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tls: send the TLS 1.3 final handshake flight and the first secureConnect write in one segment - #40655
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…e in one segment A TLS 1.3 client seals its final flight (Certificate, CertificateVerify, Finished) inside SSL_read, and the custom BIO raw-wrote those records to the socket before the handshake event reached JS. A write issued from the 'secureConnect' callback then left in a second TCP segment. A server that tears the connection down right after the handshake (node destroying a socket whose client certificate failed verification) closes with that second segment unread, so its FIN teardown becomes an RST and the client reports 'read ECONNRESET' instead of a clean 'end'. Node coalesces both into one segment through its memory BIO, so a node client sees 'end'. Batch the records SSL_read seals while the handshake is pending. When the handshake completes in that read, hold the batch across the on_handshake dispatch: a write the callback issues appends to it and flushes flight plus application data in one kernel write. Every other outcome of the read flushes the batch at once. The close and shutdown paths flush a held batch before their close_notify/FIN, an error teardown drops it, and the loop-state save/zero keeps re-entrant JS (SNI/ALPN callbacks) from appending another socket's records to a held flight. Fixes #40653
WalkthroughTLS ciphertext batching now tracks socket ownership and preserves ordering across callbacks, handshakes, writes, shutdown, close, detach, and relocation. SSL loop-state storage expands to six slots. TLS 1.3 regression tests cover record coalescing, cross-socket isolation, synchronous termination, and certificate rejection. ChangesTLS batching and loop-state preservation
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Inline comments:
In `@test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`:
- Around line 1708-1710: Update the TLS test’s assertions around the client data
handler and the corresponding code near the second referenced location so they
do not treat data callback invocations as TCP segment boundaries. Replace the
data-chunk counting with transport-level raw write instrumentation or another
deterministic observable outcome, while preserving the test’s intended handshake
and application-record validation.
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Beyond the inline finding, I also checked the 5→6 loop-state slot growth — every caller (us_select_cert_cb in openssl.c, select_alpn_callback in socket_body.rs) is updated, no stragglers. The spill-collision guard in ssl_flush_write_batch was examined for the ssl_spill_owner == s self-case: batching is only entered when ssl_spill_owner == NULL, and the owner-check guard means only s's own records reach that flush, so a self-collision would require s to have spilled mid-batch, which the entry gate rules out. Given the re-entrancy surface here (per-loop shared batch held across JS dispatch, cross-socket writes from inside on_handshake), a human pass on the C changes is still warranted.
Extended reasoning...
The confirmed finding is a test-harness nit; the substantive review effort went into the openssl.c batching/ownership changes. Two concrete concerns were examined and ruled out: the FFI array-size change is applied at every call site (grep confirms only two callers, both updated), and the spill-slot self-collision case in ssl_flush_write_batch cannot occur because the batching entry gate requires an empty spill slot and the new owner check prevents flushing another socket's records into s's spill. The change is complex enough — shared per-loop state held across a JS dispatch that can write to, close, or destroy other TLS sockets on the same loop — that recording what was checked helps a human reviewer focus on the remaining re-entrancy edges rather than re-deriving these.
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The listen() reject-wiring nit is addressed — once(server.listen(...), "listening") rejects on 'error'. I didn't find any bugs this round, but the batch-ownership and re-entrant flush changes in packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c are subtle enough that a human pass on the state machine is still worthwhile.
What was reviewed:
- The 5→6 slot save/restore array is updated at every FFI caller (openssl.c
us_select_cert_cb, internal.h, socket_body.rs, tls_socket_functions.rs) — no stale 5-slot arrays remain. - Every path that sets
hs_batching = 1reaches a matching flush orssl_release_batch(WANT_READ early return, both handshake-completion branches, pending-detach, close/shutdown). ssl_write_batch_owneris cleared on detach/relocate and checked before every flush, andus_internal_ssl_writenow saves/restoresouter_batchinginstead of zeroing the caller's flag.- New tests use
port: 0,once()for listen readiness, drain subprocess pipes concurrently, and assert stdout/stderr before exit code.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR changes TLS 1.3 client handshake behavior in packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c so that the final handshake flight sealed inside SSL_read is batched and held across the on_handshake JS dispatch, letting a secureConnect callback's first write coalesce with it into a single kernel write. To make that safe, it adds a per-loop ssl_write_batch_owner pointer, teaches BIO_s_custom_write and ssl_flush_write_batch to respect batch ownership, gates batching on a free spill slot, adds ssl_release_batch on detach/relocate/destroy, flushes held batches in us_internal_ssl_close and us_internal_ssl_shutdown, and grows the in-handshake loop-state save/restore snapshot from 5 to 6 slots (updated in C, the internal header, and both Rust FFI callers). Two tests are added to test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: a deterministic segment-count test via a raw TCP proxy, and an end-to-end Node-server repro gated on nodeExe().
Security risks
The change lives entirely in the TLS write path — per-loop shared batch/spill buffers, ownership attribution across sockets, and re-entrant JS callbacks that can write to or destroy other TLS sockets on the same loop. A mistake here could deliver one socket's ciphertext to another socket's fd (stream corruption) or drop already-sealed records (silent data loss). The ownership checks look consistent: ssl_flush_write_batch refuses to flush a batch it doesn't own, BIO_s_custom_write flushes a foreign owner's batch before appending and skips batching while a spill slot is occupied, and a second concurrent spill is now treated as a fatal socket error rather than clobbering. No new user-controlled input parsing, no auth/crypto primitive changes.
Level of scrutiny
High. This is hand-written C touching a per-loop shared mutable buffer with multiple owners, re-entrancy through JS callbacks (SNI/ALPN, on_handshake), and several exit paths that each need to either flush or release the held batch. REVIEW.md explicitly flags TLS/crypto paths and cross-socket shared state as areas where a maintainer should sign off. The FFI/ABI surface changed (array grew from 5 to 6 slots), which the landing-prs cross-platform section calls out as needing every caller updated in lockstep — I verified all four sites match, but a maintainer familiar with any out-of-tree callers should confirm.
Other factors
Since my prior inline nit, commit 9070ea2 switched both new listen waits to await once(server.listen(...), "listening"), which rejects on 'error' — that resolves the only thing I'd raised. The tests follow harness conventions (port 0, tempDir, bunExe/bunEnv/nodeExe, concurrent pipe drain, stdout asserted before exitCode, no sleeps), and the segment-count test is designed to be deterministic in debug+ASAN. The PR description reports a broad test sweep. Given the intrinsic complexity of the openssl.c state machine and the number of interacting exit paths, I'm deferring rather than approving.
… held-flight hard paths The save/restore snapshot size was hand-synced across four files. Export US_SSL_LOOP_STATE_SLOTS through us_internal_ssl_loop_state_slots() and check it with a debug assertion at the Rust call site, so the next growth fails loudly instead of writing past a caller's stack array. Add tests for the two shared-slot hard paths: a write to a second TLS socket from inside secureConnect (the BIO must flush the held flight to its owner before it takes the batch slot), and end() called from the handshake callback (the shutdown must flush the held flight before close_notify and FIN). Document the load limitation of the segment-count assertion.
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Inline comments:
In `@src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs`:
- Around line 192-193: Update the FFI declarations
us_internal_ssl_loop_state_save and us_internal_ssl_loop_state_restore to remove
the safe qualifier and mark them unsafe; then wrap every call site in explicit
unsafe blocks while preserving the existing save/restore behavior.
In `@test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`:
- Around line 1770-1774: Remove the redundant issue-context comments before the
cross-socket test at test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts lines 1770-1774
and the handshake-callback end() test at lines 1828-1833; leave the tests and
any comments documenting non-obvious mechanics or reliability constraints
unchanged.
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…the final handshake flight (#43766) ### Problem - A TLS client that writes before the handshake completes (as `node:https` does) can report `ECONNRESET` with `bytesRead === 0` although the server replied first. Bun 1.4.3-canary: 16 of 24 runs. Node: none. - Bun sends the TLS 1.3 Finished and that write as two segments, Node as one. `us_internal_ssl_on_data` (`packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`) flushes the flight, then retries the write. ### Fix - `ssl_write_parked` (new bit) records a write refused before the handshake finished, until the next writable dispatch. If set, `ssl_retry_parked_write` runs with the flight held, and the write joins it: one `send(113)`, was `send(64)`, `send(49)`. - Nothing parked: the old order stays (flush, then dispatch writable). Callback order never changes. - Verified: six new tests in `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`: three fail without the fix, one without the gate. Ran `test/js/node/tls/`, upstream `test-tls-*`/`test-https-*`, http2, fetch TLS. - Self-reviewed: 16 concerns raised, 12 addressed. Rejected (Notes): two race-dependent tests, a refactor of the #40653 test, an unreachable-case guard. ### Background - usockets batches the records `SSL_read` seals during a handshake. If the handshake completes in that read, it holds this final flight across `on_handshake` (#40655). - `ssl_retry_parked_write` dispatches a writable event so the owner resends the parked write. - A Nagle server that reads the Finished alone sends session tickets. Its reply waits for their ACK (40 ms on Linux), and a reset discards it. ### Downsides - With a parked write, the final flight leaves with that write. A `Bun.connect` `drain` handler that blocks first delays the peer's handshake that long. - Not covered: a server that sends data with its Finished. The parked write stays a second segment. <details><summary>Notes</summary> - Repro: a Node v26.3.0 server wraps each accepted socket in `new tls.TLSSocket(raw, { isServer: true })`, writes 20000 bytes on the first `data`, and calls `raw.resetAndDestroy()` 3 ms after the write callback. The client is `tls.connect()` with `socket.write(request)` on the next line. Linux x64, one client process per run. - Diagnosis: an `LD_PRELOAD` shim that logs `epoll_ctl`, `epoll_pwait`, `send` and `recv`. A losing run reads `recv = 478` (the two session tickets), then `IN|ERR|HUP` with `recv = ECONNRESET` and nothing queued. A run that works reads `recv = 20522` (tickets and reply in one segment). The read path (`drain_for_error` and the low-priority exception in `loop.c`) is not involved: Linux returns queued data before the error, and there is none. - `raw.setNoDelay(true)` on the server makes the unfixed client deliver 24 of 24. That isolates Nagle on the server as the hold. Node `net` and `tls` servers leave Nagle on. Node `http` and `https` servers set `noDelay` ([`_http_server.js`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/lib/_http_server.js#L645), [`https.js`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/lib/https.js#L95)), so they do not hold the reply. - Node's shape: a write before the handshake is parked in `pending_cleartext_input_` ([`DoWrite`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc#L1126-L1133)). When the server flight arrives, [`Cycle()`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc#L2136-L2147) runs [`ClearIn()`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc#L909-L956), whose `SSL_write` finishes the handshake and seals the record, and then one [`EncOut()`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc#L641-L719) write. The trace shows one `write(129)`. - Without the reset, the same split costs latency. Against the same server with `end()` in place of the reset, the unfixed release client reads `recv = 478` and then `recv = 20044` 40.6 ms later in 10 of 12 fresh processes. - A second symptom of the same split is the #40653 shape with the write moved before the handshake: a Node TLS 1.3 server that rejects the client certificate destroys the socket with the second segment unread. The unfixed debug build reports `secureConnect,error:ECONNRESET,close:true` in 4 of 8 runs. With the fix it reports `secureConnect,end,close:false` in 8 of 8, like Node. - With the fix (debug build): the repro client delivers 32 of 32 at reset delays 0, 1, 3 and 10 ms (unfixed debug: 5 of 8 lost at 3 ms). `https.get()` delivers 8 of 8 (unfixed debug: 4 of 8). 60 of 60 connections in one process (unfixed debug: 18, 8 and 11 lost of 30). An 8 MB write queued before the handshake arrives intact: the first send is 131312 bytes, the flight plus the first batch of records. - The loss rate depends on machine load, because the server must read the Finished before the second segment lands. At a load average near 60 the unfixed release client lost 16 of 24. Near 125 it lost 0 of 24. That is why the suite does not carry the end-to-end reset test: it passed on the unfixed release build 6 of 6 times under load. - Why the bit: `ssl_update_handshake` sets `ssl_write_wants_read` for every pending handshake, so that flag cannot tell whether a write is parked. Without the gate the final flight of every TLS socket waited on the writable dispatch (review feedback on the first commit). `us_internal_ssl_write` sets `ssl_write_parked` at its three refusal sites (`WANT_READ`, a write from inside an `SSL_read` callback, a socket that is not open yet). The bit fits in spare bits of `us_socket_t`, so the struct does not grow. `us_internal_ssl_on_writable` clears it right before `us_dispatch_writable`, where the owner is told to resend. The tail retry runs after every read and only re-drives a pending handshake, so it must not clear the bit. End to end with a HelloRetryRequest against the Node reset server: `send(1452)`, `send(303)`, then one `send(107)`, 8 of 8 delivered. - Tests. The three `Bun.connect` cases are deterministic: the client's `drain` handler blocks until the proxy has read everything the client sent before the handler's own write, so a flight sent on its own is always its own chunk. `Bun.connect, retried from drain` fails on main 4 of 4 (debug) and 8 of 8 (release) with 3 chunks, expected 2. `Bun.connect, retried from drain after a HelloRetryRequest` covers a handshake that takes two reads (server with `ecdhCurve: "P-384"`): 4 chunks on main, 3 with the fix. It also reads 4 on the second commit of this PR, which cleared the bit at the tail of the first read (review feedback). `Bun.connect, first write from drain leaves after the flight` pins the gate: with nothing parked the flight does not wait for `drain`, so the count is 3. It reads 2 when the retry runs before the flush for every socket, as in the first commit. `node:tls` has no JS between the two sends, so it runs 4 connections. It fails on main 9 of 9 (debug) and 6 of 12 (release), measured at a load average near 125. A `secureConnect` listener cannot add a sync point there: since #40655 the flight is held across that listener on main too, and the parked bytes are flushed natively before any JS runs. The four segment cases run under `describe.concurrent`. The two `is failed, not delivered` tests pin the negative contract on the fd-backed path and pass with and without the fix. Before this they existed only for the Duplex transport. - Rejected self-review concerns. (1) An `https.request` test: it reaches the same `tls.connect()` write path, and its end-to-end failure is a race. (2) A Node-server test of the reset or of the #40653 shape: the failure is a race, numbers above. (3) Folding the #40653 test's inline proxy into the new helper: it is outside this diff. (4) Following an adopted socket after the retry: adoption needs a request, and no data was read on this path. The same pattern follows `ssl_trigger_handshake` two lines above. - Not changed: a handshake that completes in the same `SSL_read` that returns application data (a TLS 1.3 server that speaks first). There the flight is still flushed before the data dispatch, and a parked write follows as a second segment. A retry at that point runs the writable dispatch before the decrypted data reaches JS, which reorders `drain` ahead of `data`. Holding the flight to the end of the read loop is not safe: later `SSL_read` calls do not batch, so a record they seal would pass the held flight. - Failures seen during the sweep that are identical on the unfixed debug build in this environment: `node-tls-server.test.ts` "SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname" (ECONNREFUSED), `node-tls-root-certs-concurrent-init.test.ts` (5 s timeout), `socket.test.ts` "should not call drain before handshake" (needs the public internet), `node-http-connect.test.ts` "tests should run on bun" (5 s timeout), upstream `test-https-timeout.js` and `test-tls-client-allow-partial-trust-chain.js`. </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **[human-review]** gate passed · iteration 0 · 3 files touched <details><summary>fails on main (without fix)</summary> ```console ASAN without fix: 3 failed, 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [2.18ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [314.26ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [6.57ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [124.75ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [13.74ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [82.82ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [121.45ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port a ... (truncated) release without fix: 3 failed, 18 skipped bun test v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [0.04ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [9.10ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [0.23ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [5.45ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [0.37ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [9.64ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [6.63ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port and host correctly (skip) tls.connect > should process port, host, and callback correctly (skip) tls.connect > should handle the absence of a callback gracefully (skip) tls.c ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>passes on PR (with fix)</summary> ```console ASAN with fix: 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [8.11ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [619.12ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [11.14ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [161.01ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [53.23ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [116.67ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [182.21ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port ... (truncated) release with fix: 18 skipped $ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release [configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) in 1622ms (unchanged) ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release' [1/226] gen bake.{client,server,error}.js -> bake.client.js, bake.server.js, bake.error.js [2/224] gen generated_host_exports.rs generated_host_exports.rs: 121 exports (host=5, lazy=10, generic=106, rust=0); 245 extern-C blocks audited [3/224] gen cpp.rs (cppbind) [4/224] gen JS modules (bundle-modules) Preprocess modules (8862ms) Bundle modules (104ms) Postprocesss modules (155ms) Bundle Functions (410ms) Generate Code (35ms) [9.58s] Bundled "src/js" for production 2595 kb 197 internal modules 13 native modules 50 internal functions across 16 files [5/221] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/loop.c.o [6/221] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/eventing/epoll_kqueue.c.o [7/221] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/fault_inject.c.o [8/221] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/context.c.o [9/221] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/node_quic_shim.c.o [10/221] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/bsd.c.o [11/221] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/eventing/libuv.c.o [12/221] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/quic.c.o [13/2 ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>diff hotspot</summary> ``` packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c | 22 ++- packages/bun-usockets/src/internal/internal.h | 4 + test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts | 228 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) ``` </details> **gate history** · 1 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 0 <details><summary>evidence per changed file</summary> ``` file reads edits tests packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c 7 4 52 packages/bun-usockets/src/internal/internal.h 1 1 52 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts 1 1 52 ``` </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:end -->
Problem
tls.connect()client whose certificate the server rejects reportserror: read ECONNRESETandclose(true). A Node client in the same exchange reports a cleanendandclose(false)(node:tls: bare EOF after TLS 1.3 client-certificate rejection is ECONNRESET instead of end #40653, reproduced 5/5 on Linux, 20/20 by the reporter on macOS).secureConnectas two TCP segments: the custom BIO (BIO_s_custom_write,packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c) raw-writes the flight from insideSSL_read, before the handshake event reaches JS. The server rejects the certificate after reading segment one and destroys the socket with segment two unread. Linux then sends an RST instead of a FIN, and the RST is a real ECONNRESET at the client.Fix
SSL_readseals while the handshake is pending. When the handshake completes in that read, hold the batch across theon_handshakedispatch. A write the callback issues appends to the held flight, and the existing flush inus_internal_ssl_writesends flight plus first application data in one kernel write. This is the segment shape Node produces through its memory BIO.ssl_write_batch_ownerfield pins the shared per-loop batch to one socket, and the loop-state save/zero keeps re-entrant JS (SNI/ALPN callbacks) from mixing another socket's records into a held flight. The snapshot size is now exported and debug-asserted at the Rust call site.test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts. The segment-count test fails on main (3 chunks, expected 2). The cross-socket-write and end-from-handshake tests cover the shared-slot hard paths. The issue's script printssecureConnect -> write -> end -> close:false10/10 with the debug build. Also rantest/js/node/tls/,node-http2.test.js,fetch.tls.test.ts,bun-serve-ssl.test.ts, and the upstreamtest-tls-*/test-https-*suites.Background
loop_ssl_data->ssl_socketroutesBIO_s_custom_writeoutput to the right fd.ssl_write_batchingalready existed forus_internal_ssl_write: it collects sealed records and writes them once.secureConnectone round trip before the server decides on the client certificate. That is why the rejection lands after the client already wrote application data.Notes
LD_PRELOADshim loggingsend/recvshows Node's client writes flight + app data as onewrite(1253)while Bun issuessend(1152)thensend(57). The server (Node in both runs) reads 1253 in one chunk from the Node client, but only 1152 from the Bun client before it destroys.SOCK_DONEis checked beforesk_errintcp_recvmsg). The gate-facing test therefore counts the client's segments through a raw in-test TCP proxy. The count discriminates reliably on an unloaded machine; under heavy CPU load the two unfixed sends can coalesce in the kernel, so a green run on a loaded machine is weaker evidence than the idle fail-before recorded here (20/20 fail on the unfixed build when idle). The end-to-end Node-server repro is kept as a second test,skipIf(!nodeExe()).us_internal_ssl_closerather than rebased mechanically.node-tls-server.test.ts"SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname" (ECONNREFUSED in this environment),test/js/bun/net/hostname-resolution failures (13, same set on system bun),test-tls-client-allow-partial-trust-chain.js(node:test runner), andtest-https-timeout.js(hangs on a main debug build too).[review] gate passed · iteration 0 · 5 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
passes on PR (with fix)
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