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WalkthroughTLS upgrade paths now route incoming socket data through a shared TLS feeder. Buffered and ChangesDuplex TLS upgrade routing
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The PR correctly stops the original socket from receiving TLS ciphertext, but a deferred upgrade failure can still surface as an uncaught exception, while one regression test may be flaky or report failures only as timeouts. The change is mergeable with explicit owner follow-up on these bounded risks. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Found 1 issue this PR may fix:
🤖 Generated with Claude Code |
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This PR may be a duplicate of:
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Relationship to the PRs the bot flagged:
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Beyond the inline note on the _http2_upgrade.ts sibling site, I also checked whether attachDuplexTLSFeeder could stall the handshake when the underlying native handle is paused — the four raw data handlers it targets only pause via socket.pause() on push() returning false, which the feeder path now bypasses, so no new stall is introduced. Also confirmed the buffered-bytes drain (connection.read()) only fires when readableLength > 0, so it doesn't flip an otherwise-idle socket into flowing mode.
Extended reasoning...
The PR routes post-upgrade bytes on the duplex-TLS path through a stored feeder instead of the public data event, touching all four raw socket data handlers plus four upgradeDuplexToTLS call sites in src/js/node/net.ts. One same-class sibling in _http2_upgrade.ts:386 remains on the public-event wiring (posted inline as a nit; pre-existing, not a regression). Given this modifies the hot data path for every net.Socket read and sits in TLS-adjacent code, deferring to a human reviewer rather than approving.
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Updated 9:11 PM PT - Sep 1st, 2026
❌ @Jarred-Sumner, your commit 6cad8a0 has 1 failures in
🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 36534That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-36534 --bun |
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Actionable comments posted: 2
Caution
Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.
⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
src/js/node/net.ts (1)
2402-2431: 🎯 Functional Correctness | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick winAdd server-side feeder regression coverage.
Existing server tests wrap
TLSSocketinstances, but they do not assert that the original raw socket receives no TLS ciphertext. The banner test writes through the wrapped socket, so it does not force the deferredhasUnflushedWrites(connection)branch. Add tests that force both server stream-upgrade branches and assert zero TLS ciphertext on raw-socketdatalisteners.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@src/js/node/net.ts` around lines 2402 - 2431, Add server-side regression tests for the stream-upgrade flow around hasUnflushedWrites(connection), covering both the normal and deferred upgradeDuplexToTLS branches. Attach a data listener to the original raw connection, write through the wrapped TLSSocket, and assert the raw socket emits no TLS ciphertext in either branch; explicitly queue an unflushed write to exercise the deferred branch.Source: Coding guidelines
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts`:
- Around line 9-13: Remove the explanatory regression-test comments, leaving
exactly the issue URL comment at each affected site:
test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts lines 9-13, 18-20, 37-40, 47-49,
63-66, and 93-94, plus test/js/node/tls/node-tls-namedpipes.test.ts lines
125-128. Preserve the tests and issue URL comments unchanged.
- Around line 45-52: Move the terminal event listeners for tlsSocket before
raw.uncork() so errors, secureConnect, or close triggered by the flush are
always observed and the test promise settles. Ensure every relevant failure
event rejects or otherwise records failure while preserving the existing leaked
result for acceptable terminal outcomes.
---
Outside diff comments:
In `@src/js/node/net.ts`:
- Around line 2402-2431: Add server-side regression tests for the stream-upgrade
flow around hasUnflushedWrites(connection), covering both the normal and
deferred upgradeDuplexToTLS branches. Attach a data listener to the original raw
connection, write through the wrapped TLSSocket, and assert the raw socket emits
no TLS ciphertext in either branch; explicitly queue an unflushed write to
exercise the deferred branch.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
ℹ️ Review info
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Run ID: 55904209-0e61-4511-9d0e-1829990e8f21
📒 Files selected for processing (4)
src/js/node/_http2_upgrade.tssrc/js/node/net.tstest/js/node/tls/node-tls-namedpipes.test.tstest/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts
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CI status on build #86132: the two new tests in The red on that build is unrelated to this diff: Ready for review. |
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Additional findings (outside current diff — PR may have been updated during review):
-
🔴
src/js/node/_http2_upgrade.ts:390-395— This site now setsrawSocket[kDuplexTLSFeeder]unconditionally, butHttp2SecureServer#emit('connection', socket)(http2.ts:6828) gates only on!(socket instanceof TLSSocket)and per Node's docs accepts any Duplex — for a plain Duplex (or anet.Socketwithout_handle) nothing ever invokes the feeder after the initialread()drain, so the TLS handshake hangs where the previousrawSocket.on("data", events[0])worked.attachDuplexTLSFeederin net.ts already carries theinstanceof Socket && connection._handlegate with an.on("data")fallback; this site (and theonTlsCloseteardown at line 263) needs the same gate — exporting the helper would keep all five sites in lockstep.Extended reasoning...
What the bug is
The follow-up commit that covers the fifth
upgradeDuplexToTLSsite replacedrawSocket.on("data", events[0])with:rawSocket[kDuplexTLSFeeder] = events[0]; let buffered; while ((buffered = rawSocket.read()) !== null) events[0](buffered);
unconditionally. But
kDuplexTLSFeederis only read by net.ts's four native raw-data handlers (SocketHandlers.data,ServerHandlers.data,SocketHandlers2.data, and theonreadvariant at net.ts:420/742/1269/1764). Those handlers fire only for anet.Socketbacked by a live native_handle. For any other stream, storing the symbol is a no-op — nothing calls it.Code path that reaches it
src/js/node/http2.ts:6825-6829:emit(event, ...args) { if (event === "connection") { const socket = args[0]; if (socket && !(socket instanceof TLSSocket)) { return upgradeRawSocketToH2(connectionListener, this, socket); } } ... }
The gate is only
!(socket instanceof TLSSocket). Node's docs forHttp2SecureServer's'connection'event explicitly state: "This event can also be explicitly emitted by users to inject connections into the HTTP server. In that case, any Duplex stream can be passed." TherawSocket: import('node:net').Sockettype annotation is compile-time-only and not enforced in built-in modules.Why the existing code doesn't cover it
net.ts's own
attachDuplexTLSFeeder(added in this PR at line 1908) handles exactly this distinction:function attachDuplexTLSFeeder(connection, onData) { if (connection instanceof Socket && connection._handle) { connection[kDuplexTLSFeeder] = onData; let chunk; while ((chunk = connection.read()) !== null) onData(chunk); } else { connection.on("data", onData); } }
The
_http2_upgrade.tssite copies only theif-branch body and drops the gate.onTlsClose(line 263) was likewise changed to only clear the symbol, so it also assumes the feeder path.Step-by-step proof
- User creates
h2s = http2.createSecureServer(opts)and a transport that delivers a plainDuplex(e.g. a tunnel, a socket pair, or anet.Socketwhose_handleis null because it was constructed from an fd/JSStream wrap). - User calls
h2s.emit('connection', duplex)— the documented Node.js pattern. Http2SecureServer#emitsees!(duplex instanceof TLSSocket)→ callsupgradeRawSocketToH2(connectionListener, this, duplex).upgradeRawSocketToH2setsduplex[kDuplexTLSFeeder] = events[0]and drainsduplex.read()untilnull(typically nothing yet).- The peer sends its ClientHello. The bytes arrive via
duplex.push(buf)→ readable buffer. There is no'data'listener (this PR removed it) and nothing callsread()again, so the stream never flows. net.ts's raw handlers never fire because there is no native_handle. events[0]is never invoked → the TLS engine receives zero bytes → handshake hangs indefinitely.
Before this PR, step 4 was
rawSocket.on("data", events[0]), which put the stream into flowing mode and delivered every pushed chunk to the feeder — the connection worked.Impact
Regression on a documented Node.js API surface:
h2SecureServer.emit('connection', duplex)with a non-native-handle Duplex now hangs where it previously succeeded. Per REVIEW.md's "fix the whole class in the same PR" rule (which this PR already follows at the four net.ts sites), this fifth site should carry the same gate.Fix
Apply the same
instanceof Socket && rawSocket._handlegate here (falling back torawSocket.on("data", events[0])), and mirror it inonTlsCloseso the fallback branch removes the listener. The cleanest option is to exportattachDuplexTLSFeeder(and a matching detach) from net.ts and reuse it here so all fiveupgradeDuplexToTLSsites stay in lockstep. - User creates
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Re the For what it's worth the specific case cited ( |
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Both earlier findings (the missing _http2_upgrade.ts site and the dropped _handle gate) are now addressed and this run found no further issues, but the change reroutes raw-socket data delivery across four hot-path handlers and five upgradeDuplexToTLS sites in net.ts/_http2_upgrade.ts, so it's worth a human look.
What was reviewed:
- Feeder short-circuit placement in all four data handlers —
bytesReadand_unrefTimerstill run before the early return; theonreadvariant correctly bypasseskOnreadTail. - Feeder lifetime in net.ts — not cleared on TLS close, but neither was the prior
.on('data', events[0])listener, so no regression;initSocketHandleclears it for reused sockets. Symbol.forcross-module sharing matches the existing::bunUpgradeServerTLS::pattern in this file.- The
_http2_upgrade.tsinline gates onrawSocket._handle(notinstanceof Socket && _handleas inattachDuplexTLSFeeder) — a non-Socket Duplex with a truthy_handlewould take the feeder path and stall, but that input is not something Node produces.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR fixes #32242 by rerouting post-upgrade ciphertext on the upgradeDuplexToTLS path so it reaches the TLS engine directly instead of surfacing on the wrapped socket's public data event. It touches src/js/node/net.ts (four raw data handlers, four upgrade call sites, a new attachDuplexTLSFeeder helper, a new kDuplexTLSFeeder symbol, and initSocketHandle) and src/js/node/_http2_upgrade.ts (the fifth upgrade site plus onTlsClose cleanup). Two new tests force the stream-level path platform-independently via cork()+write, and one Windows-only test covers real named pipes.
Security risks
The change is security-adjacent (TLS upgrade data routing) but does not touch crypto, certificate validation, or handshake logic — it only changes which callback receives already-arrived ciphertext bytes. Symbol.for("::bunDuplexTLSFeeder::") is globally reachable, so user code could set it to intercept raw bytes on its own socket, but that grants nothing beyond what a data listener already provides, and the pattern matches existing Symbol.for("::bun...::") keys in this file.
Level of scrutiny
High. net.ts is a large, hot-path core file and the four modified data handlers run for every incoming chunk on every socket. The mechanism is small per-site (a 4-line early return), but correctness depends on the feeder being set/cleared at exactly the right points across five call sites and two modules, and on the _handle gate correctly distinguishing native-backed sockets from plain Duplexes. This PR already went through two rounds of my own findings (missing fifth site; dropped _handle gate at that site), both now fixed.
Other factors
- CI build #86132 passed the new tests on every lane per the author's status comment; unrelated flakes noted.
- All prior review threads (mine, comment-cop, coderabbit) are resolved.
- The
_http2_upgrade.tsgate usesrawSocket._handlealone rather thaninstanceof Socket && _handle; the author's rationale (only Bun-nativenet.Sockets carry_handle) is reasonable for real-world inputs but is a slight divergence from the shared helper — worth a maintainer glance rather than a blocker. - Feeder cleanup on the net.ts side mirrors the pre-existing listener lifetime (never removed), so no regression there.
Jarred-Sumner
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Can we simplify the native code parts of this instead?
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This PR is JS-only (no Rust/C++ changes): A native alternative would be cleaner: have Happy to redo it that way if you prefer; it trades the JS plumbing here for a change in |
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| /// Let TLS output held behind the previous owner's writes go | ||
| /// (`us_socket_hold_tls_output` / the duplex engine's held output). |
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If you need a paragraph-long comment to justify why the workaround is OK, the code is wrong — fix the code
…ransport instead of asserting
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Windows Server 2019 x64 debug build of 7c78dba: node-tls-upgrade.test.ts 35 pass, node-tls-namedpipes.test.ts 8 pass (with --timeout 60000 for the slow debug-only GC loop in the pre-existing test, as before). Linux debug build of a072706: node-tls-upgrade.test.ts 35 pass twice, node-http2-upgrade and socket-retention pass, lint clean. Build 109142 is running on 7c78dba. |
No-Verification-Needed: comment-only change
| /// This socket is the transport under a stream-level TLS engine | ||
| /// (`upgradeDuplexToTLS` over a handle-backed net.Socket: named pipes, | ||
| /// TLS over TLS, Http2SecureServer's injected sockets). Its bytes and EOF | ||
| /// go to that engine, never to the JS handlers — node's TLSWrap taking | ||
| /// over the parent's stream. Cleared by the engine's `release_transport`. |
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If you need a paragraph-long comment to justify why the workaround is OK, the code is wrong — fix the code
… socket (#42265) Fixes #32239. ### Problem - Regression from #42213. `tls.connect({ socket })` over a `net.Socket` built with `readable: false` reports `ERR_STREAM_PUSH_AFTER_EOF` on the wrapped socket during the handshake. That destroys the connection before any data arrives. - Cause: after TLS adopts the fd, the raw half still hands the ciphertext to the wrapped socket. `pushDataToSocket` (`src/js/node/net.ts:443`) pushes it into the ended Readable. The same leak calls a wrapped `onread`, re-enters `'data'` listeners left from STARTTLS (`Invalid socket`, #32239), and fills a buffer that nothing reads. - `net.connect({ readable: false, onread })` never calls `onread`. The `readableEnded` checks from #42213 keep the handle stopped. Node starts it whenever an `onread` buffer is set ([net.js#L830-L845](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/lib/net.js#L830-L845)). ### Fix - Data on the adopted raw half (`kAdoptedTLSRaw`) is dropped before the push and before the `onread` callback. Node's `TLSWrap` takes over the handle's reads ([wrap.js#L723-L727](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/lib/internal/tls/wrap.js#L723-L727)), so the wrapped socket never sees the TLS stream. Its idle timer is still refreshed. - The `readableEnded` checks in `resume()`, `read()` and `afterConnect()` exempt a socket with an `onread` buffer. - Verified: `node-tls-upgrade.test.ts` (`readable: false`, `onread`, no reader, STARTTLS on both peers) and `node-net.test.ts` (`onread` + `readable: false`). A build of main's `src/` fails all five. ### Background - `tls.connect({ socket })` and `new tls.TLSSocket(socket, { isServer: true })` adopt the connected fd. The native call returns a TLS handle and a raw handle. The raw handle stays on the original `net.Socket` (`kAdoptedTLSRaw`) and receives each ciphertext chunk. - A Duplex built with `readable: false` starts with `endEmitted` set, so `push()` reports `ERR_STREAM_PUSH_AFTER_EOF`. - `onread` makes a `net.Socket` read into the caller's buffer and skip the Readable. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Repro 1, TLS over a `readable: false` socket** ```js const raw = net.connect({ port, host: "127.0.0.1", readable: false }); raw.on("connect", () => { const s = tls.connect({ socket: raw, ca, servername: "localhost" }); s.on("secureConnect", () => s.write("hi")); s.on("data", d => console.log("data", String(d))); }); ``` - node v26.3.0: `secureConnect | data "banner" | data "echo:hi"` - bun 1.4.2: `secureConnect | data "bannerecho:hi"` - main: `raw error ERR_STREAM_PUSH_AFTER_EOF | secureConnect | tls end | raw close | tls close` **Repro 2, `onread` + `readable: false`.** Node's `read()` / `resume()` start the handle whenever an `onread` buffer is set, whatever the Readable state, and `afterConnect` calls `read(0)`. Main reads nothing. **Results against node v26.3.0** | | node v26.3.0 | main | this branch | |---|---|---|---| | TLS over `readable: false` | `banner`, `echo:hi` | `ERR_STREAM_PUSH_AFTER_EOF`, no data | `bannerecho:hi` | | `onread` + `readable: false` | `"banner"` | `""` | `"banner"` | | wrapped `onread` socket, TLS bytes seen | 0 | 2790 | 0 | | STARTTLS, `'data'` calls on the wrapped sockets after the wrap | 0 | 4 (client and server) | 0 | | wrapped socket `readableLength` after a 16 MiB TLS transfer | 0 | 16,802,694 | 0 | | repro script of #32239 | upgrade succeeds | `Invalid socket` on the third `'data'` call | upgrade succeeds | The last three rows also fail on the released 1.4.3. They come from the same leak and are older than #42213. **More checks on this branch** - `bytesRead` of the wrapped socket still counts the TLS bytes on the push path, like node (the TCP handle counts every byte it reads). - A 300 ms `setTimeout()` on the wrapped socket does not fire while TLS traffic arrives every 100 ms, like node (`_unrefTimer()` still runs before the drop). - The event order on the wrapped socket and on the TLS socket is the same as on 1.4.3 in these cases: the peer ends first, the client calls `end()` first, each with a plain, a `readable: false` and an `allowHalfOpen` wrapped socket. **Suites** - `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts` (5), `node-tls-connect.test.ts` (55), `node-tls-server.test.ts`, `test/js/node/net/node-net.test.ts`, `test/js/node/http2/node-http2-upgrade.test.mts` (15), `test/js/bun/net/socket-retention.test.ts` (5), `test/regression/issue/{12117,40401}.test.ts`. - The 30 vendored `test-tls-*` / `test-https-*` files that wrap a socket in TLS. - The author ran `node-http2.test.js` (380 pass) on the first commit. The second commit changes only tests. **Related PRs** - #42262, opened in parallel, returns early in `pushDataToSocket` when `readableEnded`. That fixes the `ERR_STREAM_PUSH_AFTER_EOF` case. It does not fix `onread` + `readable: false`, which comes from the `readableEnded` checks in `resume()` / `read()` / `afterConnect()`. It also still hands the TLS stream to a wrapped socket whose readable side is open or that has an `onread` buffer. Both PRs touch the top of `pushDataToSocket`, so the one that lands second needs a one-line rebase. - #36534 reworks the upgrade in native code so that the ciphertext is never dispatched to JS. This PR drops it in the JS handler, which is enough for the wrapped socket to see nothing. **Not addressed here** - `bytesRead` stays 0 on every socket built with `onread`, wrapped or not. The `onread` data handler never counted. This is also the case on 1.4.3. It has its own report. - A wrapped socket that goes through the stream-level TLS engine (a named pipe on Windows, or a socket with pending writes) feeds that engine from its `'data'` events. With `readable: false` it emits none. </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **no test proof** · iteration 1 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/net/node-net.test.ts <!-- robobun:evidence:end --> --------- Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
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#32239 and #40646 are fixed on main now, by #42265 (commit 158ff6c). It drops the data of the adopted raw half in the JS handlers, so the wrapped socket sees no TLS bytes. I verified #40646 on a build of main with a grpc-js 1.14.4 client over TLS (70,000 unary RPCs). After the next rebase, the open issue for this PR is #32242 (the Windows named pipe path), which #42265 does not address. The native rework and the lifecycle parity also remain. The branch conflicts with main in |
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@Jarred-Sumner this PR conflicts with main again, and this time the conflict is in the design, not only in the text. I pushed nothing. I need a decision from you. State
Why it is not mechanical. Since Sep 2, main changed the same functions on the old structure:
A merge has to pick one design in each place, and main's new tests pin main's choices. What main still lacks without this PR (measured today)
Related report. Another session reported that a TLS socket over a Options
Which one do you want? |
…cket it wraps (#42487) ### Problem - `new tls.TLSSocket(socket, { isServer: true })` and `tls.connect({ socket })` wrap a connected `net.Socket`. When the connection closes, the wrapped socket reports events that belong to the TLS socket: `'end'` and `'finish'` on a close, `'error'` on a peer reset. Node emits only `'close'` on it. - Its `'close'` then destroys the TLS socket early. After `raw.end()`, `finished(tlsSocket)` reports `ERR_STREAM_PREMATURE_CLOSE`. Regression from #39066 and #42265. - Cause: the native close calls the wrapped socket's close handler first (`ServerHandlers.close`, `src/js/node/net.ts:1052`). It reports its own EOF or read error and closes. Its `'close'` runs `onUpgradedClose` (`net.ts:413`), which destroys the TLS socket. ### Fix - A wrapped socket's close handler reports nothing (`closeWithTLSSocket`). The TLS socket's close handler runs next and reports the EOF or the error. - The TLS socket closes the wrapped socket at `'end'`, or from `_destroy` after it queued its `'error'`. `destroy(err)` gives node's order: `tls error`, `raw close`, `tls close`. - Node does the same: `TLSWrap` owns the reads ([wrap.js#L723-L727](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/lib/internal/tls/wrap.js#L723-L727)) and `TLSWrap.close()` destroys the wrapped socket ([wrap.js#L676-L688](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/lib/internal/tls/wrap.js#L676-L688)). - Verified: two `node:test` files, `node-tls-wrapped-socket-close.test.ts` (14 cells) and `node-tls-raw-end.test.ts` (4 tests, by @alii). Node v26.3.0 passes all 18. Bun 1.4.2 fails 11. Main's `src/` fails all 18. This branch passes all. ### Background - The TLS socket adopts the fd. The wrapped socket keeps a raw handle (`kAdoptedTLSRaw`). - Only the TLS handle gets native events. Its `on_close` (`src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs`) calls the raw handle's close handler, then the TLS socket's. - A `close_notify` reaches only the TLS socket. These closes have none: after the TLS socket's own FIN, a peer reset, `destroy()` by the owner. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Scope.** #39066 made the `'close'` of the wrapped socket destroy the TLS socket. #42265 emptied the buffer of the wrapped socket, so its `'end'` is no longer held back by unread TLS bytes. Two PRs landed on main after this one opened and repaired parts of the damage. #42293 removed the tick drain between the two close handlers, so the TLS socket gets its `'end'` and its reset error again. #42176 keeps unread data when the wrapped socket closes first. What is left on main: the wrapped socket still reports events of its own, a reset is still reported on it first with `hadError=true`, and `finished(tlsSocket)` fails after `raw.end()`. None of these PRs is in a release. **Test matrix.** Both files use `node:test` and `node:assert` only. Under bun, the last test of `node-tls-wrapped-socket-close.test.ts` runs the same file in Node.js. | | `node-tls-wrapped-socket-close.test.ts` (14 cells) | `node-tls-raw-end.test.ts` (4 tests) | |---|---|---| | Node.js v26.3.0, `node --test` | 14 pass (25 of 25 runs) | 4 pass | | Bun 1.4.2, `bun test` | 9 fail, 5 pass | 2 fail, 2 pass | | main b2ad29d, debug build of its `src/` | 14 fail | 4 fail | | this branch, debug + ASAN | 14 pass | 4 pass | The 5 cells that pass on Bun 1.4.2 are the `end()` cells with a TLS peer or after the handshake, and the unread-data cell. They broke on main after 1.4.2 (#39066, #42265). The other 9 were never right: 1.4.2 reports a reset on the wrapped socket, emits `raw end` and `raw finish` on `destroy(err)`, and in 4 cells never closes one of the sockets (those time out). **Traces.** Events of the two sockets on the observed side, in order. This branch prints node's trace in every cell. | cell | node v26.3.0 and this branch | main b2ad29d | |---|---|---| | server wrap, `end()` one tick or one `setImmediate` after the wrap, TLS or plain peer (4 cells) | `tls finish, tls end, raw close, tls close` | `tls finish, raw end, tls end, raw close, tls close` | | server wrap, `end()` after the handshake, peer answers `'end'` with `destroy()` | same as above | same as above | | `tls.connect({ socket })`, `end()` after the handshake, peer answers `'end'` with `destroy()` | same as above | same as above | | server wrap, peer answers `'end'` with 4 bytes then `destroy()`, nothing reads until the connection closed | `tls finish, (closed, unread=4), tls data late, tls end, raw close, tls close` | `tls finish, raw end, raw finish, raw close, (closed, unread=4), tls data late, tls end, tls close` | | server wrap, peer reset before or after the handshake (2 cells) | `tls error ECONNRESET, raw close, tls close hadError=true` | `raw error ECONNRESET, raw close hadError=true, tls error ECONNRESET, tls close hadError=true` | | `tls.connect({ socket })`, peer reset after the handshake | same as above | `raw error ECONNRESET, tls error ECONNRESET, tls close hadError=true, raw close hadError=true` | | `tlsServer.emit('connection', socket)`, peer reset before the handshake | `tlsClientError ECONNRESET, raw close, tls close hadError=true` | `raw error ECONNRESET, raw close hadError=true, tlsClientError ECONNRESET, tls close hadError=true` | | server wrap, owner calls `tlsSocket.destroy(err)` before or after the handshake (2 cells) | `tls error, raw close, tls close hadError=true` | `raw end, tls error, raw finish, raw close, tls close hadError=true` | | `tls.connect({ socket })`, owner calls `tlsSocket.destroy(err)` after the handshake | same as above | `raw end, tls error, raw finish, tls close hadError=true, raw close` | | server wrap, owner calls `raw.end()` (`node-tls-raw-end.test.ts`) | node: `raw finish, tls end, tls finish, finished ok, raw close, tls close`. This branch: `raw finish, tls end, raw close, tls finish, finished ok, tls close` | `raw finish, raw end, tls end, raw close, tls close, finished ERR_STREAM_PREMATURE_CLOSE` | In the last row this branch still closes the wrapped socket at the `'end'` of the TLS socket, so `raw close` comes before `tls finish`. Node closes it when the TLS socket is destroyed. That order is the same on main and is listed under "Not changed". **The order for `destroy(err)`.** The first version of this PR closed the wrapped socket from inside the native close, which runs inside `_destroy` before `_destroy` queues the `'error'`. The events were `raw close, tls error, tls close`. Now the close handler of the wrapped socket only records that the TLS socket owes the close (`kOwesRawClose`). `_destroy` pays it after `callback(err)`. A `_destroy` that deferred the close of its handle (a handshake failure closes it from a microtask) has returned by then, so the next tick pays it. In both cases the `'error'` is already queued. **Reset matrix.** Measured on the first commit against main b993710, before #42293. A matrix of 24 cells of resets. Three shapes: server wrap, socket injected into a `tls.Server`, client wrap. Two phases: before and after the handshake. Four placements of the `'error'` listener: on the wrapped socket, on the TLS socket, on both, on neither. The peer is always a node process. This branch printed node's trace in 20 cells. The 4 cells that differ are client wraps whose TLS socket has no `'error'` listener: node throws the ECONNRESET as an uncaught exception. Bun closes a socket with no `'error'` listener without an error, on every kind of socket. This PR does not change that. **Related PRs.** - #42293 (merged) made the TLS socket report a peer reset. Its two tests pass on this branch. - #42176 (merged) changed `onUpgradedClose` so that unread data survives. This PR does not touch that function. With this PR the wrapped socket no longer closes first in these cells, so that path is not reached. - #38028 moves the teardown of the wrapped socket into the TLS socket's `_destroy` for every wrap. It has conflicts with main. The `_destroy` call here covers only a wrapped socket whose fd has already closed. - #36534 changes the native upgrade so that the raw handle gets no JS dispatch. It has conflicts with main. If it lands, `closeWithTLSSocket` can go. The cells still apply to it, because they assert node's events only. **Not changed, same as main.** - `'end'` after a plain `destroy()`: bun emits one on plain `net` and `tls` sockets too. The fixture of #42181 documents it. A TLS socket that its owner destroys with no error still shows `tls end`. The wrapped socket no longer shows `raw end`. - A wrapped socket that its owner destroys directly (`raw.destroy()`): `tls end, tls finish, tls close, raw close`. Node: `raw close, tls close`. - When the TLS socket gets its `'end'` while the fd is still open (a peer that closes first with a `close_notify`, or `raw.end()`), `raw close` comes before `tls finish`. Node has `tls finish` first. - `destroy()` in the same tick as the wrap, before the fd is adopted, does not close the wrapped socket. That is #38028. - `end()` in the same tick as the wrap sends no FIN. That is #42339. **Platforms.** The first commit (11 cells, as a fixture spawned on bun and on node) was also built and run on Windows x64: a canary of main failed the 11 bun cells, the branch passed all. The `destroy(err)` cells and the `node:test` files were run on Linux x64 only. **Other suites on this branch.** All of `test/js/node/tls/`, `node-http2-upgrade.test.mts`, `socket-retention.test.ts`, and 508 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-http2-*` files: 506 pass. The two others also fail on main: `test-https-timeout.js` (debug build only) and `test-tls-client-allow-partial-trust-chain.js` (needs the test runner). Also on main in this container: `node-tls-server.test.ts` "SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname" (`localhost` resolves to `::1` first). </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **[human-review]** gate passed · iteration 0 · 3 files touched <details><summary>fails on main (without fix)</summary> ```console ASAN without fix: 14 FAILED $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (09bb546) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts: (pass) should be able to upgrade a paused socket and also have backpressure on it #15438 [1654.06ms] (pass) tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket with readable: false keeps the TLS bytes off the wrapped socket [334.63ms] (pass) tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket with an onread buffer keeps the TLS bytes off the wrapped socket [113.54ms] (pass) tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket with no reader keeps the TLS bytes off the wrapped socket [59.53ms] (pass) a STARTTLS exchange hands no TLS bytes to the 'data' listeners of the wrapped sockets (#32239) [164.21ms] 182 | ["net", "process.nextTick"], 183 | ["net", "setImmediate"], 184 | ])( 185 | "new TLSSocket(socket, { isServer }) end()s before the handshake completes, %s peer, from %s", 186 | async (peer, when) => { 187 | expect(await run("end-before-handshake", peer, when)).toEqual(eof); ... (truncated) release without fix: 14 FAILED bun test v1.4.3-canary.1 (09bb546) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts: (pass) should be able to upgrade a paused socket and also have backpressure on it #15438 [55.44ms] (pass) tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket with readable: false keeps the TLS bytes off the wrapped socket [6.04ms] (pass) tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket with an onread buffer keeps the TLS bytes off the wrapped socket [2.90ms] (pass) tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket with no reader keeps the TLS bytes off the wrapped socket [2.57ms] (pass) a STARTTLS exchange hands no TLS bytes to the 'data' listeners of the wrapped sockets (#32239) [3.81ms] 182 | ["net", "process.nextTick"], 183 | ["net", "setImmediate"], 184 | ])( 185 | "new TLSSocket(socket, { isServer }) end()s before the handshake completes, %s peer, from %s", 186 | async (peer, when) => { 187 | expect(await run("end-before-handshake", peer, when)).toEqual(eof); ^ error: expect(received).toEqual(expected) [ "tls finish", - "tls end", + "raw end", + "raw finish", "raw close hadError=false", "tls close ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>passes on PR (with fix)</summary> ```console ASAN with fix: all passed $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (09bb546) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts: (pass) should be able to upgrade a paused socket and also have backpressure on it #15438 [1471.02ms] (pass) tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket with readable: false keeps the TLS bytes off the wrapped socket [236.85ms] (pass) tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket with an onread buffer keeps the TLS bytes off the wrapped socket [84.87ms] (pass) tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket with no reader keeps the TLS bytes off the wrapped socket [75.39ms] (pass) a STARTTLS exchange hands no TLS bytes to the 'data' listeners of the wrapped sockets (#32239) [188.67ms] (pass) the close of a connection under a TLS socket and the net.Socket it wraps (bun) > new TLSSocket(socket, { isServer }) end()s before the handshake completes, tls peer, from setImmediate [2170.33ms] (pass) the close of a connection under a TLS socket and the net.Socket it wraps (bun) > new TLSSocket(socket, { isServer }) end()s before the handshake comp ... (truncated) release with fix: all passed $ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release [configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) in 1157ms (unchanged) ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release' [1/125] gen JS modules (bundle-modules) Preprocess modules (8646ms) Bundle modules (67ms) Postprocesss modules (24ms) Bundle Functions (433ms) Generate Code (28ms) [9.20s] Bundled "src/js" for production 2600 kb 197 internal modules 13 native modules 50 internal functions across 16 files [1/8] cargo bun_runtime → libbun_runtime.a ^[[1m^[[92m Compiling^[[0m bun_core v0.0.0 (/workspace/bun/src/bun_core) ^[[1m^[[92m Compiling^[[0m bun_errno v0.0.0 (/workspace/bun/src/errno) ^[[1m^[[92m Compiling^[[0m bun_ptr v0.0.0 (/workspace/bun/src/ptr) ^[[1m^[[92m Compiling^[[0m bun_boringssl_sys v0.0.0 (/workspace/bun/src/boringssl_sys) ^[[1m^[[92m Compiling^[[0m bun_safety v0.0.0 (/workspace/bun/src/safety) ^[[1m^[[92m Compiling^[[0m bun_base64 v0.0.0 (/workspace/bun/src/base64) ^[[1m^[[92m Compiling^[[0m bun_cares_sys v0.0.0 (/workspace/bun/src/cares_sys) ^[[1m^[[92m Compiling^[[0m bun_zlib_sys v0.0.0 (/workspace/bun/src/zlib_sys) ^[[1m^[[92m Compiling^[[0m bun_zstd v0.0.0 (/workspace/bun/src/zstd) ^[[1m^[[92m Compi ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>diff hotspot</summary> ``` src/js/node/net.ts | 37 +++- test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts | 100 ++++++++++- .../node/tls/tls-wrapped-socket-close-fixture.mjs | 193 +++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 321 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) ``` </details> **gate history** · 2 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 0 <details><summary>evidence per changed file</summary> ``` file reads edits tests src/js/node/net.ts 19 21 51 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts 9 6 45 test/js/node/tls/tls-wrapped-socket-close-fixture.mjs 4 6 52 ``` </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:end --> --------- Co-authored-by: Alistair Smith <hi@alistair.sh>
Builds on #42176, which is merged. The base of this PR is `main`. Consolidates #42240 (the same fix). ### Problem - A TLS upgrade over a generic `Duplex` listens for the transport's `data`, `end`, `drain` and `close`, but not its `error`. So `transport.destroy(err)` after the upgrade throws `err` as an uncaught exception. Node emits it on the TLS socket. - `transport.listenerCount('error')` is 0 in bun and 1 in node v26.3.0. An `https.request` over such a socket kills the process and does not fail the request. ### Fix - `forwardUpgradedError` (`src/js/node/net.ts`) forwards the transport's `error` through `_emitTLSError`. The four stream-engine attach sites call it. A client sees `'error'`. A server wrap keeps it on `'_tlsError'` (`'tlsClientError'` on a `tls.Server`). The transport's `'close'` then ends the socket (#42176). - A `net.Socket` transport (a named pipe, unflushed writes, TLS over TLS) is excluded. Its close paths synthesize a read `ECONNRESET` as soon as anything listens for `'error'`. See Notes. - Verified: `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`, 5 new tests. One runs `node-tls-duplex-transport-error-fixture.ts` through `bunRun` (six wrap cases in one subprocess). All 5 fail on `main`. Also `test/js/node/tls` and 9 vendored `test-tls-*` tests. ### Background - A stream with no fd cannot use the kernel TLS path. `upgradeDuplexToTLS` runs a BoringSSL engine over the stream, driven by four native thunks on the stream's events. None is an error thunk. - Node wraps the stream in a `JSStreamSocket`, which re-emits the stream's `'error'`. `TLSSocket._init` forwards that error with `_emitTLSError`. - `_emitTLSError` already exists in `src/js/node/tls.ts`. It emits `'_tlsError'` always, and `'error'` only once `_releaseControl` has run. `tls.connect()` releases control at once, a server socket on `'secure'`. <details><summary>Notes</summary> #### Measurements Each case wraps a `Duplex`, then calls `transport.destroy(new Error("transport failed"))`. Events on the TLS socket (or the request), linux x64, debug+ASAN. The first six rows are `node-tls-duplex-transport-error-fixture.ts`, and the node column is v26.3.0 with the same fixture. The `https.request` row runs in the test process. | case | `main` (has #42176) | this branch | node v26.3.0 | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `tls.connect({ socket })`, destroy in the same tick | uncaught `transport failed`, non-zero exit | `_tlsError`, `error`, `close:false` | same | | `tls.connect({ socket })`, destroy after the ClientHello | uncaught, non-zero exit | `_tlsError`, `error`, `close:false` | same | | server wrap, destroy in the same tick | uncaught, non-zero exit | `_tlsError`, `close:false` | same | | server wrap, destroy after the engine started | uncaught, non-zero exit | `_tlsError`, `close:false` | same | | `tlsServer.emit("connection", duplex)`, destroy in the same tick | uncaught, non-zero exit | `tlsClientError` with the `TLSSocket`, `close:false` | same | | `tlsServer.emit("connection", duplex)`, destroy after the engine started | uncaught, non-zero exit | `tlsClientError` with the `TLSSocket`, `close:false` | same | | `https.request` over the wrap | uncaught, non-zero exit | `req.error`, `req.close` with `req.destroyed === true` | same | A transport that errors without closing also matches node: the error reaches the TLS socket and the socket stays alive (`destroyed === false`). Two more cases from #42240, measured by hand on this branch (no test): | case | bun 1.4.3-canary.1 | this branch | node v26.3.0 | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `tlsSocket.destroy()` over `Duplex.from({ readable, writable })` | uncaught `ABORT_ERR` | `error:ABORT_ERR`, `close:false` | same | | transport whose `write` calls back with an error, `s.write(data, cb)` queued | uncaught `EBOOM`, `cb` never called, no `'close'` | `error:EBOOM`, `cb(ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED)`, `close:false` | `error:EBOOM`, `cb(ECANCELED)`, `close:false` | The callback code in the last row differs because node cancels the queued write through `JSStreamSocket.doClose`. #35386 covers `ECANCELED` for cancelled TLS writes. #### Consolidation of #42240 #42240 carried the same listener with the same `net.Socket` guard. This branch keeps the test shape the review here asked for (`bunRun`, a fixture file, a one-line comment plus the node links). The cases that only #42240 had are now in the fixture: a server wrap at both timings, `https.request` over the wrap, `'_tlsError'`, and the `'close'` `hadError` flag. #42176 dropped the `attachUpgradedDuplex` helper that both PRs had patched. It now attaches the four thunks inline at each site. So the listener moved to `forwardUpgradedError`, which each site calls after it attaches the four thunks. #### Scope: every `net.Socket` transport is left out Two arms wrap a `net.Socket`, and neither gets the listener: - The fd-adoption arm. `tls.connect({ socket: connectedNetSocket })` with no queued writes hands the fd to a native TLS pair (`upgradeTLS`) and attaches nothing to the `net.Socket`. - The stream-level engine over a `net.Socket`: TLS over TLS, a named pipe, or a socket with queued plain writes. These reach `forwardUpgradedError` and the `instanceof Socket` check skips them. Node attaches the same listener in both, so `sock.destroy(err)` on such a transport is still uncaught in bun. The reason is one mechanism. `SocketEmitEndNT`, `SocketHandlers2.close`, `failWrite` and `ServerHandlers.error` turn a peer reset into `destroy(ECONNRESET)` only when the socket has an `'error'` listener, and stay silent otherwise. A forwarder counts as a listener. The first push of #42240 attached it to every transport. `test-tls-inception.js` (TLS over TLS, no `'error'` listener anywhere) then failed on Windows x64, Windows arm64 and macOS arm64 with an uncaught `read ECONNRESET`. On Windows x64 the base passed 5 of 5 runs, that push failed 5 of 5, and the narrowed listener passed 6 of 6. Those arms also have a second route to the same failure (the raw socket's own dispatch), so they need the de-duplication that #36534 and #38122 are about. `new tls.TLSSocket(stream)` with no `connect()` wraps nothing today, so nothing reaches it there either. That is #37664's subject. `_http2_upgrade.ts` has a fifth copy of the same four `.on()` calls. #38124 routes its transport error to the h2 session. #### Fixture startup The fixture runs its six cases in one subprocess and takes the key and the cert from `KEY` and `CERT`, which the test sets. An earlier shape ran five subprocesses at once, and each imported `harness`. A debug build needs about 1.5 s to load `node:tls` and about 1 s more for `harness`, so on a loaded machine (load average 150 on 16 cores) two of the five reached the 5 s test timeout. The one subprocess takes 2.1 to 2.8 s on the same machine. #### Suites `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`: 84 pass, 0 fail. `test/js/node/tls/`: 391 pass, 3 fail, none on the Duplex wrap path. `SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname` binds `localhost` and connects to `127.0.0.1`, and fails the same way on the released binary in this container. `tls.Server socket destroySoon > delivers the whole stream when destroySoon follows end` (64 rounds of 2 MB) times out at 5 s on this debug build, and does the same with `main`'s `net.ts`. `root certificate initialization > concurrent Workers all see the same CA certificate lists` times out in some runs on this loaded machine. Vendored, all exit 0: `test-tls-inception`, `test-tls-js-stream`, `test-tls-connect-given-socket`, `test-tls-delayed-attach-error`, `test-tls-socket-failed-handshake-emits-error`, `test-tls-over-http-tunnel`, `test-tls-starttls-server`, `test-tls-destroy-stream`, `test-https-agent-create-connection`. </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **[human-review]** gate passed · iteration 0 · 3 files touched <details><summary>fails on main (without fix)</summary> ```console ASAN without fix: 7 failed, 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [4.73ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [534.04ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [6.87ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [120.38ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [14.03ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [116.64ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [150.83ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port ... (truncated) release without fix: 11 failed, 18 skipped bun test v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [0.03ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [6.17ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [0.16ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [3.30ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [0.21ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [5.48ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [4.83ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port and host correctly (skip) tls.connect > should process port, host, and callback correctly (skip) tls.connect > should handle the absence of a callback gracefully (skip) tls.c ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>passes on PR (with fix)</summary> ```console ASAN with fix: 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [3.79ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [386.28ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [6.71ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [102.58ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [15.93ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [97.47ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [122.29ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port a ... (truncated) release with fix: 18 skipped $ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release [configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) target linux-x64-gnu build type Release build dir ./build/release revision 9098c05 features lto, baseline 23 deps, 136 codegen, 1176 objects in 977ms ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release' [1/4] fetch lolhtml [lolhtml] up to date [2/4] fetch rust-argon2 [rust-argon2] up to date [2/4] cargo plan → /workspace/bun/build/release/rust-target/plan.json 244 units: 172 lib, 16 proc-macro (host), 19 custom-build (host), 15 run custom-build, 17 lib (host), 4 run custom-build (host), 1 rlib [3/4] reconfigure [1/1499] mkdir codegen [2/1499] mkdir stamps [3/1499] install /workspace/bun bun install v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) Checked 26 installs across 65 packages (no changes) [15.00ms] [4/1499] install /workspace/bun/packages/bun-error bun install v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) Checked 1 install across 2 packages (no changes) [4.00ms] [5/1499] install /workspace/bun/src/node-fallbacks bun install v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) Checked 111 installs across 104 packages (no changes) [6.00ms] [6/1499] rustc unicode_ident [7/1499] gen node-fallbacks ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>diff hotspot</summary> ``` src/js/node/net.ts | 10 ++++ test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts | 45 ++++++++++++++++- .../tls/node-tls-duplex-transport-error-fixture.ts | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) ``` </details> **gate history** · 5 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 0 <details><summary>evidence per changed file</summary> ``` file reads edits tests src/js/node/net.ts 13 12 41 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts 3 4 39 …/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-transport-error-fixture.ts 1 3 44 ``` </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:end --> --------- Co-authored-by: robobun <robobun@bun.sh> Co-authored-by: Ciro Spaciari <ciro.spaciari@gmail.com>
What is left of #36534 once the fd adoption stopped surfacing ciphertext: - A ClientHello buffered as several chunks (read(1) + unshift() sniffing) was only half handed over, because read() returns one chunk: the handshake hung. - A transport that is paused when the stream-level engine takes it never handshook: on('data') does not resume an explicitly paused stream, node's JSStreamSocket does. - upgradeTLS() enabled the raw tap before it fed initialData, so the bytes the raw half had just handed over were shown to it again. - ref() and unref() on the wrapped socket did nothing after the adoption, where node has one handle under both sockets. - _parent was never set.
What is left of #36534 once the fd adoption stopped surfacing ciphertext: - A ClientHello buffered as several chunks (read(1) + unshift() sniffing) was only half handed over, because read() returns one chunk: the handshake hung. - A transport that is paused when the stream-level engine takes it never handshook: on('data') does not resume an explicitly paused stream, node's JSStreamSocket does. - upgradeTLS() enabled the raw tap before it fed initialData, so the bytes the raw half had just handed over were shown to it again. - ref() and unref() on the wrapped socket did nothing after the adoption, where node has one handle under both sockets. - _parent was never set.
What is left of #36534 once the fd adoption stopped surfacing ciphertext: - A ClientHello buffered as several chunks (read(1) + unshift() sniffing) was only half handed over, because read() returns one chunk: the handshake hung. - A transport that is paused when the stream-level engine takes it never handshook: on('data') does not resume an explicitly paused stream, node's JSStreamSocket does. - upgradeTLS() enabled the raw tap before it fed initialData, so the bytes the raw half had just handed over were shown to it again. - ref() and unref() on the wrapped socket did nothing after the adoption, where node has one handle under both sockets. - _parent was never set.
What is left of #36534 once the fd adoption stopped surfacing ciphertext: - A ClientHello buffered as several chunks (read(1) + unshift() sniffing) was only half handed over, because read() returns one chunk: the handshake hung. - A transport that is paused when the stream-level engine takes it never handshook: on('data') does not resume an explicitly paused stream, node's JSStreamSocket does. - upgradeTLS() enabled the raw tap before it fed initialData, so the bytes the raw half had just handed over were shown to it again. - ref() and unref() on the wrapped socket did nothing after the adoption, where node has one handle under both sockets. - _parent was never set.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
Fixes #32239. Fixes #32242. Fixes #40646. Consolidates #32241, #32243 and #32372 (@Sids15, credited as co-author).
Problem
After
tls.connect({ socket })ornew tls.TLSSocket(socket, { isServer: true })puts a TLS layer on anet.Socket, that socket kept receiving the connection's ciphertext asdata: a STARTTLS handler still attached re-enters and upgrades again (Invalid socket, #32239); with no listener (postgres.js) the ciphertext piles up in the socket's readable buffer for the life of the connection (4 GB retained on a 4 GB transfer, #32241).What Node does
new TLSSocket(sock)keeps the originalnet.Socketalive (tlsSocket._parent/_parentWrap) with its own handle, for close/destroy/address/ref — butTLSWrapdoesstream->PushStreamListener(this), so every read on that handle goes to the TLS layer and the parent never sees another byte. Output is held while the parent still has writes queued (wrapHasActiveWriteFromPrevOwner). Anything that is not a handle-backednet.Socketis wrapped in aJSStreamSocketfed fromdataevents;initReaddrains whatever the parent had already buffered into the engine.Fix
The upgrade is now modelled the same way, and almost entirely natively:
upgradeTLSno longer creates a secondTLSSocket"raw twin" and swaps it in asconnection._handle: the originalTCPSocketfollows the fd into the adoptedus_socket_t(BYPASS_TLS: writes skip SSL; close/writable are chained to it from the TLS half). For the publicBun.Socket.upgradeTLS(),raw === socketnow (same handlers, samedata), and upgrading a raw half again returnsundefined. node:net'skAdoptedTLSRaw/kCloseRawConnectionbookkeeping is gone; afdIsTLSgetter tells_destroy/connect()the fd belongs to a TLS layer.jsNodeNetUpgradeTLS) doesn't enable thessl_raw_tap, so nothing of the TLS stream is dispatched to JS. Whatever the parent had already buffered (every chunk) is handed over asinitialData; strings (aftersetEncoding) fail withERR_STREAM_WRAPlike Node's JSStreamSocket.us_socket_hold_tls_output/us_socket_release_tls_output, node'shas_active_write_issued_by_prev_listener_): the fd is adopted immediately; whatever SSL emits (the handshake flight) is kept in a per-SSL buffer instead of written, while input is processed as usual (so garbage or a FIN during the hold is an ordinary mid-handshake failure). node:net queues an empty write behind the plaintext and callsstartTLSHandshake()from its callback; release writes the buffer out ahead of anything newer. Plaintext still queued natively drains through the raw half first (the TLS half chainswritableto it). A close while held reportsECONNRESETlike any close before the handshake finished and puts no TLS bytes on the wire. The stream-level engine gets the same hold (held_output) when its handle-backed transport still has JS writes queued, writes its ciphertext into that transport natively (write_from_engine), and ashutdown()with engine output still parked waits for it.net.Socketis upgraded on'connect'(TCP, named pipe, or an outer TLS socket alike), as Node'sTLSSocket._startwaits for'connect'before_handle.start(); there is no fd to adopt and no transport to write a ClientHello into before that.upgradeDuplexToTLSover a handle-backednet.Socket(named pipes, TLS over TLS,Http2SecureServer#emit('connection')) takestransport: connection._handle;NativeCallbacks::TlsTransportroutes that socket's data/end/close into the engine (never through JS or the parent's listeners), and the engine's pause/resume reach the transport (backpressure for these paths, previously a TODO). A plainDuplexkeeps thedata-event wiring, as Node's JSStreamSocket does.kTLSUpgradeSinkand the per-chunk sink checks in the four data handlers are gone;internal/net/streamTLS.tsis the one helper for net.ts and_http2_upgrade.ts.TLSSocket._parentis set (idle timeouts on the parent are refreshed by TLS activity;ref()/unref()on either socket count); the TLS socket is destroyed when the wrapped stream closes/errors and the wrapped stream is destroyed with the TLS socket (_wrapHandle/doClose);_finalwaits for a handle that is still on its way;connect()on a socket whose fd a TLS layer owns fails withEISCONNinstead of pulling the fd out from under it; the HTTP/2 raw-socket upgrade destroys the raw socket with the session and pauses the native handle for backpressure.upgrade_tls_impl:initialDatais fed before the tap is enabled, so the publicupgradeTLS({ initialData })no longer showsrawthose bytes a second time.Verification
test/js/node/tls/node-tls-upgrade.test.ts(34 cases: STARTTLS repro, client fd adoption immediate / behind a corked write / behind real backpressure,onread, server adoption immediate / behind a pending write / write issued after the wrap, bytes arriving while writes are pending, ClientHello buffered in one and in several chunks,setEncoding→ERR_STREAM_WRAP, TLS over TLS incl. peer close of the outer layer, no-listener retention, reconnect after TLS /EISCONNwhile wrapped, parent idle timeout,ref()/unref()through the parent, destroy /end()/ peer FIN / peer flood while the handshake is held (client and server side), half-open write not cut off),test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts(raw === socket, double upgrade, close-handler cross-calls),socket-retention.test.ts(raw halves collectable),node-http2-upgrade.test.mts,cluster.test.ts,node-tls-namedpipes.test.ts(Windows).test/js/node/{tls,net,http2},test/js/bun/netand all vendoredtest-tls-*/test-https-*/test-net-*/test-http2-*node tests pass as on main (plustest-tls-connect-allow-half-open-option.js, newly vendored). Scripts driving client/server STARTTLS, TLS-over-TLS, pending-write, destroy-while-flushing, multi-chunk ClientHello, parent-dies-before-adoption and reconnect print the same results under this build and Node 26. TLS bulk-write throughput (1 KiB / 16 KiB writes, release build) is unchanged within noise.Notes
net.Sockettransport never hears that transport'serror(node:tls: report a Duplex transport's error on the TLS socket #42235 covers a Duplex transport only).tieToWrappedStreamin this PR forwardserrorandclosefor every wrapped stream.no test proof · iteration 8 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/tls/node-tls-namedpipes.test.ts, test/js/node/cluster.test.ts, test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts, test/js/bun/net/socket-retention.test.ts