tls: report a handshake that the peer left, and reset the chain check for a renegotiation by robobun · Pull Request #44021 · oven-sh/bun

robobun · 2026-09-26T01:13:53Z

Follow-up to #43947.

Problem

A node:tls server socket calls end() during its handshake, and the peer then closes. The server emits no tlsClientError. Node emits tlsClientError ECONNRESET.
A TLS 1.2 client calls end(), and the server then asks for a renegotiation. The client emits secureConnect twice: ssl_peer_chain_checked (packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c) is set once for a socket, so the refused renegotiation reports the check of the first handshake.
Four tests of tls: our own FIN does not fail a handshake that is still running #43947 did not split the server's flight.

Fix

net.ts gets node's onSocketClose rule: an accepted socket that closes with no error while the server still owns it reports tlsClientError ("socket hang up").
ssl_renegotiate clears ssl_peer_chain_checked.
The test relay delivers each chunk behind the client's FIN, in pieces.
Verified: 5 new tests fail on main. Node v26.3.0 passes 35 of 35 in node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts. Self-reviewed: 3 concerns raised, 2 addressed.

Background

_controlReleased is true once the server emitted secureConnection.
The loop closes a socket that sent its FIN and gets the peer's FIN with no TLS step (loop.c).
Considered a report from that branch of loop.c. It made 8 tests fail: a wrapped socket with no server closes with no error.

Downsides

A tls.Server now emits tlsClientError for a socket that it destroys with no error before the handshake completes. Node does the same.
A Bun.listen or Bun.connect socket that shut down gets close and no handshake call when its peer leaves.
Cost: 1 'close' listener for each accepted TLS socket, 1 store for each renegotiation. Release .text (58301813 B) and stripped bun (80995912 B) do not change.

Notes

Cases

A node:tls server socket calls end() after the ClientHello. The proxy in front of the server holds the client's last flight.

The peer sends	Node v26.3.0	main before #43947	main (`caa197e`)	This PR
its FIN	`close`, `tlsClientError ECONNRESET`	`close`, no report	`close`, no report	`tlsClientError ECONNRESET`, `close`
half of its flight, then its FIN	the same	`tlsClientError ECONNRESET`, socket `error`, `close` with an error	`close`, no report	`tlsClientError ECONNRESET`, `close`

A TLS 1.2 client calls end() in secureConnect. A proxy holds the client's close_notify and FIN, and the server then asks for a renegotiation.

	Node v26.3.0	main (`caa197e`)	This PR
`secureConnect` events of the client	1	2	1

Mechanism

loop.c has a branch for the peer's FIN on a socket that is shut down ("We got FIN back after sending it"). It calls us_internal_socket_close_raw. us_internal_ssl_close, which reports a handshake that is still pending, does not run.
Before tls: our own FIN does not fail a handshake that is still running #43947 ssl_update_handshake reported a failed handshake from the writable event as soon as the socket had sent its FIN. That report was too early when the peer finished its flight, which is what tls: our own FIN does not fail a handshake that is still running #43947 fixed. It was the only report when the peer left after a part of its flight.
us_cert_verify_cb sets ssl_peer_chain_checked, and only us_internal_ssl_attach cleared it. ssl_renegotiate reports a renegotiation that it refuses through ssl_trigger_handshake(s, 0). On a socket that sent its close_notify, ssl_failed_handshake_verify_error then read the SSL because the bit was still set. net.ts reads a failed handshake with an X509 code as an established session.

The two tests that pin the verify reader of #43947

They pass on main and with this PR. No test ran these two branches before.

getAuthorizationError() before the handshake reports, on a socket that shut down: UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT. The SSL has no certificate to show.
A handshake that fails after shutdown() with a chain that it read: handshake(false, UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE).

Measurements

Release builds of main (caa197e) and of this PR: .text 58301813 B both (size -A), stripped bun 80995912 B both. us_internal_ssl_on_data, which holds the inlined ssl_renegotiate, grows from 2651 to 2655 B.
Per accepted TLS socket: 1 more 'close' listener, which reads 2 fields. Per renegotiation: 1 store. A handshake on a client, and every socket that is not a tls.Server socket, pays nothing.

Not in this PR

The new rule runs where initAcceptedTLSSocket runs: for a socket that a tls.Server accepts (an Http2SecureServer is one), and for a socket that server.emit("connection") injects. It does not run for a raw socket that an Http2SecureServer upgrades (_http2_upgrade.ts), and not for https.Server, which is not a tls.Server in Bun.
A renegotiation that is refused on a socket that did not shut down is not changed: ssl_failed_handshake_verify_error looks at ssl_peer_chain_checked only on a socket that shut down. With a server that asks 4 times, the client still emits one more secureConnect for the request that it refuses, and then closes with no error. A build that is older than tls: our own FIN does not fail a handshake that is still running #43947 does the same.
Bun.listen and Bun.connect report nothing for a handshake that the peer left on a socket that shut down. The socket gets close.
A TLS client over a Duplex reports a handshake that failed with a protocol error as secureConnect. That is in 1.4.2 too. node:tls: report the fatal TLS alert when a handshake over a Duplex fails #32929 has the fix.
tls: drop the handshake records that are sealed after our own FIN #43957 drops the records that a socket seals after its FIN.

Self-review

Rejected, with the reason:

Split the rule of net.ts from the reset of the bit and from the test repairs. Both production parts fix a regression of the same merged PR, each has its own test that fails on main, and together they are 12 lines.

Tests

test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts: 4 new tests, the two cases under TLS 1.2 and under TLS 1.3. All four fail on main with a timeout, because the report never comes. With the repaired relay the four client tests with the flight in two reads fail on the tree before tls: our own FIN does not fail a handshake that is still running #43947 and pass on main.
test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts: 1 new test. It fails on main with 2 secureConnect events.
test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts: 1 new test and 1 extended test for the verify reader. The test of the rejecting client now fails with an assertion, not with a timeout.
test/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.ts: the test of the pending SNICallback now fails with an assertion, not with a timeout.
test/js/node/tls/ and test/js/bun/net/ together: 794 tests, 8 failures. Each of the 8 also fails or times out on main on the test machine, which had a load average above 200 during the run: 4 tests that wait for a garbage collection or for workers, should not call drain before handshake (needs www.example.com), a cluster test, and 2 tests that pass when they run alone.
node-tls-raw-end.test.ts and node-tls-wrapped-socket-close.test.ts pass.

no test proof · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.ts, test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts

… for a renegotiation - node:tls: an accepted socket that closes with no error while the server still owns it reports 'tlsClientError' (socket hang up), like node's onSocketClose. A socket that called end() while its handshake ran lost that report when its peer left. - ssl_renegotiate clears ssl_peer_chain_checked. A renegotiation that was refused after our close_notify reported the certificate check of the first handshake, and the client emitted 'secureConnect' twice. - Tests: the TCP relay of the client tests delivers the server's flight behind the client's FIN, in pieces. Two tests fail with an assertion where they could only time out. Two tests pin what the verify reader answers on a socket that shut down.

robobun · 2026-09-26T01:15:32Z

^{Updated 12:28 PM PT - Sep 26th, 2026}

✅ @robobun, your commit 153a582e2fdc4680d79492d4f93fdc5b939629ee passed in Build #121020! 🎉

🧪 To try this PR locally:

bunx bun-pr 44021

That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-44021 executable, so you can run:

bun-44021 --bun

robobun · 2026-09-26T01:37:34Z

Status

How to reproduce, on main (caa197e):

bun bd test test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts -t "asks for a renegotiation" fails: the client emits secureConnect twice.
bun bd test test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts -t "its peer left" fails 4 of 4 tests: the server never emits tlsClientError. node --test passes 35 of 35 in that file.

With this PR all of them pass. This PR is the follow-up to #43947, which is merged.

coderabbitai · 2026-09-26T17:57:23Z

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test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts
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Walkthrough

Accepted TLS sockets now report eligible closes as tlsClientError events. The changes also reset certificate-chain state during renegotiation and add tests for TLS shutdown, verification, and disconnect event ordering.

Changes

Accepted TLS socket close handling

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Report TLS errors on accepted socket close `src/js/node/net.ts`, `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`, `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.ts`	Accepted TLS sockets emit `tlsClientError` with `ECONNRESET` when they close without an error and before control is released, unless a TLS error was already reported. Tests cover disconnects during TLS handshakes and refusal and close event ordering. The duplex proxy now forwards post-FIN server data in ordered pieces.

TLS client shutdown and renegotiation

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Reset certificate-chain state for renegotiation `packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`, `test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts`	`ssl_renegotiate` clears `ssl_peer_chain_checked`. A TLS 1.2 test checks client events when the server requests renegotiation after the client ends its write side.
Check authorization state during TLS shutdown `test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts`	Tests check handshake reports, close events, and authorization-error values before and after shutdown. A TLS 1.2 case holds the untrusted server flight until the client sends FIN.

Suggested reviewers: jarred-sumner

Priority: ⬇️ Low

Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to 153a5

No confirmed issue remains that would prevent merging after normal checks.

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✅ Passed checks (4 passed)

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Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly summarizes both primary changes: reporting a peer-left TLS handshake and resetting the certificate-chain check during renegotiation.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description provides detailed problem, fix, background, downsides, test coverage, and verification information. It does not use the exact template headings, but it includes the required content an…

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Inline comments:
In `@test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts`:
- Around line 479-480: Update the port-reading logic in the TLS renegotiation
test to accumulate stdout chunks until a newline is received before parsing the
port, then release the reader lock. Handle the stream ending before the port
line is complete so the test does not parse an incomplete value.

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packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c
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test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts
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test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts

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claude

Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.

Additional findings (outside the current diff — GitHub can't attach inline comments there):

🟣 packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c — pre-existing: a node:tls client whose server asks for one renegotiation too many still gets a second 'secureConnect' and then a silent close, with no error. The new ssl_peer_chain_checked = 0 at openssl.c:1966 only changes the report for a socket that already shut down; on an open socket the refused renegotiation at openssl.c:1978 still reports the SSL's cached X509 verdict of the first handshake, which net.ts:495-521 reads as an established session. Fix: a refused renegotiation should report a distinct failure (an EPROTO/renegotiation-limit error, or the empty verdict) on every socket state, not only after shutdown, so onClientHandshake never emits 'secureConnect' for it.

Why this was flagged

A TLS 1.2 client (tls.connect or Bun.connect over TCP) whose server sends a 4th HelloRequest inside the 600 s window, or whose SSL_renegotiate fails, reaches ssl_renegotiate at openssl.c:1977-1984, which calls ssl_trigger_handshake(s, 0). That goes to ssl_failed_handshake_verify_error at openssl.c:1830: the shutdown gate at openssl.c:1831 is false for an open socket, so us_internal_ssl_verify_error returns the SSL's verify result, X509_V_OK for a trusted chain, which the Rust dispatch turns into a null error (socket_body.rs:1927-1934). onClientHandshake at src/js/node/net.ts:487 then sees success=false, verifyError=null and writableFinished=false, so none of the early returns at net.ts:488-518 fire; it sets _secureEstablished and emits 'secureConnect' a second time at net.ts:562, after which us_internal_ssl_on_data closes the socket at openssl.c:2540 with no error. The base branch behaves the same; this PR fixes only the shut-down socket (renegotiation.test.ts:447), and its description says the open-socket case is unchanged. A user with an 'on("secureConnect")' listener that writes a…

Verification: pre-existing; acknowledged in diff: the PR description's "Not in this PR" section states "A renegotiation that is refused on a socket that did not shut down is not changed: ssl_failed_handshake_verify_error looks at ssl_peer_chain_checked only on a socket that shut down" — that claim is accurate, and the base branch reaches the same misreport by the same route. Triggering condition: a TLS…

claude

Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.

The port-read fix in 9eac367 addresses my earlier inline note. Beyond the inline finding on this push, I also checked the double-report path in src/js/node/net.ts: a handshake that fails after the peer leaves sets kerrorEmitted before the socket's 'close' fires, so onSocketTLSClose stays silent there; and the new ssl_peer_chain_checked reset in ssl_renegotiate has one sibling clear (us_internal_ssl_attach) and one reader (ssl_failed_handshake_verify_error), both consistent with the reset.

Extended reasoning...

The change adds a 'close' listener on server-accepted TLS sockets in src/js/node/net.ts that emits tlsClientError ECONNRESET when the socket closes without error before control was released, and clears ssl_peer_chain_checked in ssl_renegotiate in packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c; the rest is test additions and relay rework. It touches TLS handshake reporting, a security-adjacent surface, though no verification logic changes. The prior inline finding was addressed by the latest commit; the remaining inline finding is a test-matrix nit.

claude

Code review completed

Nothing new to post: everything this review found is already covered by existing comments on this pull request or didn't merit a separate one.

robobun · 2026-09-28T19:53:13Z

@robobun wake up!!

Jarred-Sumner · 2026-09-28T20:38:37Z

@robobun wake up!!

robobun · 2026-09-28T21:36:36Z

I am awake. The state:

This PR: head 153a582 passed CI in build 121020. No review thread is open. It waits for a review.
tls: drop the handshake records that are sealed after our own FIN #43957 (the TLS 1.2 flight fix): head 347293f passed CI in build 120832. No review thread is open. It waits for a review.
main is 17 commits ahead of the base of this PR. In that range, node:http: the server follows Node (request body, framing, response finish, lifecycle) #43557 changed openssl.c, loop.c, socket.c and net.ts. A trial merge of main (a4f1429) with both PRs has no conflict, in either order, and gives the same tree.

I now build that trial merge and run the five test files of the two PRs on it. I will post the result here.

If you need something else from me, tell me what it is.

robobun · 2026-09-29T00:25:12Z

Result of the trial merge: main a4f1429 with this PR and #43957, debug build with ASAN, Linux x64. The machine had a load average of 300 to 700, so I ran each file with --timeout 60000.

Test file	Result
`test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts`	22 pass
`test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`	38 pass
`test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`	87 pass, 18 skip
`test/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.ts`	97 pass, 2 fail. The 2 pass when they run alone.
`test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts`	112 pass, 6 skip, 1 fail
`test/js/node/tls/tls-syscall-fault.test.ts` (changed by #43557)	14 pass
`test/js/node/tls/node-tls-raw-end.test.ts`	4 pass
`test/js/node/tls/node-tls-wrapped-socket-close.test.ts`	15 pass

The failures are not from these PRs:

should work with getCertificate and should receive data set their own deadlines of 1 s and 2 s. They are tests of main. Under this load they missed the deadline in the full run.
should not call drain before handshake connects to www.example.com. This machine has no DNS for it (getaddrinfo EAI_AGAIN).

This PR and #43957 can merge in either order, and neither needs a rebase after the other. I did not push. The heads and their CI results are the same as before.

…r end() (#44290) Regression from #42181 (in no release). Merge before 1.4.3 is tagged, and before #43957 and #43962. ### Problem - After `end()` during its handshake, a node:tls client accepts a trusted certificate for another name: no error, and it reads the server's data. Node and Bun 1.4.2 report `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. - `on_handshake` (`src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs`) passed its name verdict to the handler as the success flag. After `end()`, `onClientHandshake` (`src/js/node/net.ts:496`) reads a failure with no error as the client's own close and skips `checkServerIdentity`. ### Fix - `on_handshake` no longer runs the native name check for a node:tls socket. The handler's flag is the handshake result. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not change. - Verified: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`, 19 new tests. `main` fails 18. Node v26.3.0 passes 49, skips 1. - Self-reviewed: 10 concerns raised, 10 addressed. One is #44422 (`onClientHandshake` reads some failed handshakes as established). ### Background - node:tls checks the name in JS (`checkServerIdentity`), on sockets that `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY` marks. The native check ran for them: another name gave `(false, null)`, like a handshake that fails after this side's FIN. - Considered a `getAuthorizationError()` test in the guard, or a second flag variable: both keep an unused native check. ### Downsides - Needs a maintainer's yes: the internal `socket._handle.authorized` and `getAuthorizationError()` of a node:tls client drop the name check (no reader in `src/js` or `test`). The public values do not change. - Still open (#43957): only the first such connection of a process reports if its server keeps its side open. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **The regression** (`tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. Trusted chain, certificate for another name, server in the same process, 3 runs each) | Runtime | Output | |---|---| | Node v26.3.0 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.4.2 (744846f) | `error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.3.13 | `end, finish, error ECONNRESET, close` | | canary 1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939, has #42181) | `finish, end, close`, no error | | this PR | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | - #42181 (44e51b7) is on `main` and is not an ancestor of the tag `bun-v1.4.2`. The client handler at that tag has no such guard. **Merge order, and why** - This PR first. Both later PRs let more handshakes complete after `end()`, and on `main` each of those accepts a certificate for another name. - #43957 removes the engine defect that today keeps the second and later connections of a process from completing such a handshake. Merged before this PR, it turns one silently accepted connection into all of them. Measured with five connections in one process (`tls.connect({ socket })`, another name, server keeps its side open): on `main` 1 of 5 handshakes completes, and the client reports no error for it. On `main` with the source change of #43957, 5 of 5 complete with no error. - #43962 sends a client's FIN after its ClientHello. It contains this PR's commits. - With #43957 only the test file conflicts: both PRs insert a block. Keep both. **Where the native check came from** - #31339 added the native name check for all clients. - #32359 proposed to remove it and was closed for #33755. #33755 added `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`: the check stayed enforced for `Bun.connect`, and for node:tls it was computed but not enforced. It took node:tls sockets out of `reject_unauthorized` and out of the error argument. - #42181 then added the guard for "failed after our own FIN", which is the same pair as "computed, another name". - #43863 says "Each connection has one server name check", and lists node:tls as "checked after the handshake, in JS". - This PR is the node:tls half of #32359. It does not touch the check for `Bun.connect`. - #43865, #43924 and #43947 are the fixes of the chain check in the same test file. **What the client handler gets from the fd engine** (`packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`) `on_handshake` calls the handler with `(socket, flag, error)`. For a node:tls client: | Case | Before | Now | |---|---|---| | Handshake completed, chain and name good | `true, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain good, another name | `false, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain bad | `true, X509 error` | `true, X509 error` | | Chain refused inside the handshake | `false, X509 error` | `false, X509 error` | | Handshake failed after this side's FIN | `false, null` | `false, null` | | Handshake failed with a TLS reason | `false, EPROTO` | `false, EPROTO` | | The peer closed before the handshake finished | `false, ECONNRESET` | `false, ECONNRESET` | - Row 2 and row 5 were the same pair. The guard that #42181 added for row 5 also caught row 2 once the client had ended. - With no `end()`, row 2 already reached `checkServerIdentity`, because the guard tests `writableFinished`. So a client that does not end behaves as before. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not carry `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`. Their flag is `authorized`, as documented. **Rows that this PR does not change** The engine for a Duplex, a named pipe and TLS inside TLS (`SSLWrapper`, `src/uws/lib.rs`) reports no TLS reason. A failed handshake arrives as `(false, null)` after a verified chain and as `(false, X509 code)` otherwise. `onClientHandshake` reads both as an established session unless the client rejects the code. Measured on this PR with a client over a Duplex that does not call `end()`: | The peer answers the ClientHello with | `rejectUnauthorized` | `main`, Bun 1.4.2 and this PR | Node v26.3.0 | |---|---|---|---| | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `true` | `error UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, close` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | bytes that are not TLS | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER, close` | | a `close_notify` alert | either | no event | `end, error ECONNRESET, close` | - These rows are older than this PR: Bun 1.4.2 prints them too. The native socket is marked unusable after a failed handshake (`transport_unusable` in `on_handshake`). - Owners: #32929 (the engine reports the fatal alert over a Duplex), #44223 and #44021 (a refused renegotiation). - #44422 makes a handshake that did not complete terminal in `onClientHandshake`, as it is in the server handler. This PR is the step before it: while `(false, null)` could be a completed handshake, that arm could not go. It stays out of this PR so that this PR can land, or be reverted, alone. **What the native handle of a node:tls client reports** (trusted chain, another name, `rejectUnauthorized: false`, measured) | Value | `main` | This PR | |---|---|---| | `socket.authorized` | `false` | `false` | | `socket.authorizationError` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | | `socket._handle.authorized` | `false` | `true` | | `socket._handle.getAuthorizationError()` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `null` | - The native check for these sockets had three effects on `main`: the flag in row 2 above, and the two internal values. - The in-handshake check (`server_identity`) already left node:tls sockets out. Both sites now agree. - `Flags::HOSTNAME_MISMATCH` has no reader on `main`. This PR does not remove it. - The hunk that stops the native check came from an optional finding of an automated review. No person has reviewed it yet. **Measured** (Linux x64, debug builds, Node v26.3.0, server in its own Node process, 40 s watchdog) `tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. The chain is trusted, the certificate is for another name, `rejectUnauthorized: true`: | Server | TLS | Node | `main` (d115f54) | This PR | |---|---|---|---|---| | keeps its side open | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish, end, close`, no error | same as Node | | keeps its side open | 1.2 | `finish`, never exits | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.2 | `finish, end, error ECONNRESET, close` | same as Node | same as Node | - `end()` in the same tick and `end()` one `setImmediate` later give the same lines. - In the new tests the handshake completes after the client's `end()` under TLS 1.2 and over a Duplex as well. There `main` delivers `secret-banner` to a client with `rejectUnauthorized: true`. - A client that passes its own `checkServerIdentity` is asked: one test asserts the name that it gets, and `authorized=true` when it accepts. **Still open, the engine** - Each line of the table above is the first connection of its process. Five such connections, one after the other in one process, against a server that keeps its side open: with this PR the first reports and the other four print `finish` only. `main` does the same when the name is good. The flight that the first socket seals after its FIN takes the event loop's one spill slot and never leaves it. #43957 is open for that. - `tls.connect(port)` followed at once by `end()` still sends its FIN before its ClientHello, so no handshake runs there. #43962 changes that order. - #43957 is open for the spill slot. Measured with its source change on this PR: all five connections report, for another name and for a good name. - A handshake that fails after `end()` with no certificate still reports nothing. The tests of #42181 and #43947 for that case pass. **Tests** - 19 new tests against `main`: the name check after `end()` over a Duplex, over TCP behind a record proxy (TLS 1.2 and 1.3) and on a connected `net.Socket` (3 each), `end()` and `end("")` in the turn of `tls.connect()` over a socket that is still connecting and over a Duplex (6), and a resumed session (1, Bun only). - 7 of them are the commit of another branch (`robobun/baba0385/tls-early-end-hostname-check`), taken as it is. The resumed-session test now asserts `isSessionReused()`. - `main` (4b02e10) fails 18 of the 19. The one that passes is `end("")` over a Duplex. **Suites** (this machine ran at a load average of 200 to 800) - On this head: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify` (50 of 50), `node-tls-connect` (121), `tls-reject-before-client-cert` (121), `node-https-agent-checkserveridentity-reuse` (30), `renegotiation` (21), `node-tls-wrapped-socket-close` (15), `node-tls-connect-hostname-verification` (11), `node-tls-upgrade` (5), `node-tls-raw-end` (4), `node-https-checkServerIdentity` (4). - On the head before the rebase: 14 vendored Node tests that use `checkServerIdentity` or the name error, `fetch.tls` (61). `socket.test.ts`, `node-tls-cert` and `node-tls-server` had only failures that `main` has on this machine too (timeouts of child processes, and one test that needs `www.example.com`). - Not run on this machine: macOS, Windows. </details>

Jarred-Sumner · 2026-10-06T06:19:11Z

Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it.

…finished (#44021) A server socket that called end() while the handshake ran, and whose peer then left, closed with no error and the server reported nothing. Node's onSocketClose emits 'tlsClientError' ECONNRESET for any accepted socket that closes without an error while the server still owns it. This is that listener. The relay of endMidHandshakeOverTcp now waits for the client's FIN per chunk, so its `pieces` rows split the server's flight whichever arrives first.

…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>

robobun · 2026-10-16T13:02:42Z

Confirmed. I checked what this PR fixed against main (5866b5f, debug build) and against the 1.4.3 release (c6da4a4).

Defect	main	1.4.3
A server that `end()`s during the handshake emits no `tlsClientError` when its peer leaves	Fixed as written (`onSocketTLSClose` in `net.ts`). The 4 tests of this PR are on main and pass.	The 4 tests fail
A client emits `secureConnect` twice when a renegotiation request follows its own `end()`	Fixed in another way. A refused renegotiation goes to `ssl_fail_established_session`, which never reads the certificate check. Only the first handshake reads `ssl_peer_chain_checked`, so the reset that this PR added is not needed. The test of this PR passes.	The test fails

#44618 merged one day after the 1.4.3 tag, so 1.4.3 has both defects. 1.4.2 fails the same tests.

One gap: the test on main for the second defect uses a trusted chain only, and that case passes on 1.4.3. #45534 adds the untrusted case. It changes tests only.

robobun assigned alii Sep 26, 2026

github-actions Bot added the claude label Sep 26, 2026

robobun mentioned this pull request Sep 26, 2026

tls: our own FIN does not fail a handshake that is still running #43947

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[autofix.ci] apply automated fixes

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github-actions Bot reviewed Sep 26, 2026

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Comment thread src/js/node/net.ts Resolved

node:tls: keep only the reference to node for the close rule

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robobun marked this pull request as ready for review September 26, 2026 17:49

coderabbitai Bot reviewed Sep 26, 2026

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Comment thread test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts Resolved

claude Bot reviewed Sep 26, 2026

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Comment thread test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts Resolved

test: fail with a reason when the server exits before it prints its port

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claude Bot reviewed Sep 26, 2026

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Comment thread test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts Resolved

test: run the tests of a peer that left under TLS 1.2 too

153a582

claude Bot reviewed Sep 26, 2026

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Jarred-Sumner mentioned this pull request Oct 6, 2026

tls: consolidate the open TLS fixes (both engines, node:tls, node:https, WebSocket, SQL) #44618

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Jarred-Sumner closed this Oct 6, 2026

robobun mentioned this pull request Oct 16, 2026

test(tls): cover an untrusted chain for a renegotiation request after end() #45534

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