 0)` (#44745, #44867), `new Database(path, true)`, `{ readonly: true, create: true }` on the SQLite adapter, `prepare: false` on MariaDB. Options: `?` inside a plain SQLite file name (#38427), `new SQL("")` reading the environment. ### From outside contributors PRs by people, team members included. Every item is reimplemented from the idea unless it says otherwise. - #40913 @dylan-conway: his mechanism as it is (`onconnect` at the end of the read, only if still connected), ported by hand to both drivers. Also the error of his #38514. - #25623 @eriklangille: the diagnosis in #23215 and the goal, reuse across `--hot` reloads. Other mechanism: connections move between pools in `pool.ts`, no GC hook. - #23350 @gohryt: the request for COPY and the scenarios to test. Other API. - #36451 @pjb3: the `transform` option on all adapters, with postgres.js's directions, applied to the row shape. - #8558 @nikeee, #25703 @jdjkelly: user-defined functions; the name `function`, option names, arity rule, test ideas. - #12631 @jecquas: `sqlite3_update_hook`, in the shape its review suggested. - #31669 @alii: one cached Structure for rows wider than 62 columns. #31209, #31738 @alii: `Date` parameters before 1970, fractional seconds of binary TIME. - #43789 @ralyodio: the diagnosis that `detectCommand` copies and lower-cases the whole text per helper. #45151 @RubenPari: the cause (every JSC `Error` has its own `line` / `column`) and the `delete`. - #26711 @RajeshKumar11: `PGUSERNAME`. #45287 @wahajahmed010 (the URL's database above `PGDATABASE`) stays open: decided as on main. - #22109 @himself65: `Symbol.for("sqlite-type")`. #26627 @0xh3x: `safeIntegers()` typings. #31747 @Artoria2e5: the JSDoc correction. #24482 @jobansd: `exec` -> `run`, the same 15 edits. #41094 @deepshekhardas: trailing spaces. - Not taken, with thanks (reasons below): #26503 @S4N-T0S, #31751 @EffortlessSteven, #27442 @sosukesuzuki (cases of both are tests now), #22934 @nektro, #16884 @chrisbenincasa, #25836 @alimd, #26880 @theshadow27, #31078 @countradooku, #25403 @abelcha, #44854 and #44860 @deepshekhardas. - Not in this set: #41890 @steipete (only statements a `StatementSync` owns may be finalized), #28161 @kernoeb (found the 21-byte nonce first). Reports and measurements: @bompus (#44084, #44187), @gerardp (#35120, his burst script is a test), @Dex4Sure (#38163), @filipesarturi (#33190), @KilianB (#30037). ### Replaces #8558 #12631 #22109 #23350 #24482 #25623 #25703 #26627 #26711 #28912 #30037 #30648 #30848 #31209 #31669 #31738 #31747 #32040 #32100 #32422 #32558 #32841 #32917 #33189 #33190 #33370 #33504 #33579 #33583 #33740 #34453 #34898 #35111 #35117 #35118 #35120 #35912 #36241 #36301 #36371 #36451 #36948 #37006 #37114 #37123 #37125 #37238 #37240 #37418 #37807 #37819 #37960 #38163 #38219 #38220 #38221 #38417 #38438 #38468 #38625 #38634 #39452 #39881 #40005 #40193 #40194 #40434 #40537 #40633 #40913 #41042 #41051 #41094 #41104 #41176 #41301 #41570 #41605 #41611 #41703 #41725 #41744 #41758 #41813 #41815 #41816 #41817 #41886 #41970 #41976 #42587 #42637 #43116 #43205 #43249 #43255 #43257 #43261 #43263 #43281 #43293 #43306 #43335 #43336 #43652 #43789 #43818 #43918 #43958 #43959 #44022 #44035 #44042 #44043 #44089 #44103 #44105 #44118 #44197 #44204 #44315 #44373 #44483 #44625 #44646 #44784 #44799 #44850 #44908 #44932 #44938 #44983 #44998 #45014 #45065 #45079 #45080 #45096 #45111 #45118 #45151 #45153 #45160 #45207 #45229 #45305 #45332 #45367 #45387 ### Closed without porting - #16884: the compile option is already on main - #22934: those suppressions are already gone (#30875) - #25403: would make the private adapter interface public - #25836: part landed in #43649, two lines mistype - #26503: four claims already fixed on main; default `sslmode` stays `disable` - #26880: superseded by the author's own #26884 - #27442: already fixed on main (#35246) - #31078: nothing can call `interrupt()` while a statement runs - #31751: no observable bug on a real server - #34435: `numeric` is read as text; binary decoder deleted - #34673: its Structure slots are never freed on eviction - #35738: the mock repeats a real-server test - #35753: duplicate export already removed (#44614) - #37544: main already holds statements in `RefPtr` (#40516) - #37620: its leak was fixed on main (#40238) - #44040: superseded by #44105's synchronous start - #44854: makes the page's spelling less consistent - #44860: makes the guide's wording less consistent ### Left open - #26884: backup API is a product decision - #30636: main's docs promise the eager fill; a lazy pool is a product decision - #34281: `mkdir -p` on open is a product decision - #34863: `AsyncDatabase` is a product decision - #36712: the `better-sqlite3` alias is a product decision - #37013: SQL part obsolete since #44618; the rest is not SQL - #38133: the SCRAM floor is kept; only its better error is here - #38289: MySQL half is here; `Bun.Image` is not SQL - #38427: its `url` half is here; the `?` half changes what main opens - #38443: `console.log(rows)` keeps showing the four properties, as on main, decided - #38514: bun:sqlite part is here; the rest is not SQL - #39850: SQL gates are here; the rest is not SQL - #40250: the SQL code it repairs is deleted here; the rest is not SQL - #40944: main works, like postgres.js; the change breaks stored data - #41586: two parts are here; the rest is decided: as on main (Limits) - #41589: decided: as on main (Limits) - #41888: `real` follows the wire format, as on main, decided - #42054: SQL half is here; the Redis half is not - #42206: SQL half is here; the `nodejs-compat` half is not - #42868: SQLite parts are here; the rest is not SQL - #43797: SQLite half is here; the V8 addon half is not - #44745: its SQLite part is here; `parts.map(sql.unsafe)` works on main and in postgres.js - #44867: its SQLite part is here; on the servers `sql.unsafe(text, 0)` runs on main - #44897: SQL half is here; the node:http2 half is not - #44924: handing unsent requests back can half-commit at `max: 1`; needs a maintainer's yes - #44962: SQLite 3.54.0 should merge, and revert, alone - #45132: an `async` callback without `await` works on main - #45211: NULLs and dimensions on the binary paths are here; typed arrays stay, decided - #45287: decided: as on main (Limits) - #45437: a source break in the types, on its own ### Partly addressed - #39877: a bare key binds; an unknown key in default mode still binds NULL (`strict: true` throws). - #43113: not reproduced; the one route found to its errors (an open `iterate()` cursor) is closed. - #19130, #40077: `expect()` no longer hangs on a lazy `Query`; #19130's own script (Windows) didn't hang on Linux, #40077's other items are untouched. - #27102: the process no longer exits with a query in flight; its `CONNECTION_CLOSED` under load wasn't reproduced. #38277: MySQL half only. - #15088: its COPY item. #15087: `SQL.toCamel` and friends cover its SQL use. #18866: `columns` and `statement`, not `state`. #23175: `cancel()` works, no `signal`. #16665: `new Bun.sql(url, options)` applies the options. - #39450: Date and object are fixed; a Date into `time` / `json` with `prepare: false` still differs. - #28819, #40942: not changed, see Limits; `sql.json()` and the docs now say how to store each kind of value. - #26629: changed by reading, no such build was made. #16717: documented (macOS reports Apple's version). #26369: already fixed on main (#44618). - #44187: memory statistics and the connection mutex are gone; scaling like Node was measured on a loaded box only. - #20662: not changed; the docs give the `PRAGMA synchronous = NORMAL` tip. - #24662: async support isn't added; only a promise that is already rejected at the return rolls back, and the docs warn. - #45276: not changed, decided as on main (Limits). ### Issues fixed Fixes #1332. Fixes #1474. Fixes #4175. Fixes #5051. Fixes #9410. Fixes #13409. Fixes #15876. Fixes #16469. Fixes #18326. Fixes #18456. Fixes #23215. Fixes #23954. Fixes #24050. Fixes #25405. Fixes #25472. Fixes #26195. Fixes #26622. Fixes #26684. Fixes #26809. Fixes #28911. Fixes #28980. Fixes #29010. Fixes #29484. Fixes #29551. Fixes #30221. Fixes #30646. Fixes #30811. Fixes #30843. Fixes #32005. Fixes #32035. Fixes #32038. Fixes #32096. Fixes #32148. Fixes #37415. Fixes #39879. Fixes #40001. Fixes #40432. Fixes #41010. Fixes #41039. Fixes #41050. Fixes #41242. Fixes #41740. Fixes #41856. Fixes #42720. Fixes #42804. Fixes #44084. Fixes #44367. Fixes #45039. Fixes #45062. Fixes #45064. Fixes #45275.
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The stricter bound is not in, and in particular not for The second half is in as proposed: See "close({ timeout: 2 ** 31 }) waits for the query" and "close({ timeout: %p }) rejects and the pool stays open" (-1, NaN, "soon", 2 ** 31 + 1) in |
Fixes #32096
Repro
Cause
close({ timeout })takes seconds, but every close site (the pool close shared by the postgres and mysql adapters,reserved_sql.close,transaction_sql.close) validated the upper bound against the seconds value and then armed the timer in milliseconds:setTimeoutclamps delays above2 ** 31 - 1ms to 1 ms, so any timeout in(2147483.647, 2 ** 31]seconds passed validation and force-closed after about 1 ms, cancelling in-flight queries instead of waiting.Fix
validateTimeoutSeconds(name, value)ininternal/sql/shared.ts, bounded at(2 ** 31 - 1) / 1000seconds, replaces the inline checks. It also covers theidle_timeout,connection_timeoutandmax_lifetimeconstructor options, which had the same seconds-bounded check before their own* 1000; their native consumer saturates at2 ** 31 - 1ms, so out of range values silently became 24.8 days. The error message now states the real bound:must be a non-negative number no greater than 2147483.647 seconds. After the rebase onto sql: consolidate JS pool/connection plumbing into BasePooledConnection in shared.ts #32145 (which consolidated the postgres and mysql adapters' pool plumbing into shared.ts), that means the consolidated poolclose()inshared.tsplusreserved_sql.closeandtransaction_sql.closeinsql.ts.reserved_sql.closeandtransaction_sql.close, validation ran afteracceptQuerieswas already cleared, so a rejected close left the handle refusing all further queries. Validation now runs before the state mutation. Main has since given the poolclose()the same shape (ahasTimeoutflag checked beforeclosed = true), and this PR drops the validator into that block.While verifying the reserved path I hit an unrelated pre-existing hang (
reserved.close()thensql.close()never resolves, with no timeout option at all); filed as #32099, not touched here.Verification
test/js/sql/sql-close-timeout-overflow.test.ts:idle_timeout,connection_timeoutandmax_lifetimereject2 ** 31,2147483.648, andInfinityin the constructor and accept the exact max,60, and0.close()reject2 ** 31,2147483.648, andInfinitywithERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE, accept2147483.647(the exact max),60, and0.5, and still reject-1and non-numeric input. Pool connections are lazy, so these run without a server.tx.close({ timeout: 2 ** 31 })rejects and the transaction still runs queries and commits.The server-free tests fail on the unfixed build (13 fail: the close resolves instead of rejecting, and the sqlite transaction gets rolled back with
ERR_SQLITE_CONNECTION_CLOSED) and pass with the fix (37 pass). Re-verified after each rebase (onto #32145, and again onto current main at ae3c3ad).The new test file is separate from
sql.test.tsbecause that file is wrapped inisDockerEnabled()and skips entirely without docker; these tests need no server.[human-review] gate passed · iteration 5 · 3 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
passes on PR (with fix)
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gate history · 1 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 5
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root cause · written by the author bot
The timeout validation in the SQL close paths and constructor options compared the raw seconds value against 2 ** 31, but the timer was armed with timeout * 1000 milliseconds, so any value between roughly 2147483.648 and 2 ** 31 seconds passed validation and then overflowed setTimeout's 32-bit delay, which clamped it to 1 ms and force-closed the pool almost immediately. The fix introduces a shared validateTimeoutSeconds helper that bounds the seconds value against (2 ** 31 - 1) / 1000 so the millisecond product can never overflow, and routes all six inline checks through it. It also moves v…