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…NFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH as an empty string The getters of these three process.env accessors returned undefined when the variable was set to an empty string. The key was still listed. A spread, JSON.stringify, a Worker, process.loadEnvFile, process.execve and child processes then saw a variable that is set as a variable that is not set. The getters now return undefined only when the variable is not set.
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Updated 4:33 PM PT - Oct 19th, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit 2eb091647359bf97397372201fec13696316e68a passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: That installs a local version of the PR into your |
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Reproduction (bun 1.4.3-canary.1+367d939d9, Linux x64): S='console.log(process.env.TZ, process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED, process.env.BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH, JSON.stringify(process.env.OTHER))'
TZ= NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED= BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH= OTHER= bun -e "$S"
# undefined undefined undefined ""Node.js v26.3.0 prints three empty strings and |
…ue test On Windows process.env is a Proxy, and structuredClone rejects a Proxy with DataCloneError. The spread and JSON.stringify reads cover the same list-then-read path on every platform.
![github-actions[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/15368?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
…ocess.loadEnvFile
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Oct 10, 2026
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
…ab019e/process-env-empty-accessor-vars
robobun
marked this pull request as ready for review
October 17, 2026 01:20
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WalkthroughThe three environment accessors now return empty strings when their variables exist with empty values. Tests cover reads through environment APIs, env-file loading, inheritance by child processes, ChangesEmpty Environment Variable Handling
Suggested reviewers: Priority: ⬇️ Low Severity of issue fixed: Low Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to
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| Check name | Status | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Linked Issues check |  |
Issue #44379 is closed and supplies historical context only. No active directly linked target remains, so no linked-issue coding requirements apply. The PR summary and changed-file evidence show the i… |
| Out of Scope Changes check | |
The changes remain within the stated PR scope. The three getter changes implement the empty-string behavior, the execve and loadEnvFile comment updates document retained behavior, and the added tests … |
| Title check | |
The title clearly and specifically summarizes the primary change: empty values for three process.env variables now read as empty strings. |
| Description check | |
The description explains the problem, fix, scope, known limitations, and verification results. It does not use the exact template headings, but it provides the required information in equivalent secti… |
Full details: Linked Issues check
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Explanation
Issue
#44379is closed and supplies historical context only. No active directly linked target remains, so no linked-issue coding requirements apply. The PR summary and changed-file evidence show the intended empty-value getter fix and regression coverage.
Full details: Out of Scope Changes check
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Explanation
The changes remain within the stated PR scope. The three getter changes implement the empty-string behavior, the execve and loadEnvFile comment updates document retained behavior, and the added tests cover reads, inheritance, workers, and execve. No unrelated change is demonstrated.
Full details: Description check
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Explanation
The description explains the problem, fix, scope, known limitations, and verification results. It does not use the exact template headings, but it provides the required information in equivalent sections.
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Contributor
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline findings, two other candidates were examined and ruled out: the TZ getter now returning "" means children spawned with env: process.env or via execve inherit TZ= (matching Node, and the PR description already names this), and process.loadEnvFile() no longer overwriting an exported empty TZ/NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED/BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH from a .env file is the Node semantics (existing keys win, an empty string is an existing key).
Extended reasoning...
The diff removes the || value.len == 0 clause from the three accessor getters in src/jsc/bindings/JSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp and rewrites two comments in src/jsc/bindings/BunProcess.cpp and src/js/builtins/ProcessObjectInternals.ts, with tests in process.test.js, process-execve.test.ts and worker_threads.test.ts. It touches no security-sensitive surface beyond NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED being read as "" (which applyTLSRejectFromString treats like any other non-"0" value). The two inline findings (the worker env copy still stringifying undefined, and the execve comment's $-prefix claim being wrong) already signal that a human look is needed.
Additional findings (outside the current diff — GitHub can't attach inline comments there):
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🟣
src/jsc/bindings/JSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp— Workers still receive the literal string "undefined" for any process.env key whose getter returns undefined, the same bug class this PR fixes for an empty TZ. The SHARE_ENV seed loop at src/jsc/bindings/JSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp:941 and the default-env copy at src/jsc/bindings/webcore/JSWorker.cpp:298 call toWTFString on every enumerated value with no isUndefined skip. A$-prefixed OS name whose stripped base is unset (src/dotenv/env_loader.rs:505) or a non-UTF-8 name still reads undefined, so the worker's process.env gets "undefined" where the main thread reads undefined. Fix: skip undefined values in both worker copy loops the way the execve loop at BunProcess.cpp:2012 does, so every copy site treats an undefined read as absent.Why this was flagged
Trigger: the OS environment contains a name that process.env reads as undefined while still enumerating it: a
$-prefixed name such as$FOOwith FOO unset (Bun__getEnvValue strips the$at src/dotenv/env_loader.rs:505 and finds nothing) or a name with invalid UTF-8 (src/jsc/bindings/JSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp:1017 replaces bytes so the lookup misses). Entry points:new Worker(file)after the main thread touched process.env (src/jsc/bindings/webcore/JSWorker.cpp:279-300) andnew Worker(file, { env: SHARE_ENV })(src/jsc/bindings/JSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp:935-944). Both loops dovalue.toWTFString(...)on the undefined JSValue and store it, so the worker observes the string "undefined" for that key. The execve loop at src/jsc/bindings/BunProcess.cpp:2012 keeps its isUndefined skip for this very case while the worker loops do not. The base branch behaves the same for these names, but the sameisUndefined()skip belongs at JSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp:936 and JSWorker.cpp:296.Verification: pre-existing (the base branch already fails the same way for a
$-prefixed or non-UTF-8 OS env name). Worker copy sites have no isUndefined skip: src/jsc/bindings/webcore/JSWorker.cpp:295-301 and src/jsc/bindings/JSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp:935-944.toWTFStringof undefined yields the string "undefined". The execve sibling site keepsif (value.isUndefined()) continue;(BunProcess.cpp:2012).
process.env reads `$NAME` as undefined only while NAME is not set. When NAME is set, it reads the value of NAME. The comment and the test now say that.
Contributor
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LGTM — the three getters now match the generic jsGetterEnvironmentVariable path, which already had no empty-value clause, and the latest push reworded the execve comment to state the real skip condition.
What was reviewed:
- Empty-slice path through the getters:
Bun__getEnvValuereturns true for"",toStringCopyyields a null WTF::String andjsStringturns that into the empty string — same as the generic getter does for every other variable. - Remaining consumers of the old undefined-for-empty read:
tls.tscompares against"0"(unchanged either way),loadEnvFilenow keeps""instead of overwriting it, and no otherlen == 0value check remains inJSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp. - Existing suite: no assertion depended on an empty TZ/NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED/BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH reading undefined; the pre-existing empty-TZ execve test keeps its assertions and only its comment changed.
- New tests spread
bunEnv, drain all pipes withPromise.all, assert combined{stdout, stderr, exitCode}objects, and cover env/.env sources, loadEnvFile both states, child_process/Bun.spawn/Bun.$, four worker env modes and three execve env shapes.
Extended reasoning...
The diff removes || value.len == 0 from the TZ, NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED and BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH custom getters in src/jsc/bindings/JSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp, rewrites two one-line comments in src/js/builtins/ProcessObjectInternals.ts and src/jsc/bindings/BunProcess.cpp, and adds tests across three files with no existing assertions weakened. It touches process.env, which feeds the TLS rejectUnauthorized default, but the only JS consumer (src/js/node/tls.ts) compares against "0" so an empty string and undefined behave identically there, and the native launch-time application is untouched. The source change is three identical one-token deletions that bring the accessors in line with the generic getter at line 275 of the same file, the test matrix is broad and hermetic, no CODEOWNERS entry covers the changed paths, and the only prior inline comment (from this bot) was addressed by the comment rewrite in the newest commit. The hunt ran to dry_streak with no findings.
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Fixes #44379
Problem
process.env.TZ,.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZEDand.BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCHreadundefinedwhen the variable is set to"".Object.keys(process.env)still lists them. Node.js reads"".Workerthen reads the string"undefined".process.loadEnvFile()overwrites the value, and child processes do not get the variable.|| value.len == 0in the three getters insrc/jsc/bindings/JSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp. fix zero length env var values #3496 removed the same clause for all other variables.Fix
undefinedonly when the variable is not set.Bun__getEnvValuealready reports an empty value as present.undefinedskip inprocess.execvestays: a non-UTF-8 name, or$NAMEwhileNAMEis not set, still readsundefined.process.test.js,process-execve.test.tsandworker_threads.test.ts. 11 fail on bun 1.4.3-canary.1. All pass with this change.Background
CustomAccessorproperties ofprocess.env: a native getter runs on each read.TZandNODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED. That also changes"TZ" in process.envand the descriptor, so it waits for a maintainer decision.Downsides
TZ=now passesTZ=to its children, as Node.js does. Before, they got noTZ, which libc reads as the system zone, not UTC.TZadds one structure transition toprocess.env(0 to 1). A non-emptyTZalready has it.Notes
Measured (Linux x64, debug build of this branch against bun 1.4.3-canary.1+367d939d9 and Node.js v26.3.0)
in,hasOwn, descriptor kind,Object.keys, spread,JSON.stringify,Object.entries, aWorker(default env, default env after a read,SHARE_ENV, the main thread afterSHARE_ENV),process.loadEnvFile,child_process.spawnSync(default env,env: process.env, a spread) and theprocess.execveimage.inandhasOwnaretruewhen the name is not set (6 cells).TZ1/0/0 to 1/1/0.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZEDandBUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH0/0/0 to 0/0/0.put,deleteProperty, the setters or the Windows write and delete hooks.e6621c3268: 0 conflict regions (git merge-fileonJSEnvironmentVariableMap.cpp,BunProcess.cppandprocess.test.js). The merged TZ getter returns""and adds no property on a read.perfis not permitted on this machine (perf_event_paranoidis 4).Tests
process.test.js: reads from the environment and from.env(read,Bun.env,import.meta.env,Object.keys, spread,JSON.stringify),process.loadEnvFilekeeps the empty values,process.loadEnvFilefills in names that are not set, and children inherit the empty values (node:child_process,Bun.spawn({ env: process.env }),Bun.$).worker_threads.test.ts: a worker with the default env (before and after the main thread readsprocess.env),env: process.envandenv: SHARE_ENV.process-execve.test.ts: the new image gets the empty values whenenvis omitted, isprocess.env, or is a spread. One more test keeps theundefinedskip covered with a$-prefixed name.$-prefixed name. They cover code that stays.d7562f260d(Linux x64):test-process-env.js,test-process-env-tz.js,test-process-env-delete.js,test-process-env-symbols.js,test-process-env-deprecation.js,test-process-env-ignore-getter-setter.js,test-process-execve.js,test-process-execve-validation.js,test-process-load-env-file.js,test-worker-process-env-shared.js,test-child-process-env.js,test-vm-access-process-env.js,isolation.test.ts -t "native side effects"andfetch.tls.test.ts -t NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED.worker_threads.test.ts157 pass.process.test.js191 pass, and 2signaltests that time out in the full run pass when run alone.process-execve.test.ts14 pass, and thepthread_createstress test exceeds the 5 s limit on the debug build. None of those three tests readsprocess.env.process.test.jsandworker_threads.test.tspass on the Windows x64 and arm64 lanes. The Windowsprocess.envProxy reads through the same three getters. I did not run Windows locally.Not in this PR
process.execve(path, args, { A: undefined })still reachesexecve. Node.js throwsERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE. The skip cannot go while a non-UTF-8 name, or$NAMEwithNAMEnot set, readsundefined:process.execve(path, args)with the default env would then throw for an argument that the caller did not pass. process: let inline caches work on process.env and process.argv #44356 reads the values by index. The skip can go when no listed name readsundefined."TZ" in process.envistruewhenTZis not set, and the descriptor of the three names is an accessor descriptor. Plain values forTZandNODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZEDfix both for those two names and remove their four native functions.putanddeletePropertyalready apply their side effects by name. process.env: keep the native accessors of TZ, NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED, BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH and the proxy keys away from every object but process.env #42710 and process.env: delete resets native state for proxy vars, BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH and launch-time TZ, and later writes stay live #35003 change the same functions.BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCHstays not enumerable when it was not set at launch and a program assigns it. process.env: delete resets native state for proxy vars, BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH and launch-time TZ, and later writes stay live #35003 changes that.process.loadEnvFilecompares withundefined, so a line such astoString=xin the file is not applied.process.env["$NAME"]reads the value ofNAME, orundefinedwhenNAMEis not set. The native lookup strips a leading$(Loader::getinsrc/dotenv/env_loader.rs). Node.js reads the value of$NAME.process.execvewith the default env then passes$NAME=<value of NAME>.Workergets the string"undefined"for a listed name that readsundefined($NAMEwithNAMEnot set, or a non-UTF-8 name). The default env copy inJSWorker.cppand theSHARE_ENVseed turn the value into a string.structuredClone(process.env)throwsDataCloneErroron Windows, whereprocess.envis a Proxy.test-process-env.jsalready records that gap, so the new tests do not clone.no test proof · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/process/process.test.js, test/js/node/process/process-execve.test.ts