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Add Trustabl Agent Scanner to CI #275

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Add Trustabl Agent Scanner to CI #275

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17 changes: 17 additions & 0 deletions .github/workflows/trustabl.yml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
name: Trustabl
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:

permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
pull-requests: write

jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: trustabl/trustabl-action@v0

@cubic-dev-ai cubic-dev-ai Bot Aug 6, 2026

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P2: The workflow grants the repository write permissions (security-events: write, pull-requests: write) to a third-party action pinned by a mutable @v0 tag rather than a commit SHA. A tag can be force-updated or the upstream repo compromised, and any code the action then runs does so with repo write access. Pin the action to a full commit SHA (and add a comment noting the verified version) to keep the supply chain deterministic.

Prompt for AI agents 
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At .github/workflows/trustabl.yml, line 17:

<comment>The workflow grants the repository write permissions (`security-events: write`, `pull-requests: write`) to a third-party action pinned by a mutable `@v0` tag rather than a commit SHA. A tag can be force-updated or the upstream repo compromised, and any code the action then runs does so with repo write access. Pin the action to a full commit SHA (and add a comment noting the verified version) to keep the supply chain deterministic.</comment>

<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: trustabl/trustabl-action@v0
</file context>

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